Eva Taché-Green

A foreign national subject to a removal order was convicted of making, distributing, and possessing child pornography after CBSA officers discovered explicit images of her children on her cell phone during a search incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed her conviction on five grounds, including Charter breaches related to the cell phone search, the reasonableness of the verdict, misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the CBSA search was authorized under section 16(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, that the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, and that the verdict was reasonable on the evidence.

The court also rejected claims of bias.

On sentencing, the court set aside the victim surcharge but otherwise upheld the sentence.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

A 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first degree murder under sections 229(c) and 231(4)(a) of the Criminal Code after a police officer was killed during a traffic stop.

The officer attempted to remove the appellant from a stolen vehicle, became trapped as the vehicle accelerated, and was ejected and killed when the vehicle became airborne.

The appellant claimed he did not intentionally accelerate the vehicle and that pedal misapplication occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's age and level of maturity when assessing whether he knew his dangerous driving was likely to cause death.

The court also found errors regarding the Crown's closing address and the exclusion of a prior consistent statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 40-month sentence.

He was self-represented at trial and argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, rendering the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and that the trial judge provided extensive assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 40-month sentence fell within the appropriate range for aggravated assault given the appellant's criminal record.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault of a 16-year-old complainant who was intoxicated during a camping trip.

The appellants appealed their convictions on the grounds that the trial judge erred in his analysis of consent and capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to separately consider the issues of consent and capacity, and failed to apply the proper legal framework for determining incapacity due to intoxication.

The court held that the trial judge appeared to equate any degree of impairment with incapacity, which is an error of law.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent following conviction on four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault charges and imposed a total sentence of two and a half years.

The Crown argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and sought a sentence of five years.

The appellate court found that while the sentence could have been higher, it was not manifestly inadequate given the totality of circumstances, including the respondent's age and status as a first offender.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing and killing an 18-year-old victim following a brief altercation.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 13 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: failure to leave the defence of provocation with the jury, failure to provide a rolled-up charge incorporating self-defence, provocation, and intoxication, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.

The appellant also challenged the sentence on three grounds: erroneous finding that the appellant armed himself after being attacked, failure to treat provocation and self-defence as mitigating, and improper focus on lack of remorse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 45 months for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and 12 months consecutive for breach of a firearm prohibition order.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by disregarding principles of totality and parity, engaging in double counting, ignoring mitigating factors, and misapprehending evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence was well within the range for similar offenders and similar offences, and that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant factors.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal of his conviction for aggravated assault.

The trial judge found that the appellant stabbed the victim with a steak knife during a party while very intoxicated.

The Crown conceded the appellant was not a flight risk.

The motions judge dismissed the bail application, finding that detention was necessary in the public interest under section 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The grounds for appeal were not strong, and the seriousness of the offence, combined with the appellant's lengthy criminal record including violent convictions, favoured detention.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of a man leaving a New Year's Eve party.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or his associate, Baptists Bernier, fired the fatal shot.

Bernier testified as a Crown witness after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to murder.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) failure to instruct the jury that Bernier's guilty plea could not be used as evidence against the appellant; (2) failure to give an adequate Vetrovec instruction regarding Bernier's evidence; and (3) failure to adequately relate evidence to the issue of intent for the included offence of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but sought leave to introduce fresh evidence and to appeal his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed without consideration of collateral immigration consequences that arose from amendments to federal immigration legislation introduced after sentencing.

The Crown conceded that had these consequences been known at sentencing, they would have affected the result.

The court granted the fresh evidence application, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the appeal, imposing a suspended sentence with credit for six months less one day of pre-sentence custody and two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence for two counts of possession of morphine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking while incarcerated in a federal penitentiary.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence but did not specify whether it was concurrent or consecutive to the appellant's existing robbery sentence.

The sentencing judge later amended the Information to indicate the sentence was consecutive without notifying or reconvening the parties.

The appellant was released on statutory release based on the concurrent interpretation, but was re-arrested after the amendment.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to amend the sentence, as the amendment was not consistent with the judge's manifest intentions and the failure to notify and reconvene the parties seriously compromised the appearance of fairness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The trial judge found that while the appellant initially acted in self-defence during an altercation with an intruder in his apartment, he went beyond the limits of self-defence by continuing to strike the victim with a metal object after the threat had diminished.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the significant mitigating factors arising from the appellant's initial justification in self-defence and the victim's role as an aggressor and trespasser.

The sentence was reduced from six years to time served (approximately two and one-half years).

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed following his conviction for intimidation, criminal harassment, and two counts of assault.

The appellant did not challenge the validity of the dangerous offender designation but contested the trial judge's decision to impose an indeterminate sentence rather than a long-term supervision order.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence regarding treatment refusal, misapprehension of evidence regarding burnout in aging offenders, application of the wrong test for manageability in the community, and an unfair burden placed on the defence to demonstrate immediately available resources.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence on the grounds that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-trial custody and that such denial constituted an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal found that while the absence of explicit reasons was concerning, the trial judge's decision was justified based on the nature of the manslaughter conviction, the appellant's institutional record showing gratuitous violence, his significant criminal history, and his refusal to address addiction issues.

The court concluded this was a rare case where enhanced credit should not be granted.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered correction of the warrant of committal to reflect 1:1 credit for 1083 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three counts of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking arising from the discovery of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in Scarborough containing approximately 150 kilograms of drugs with a street value of $12 million.

The appellant challenged the verdicts as unreasonable, inconsistent with his acquittal on production charges, and inconsistent with the trial judge's finding that he lacked standing under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of 8 years as manifestly unfit and sought a 12-year sentence with delayed parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed a 12-month prison sentence imposed for fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, an accountant and real estate agent, had prepared 292 false tax returns using clients' personal information without consent between 2009 and 2012, obtaining $35,321 through fraudulent tax refunds while attempting to obtain $343,840.

The sentencing judge rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation as paramount in fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider his offer of restitution.

The Court of Appeal found the failure to consider restitution was an error in principle but held it did not impact the sentence imposed, as restitution must take a secondary role to deterrence and denunciation in large-scale fraud cases involving breaches of trust.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal harassment involving the surreptitious downloading of the victim's cell phone data and threats to distribute intimate photographs, which he subsequently carried out by sending explicit images to the victim's son.

The trial judge rejected a joint sentence submission of 9-12 months and imposed three years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly followed the procedure for rejecting a joint submission as established in R. v. Anthony-Cook and that the three-year sentence was justified given the appellant's extensive criminal record, pattern of violence and harassment, and lack of response to prior interventions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault for anally penetrating a 19-year-old co-worker at a workplace Christmas party without consent.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed on the basis that the sentence was unfit, particularly given that a sentence of six months or more would trigger immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, resulting in loss of the right to appeal a removal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and holding that the trial judge did not err in first determining an appropriate sentence and then considering whether immigration consequences warranted reduction.