Eric Siebenmorgen

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his presence in the group surrounding the victims, disregarded evidence that he was separate from the robbers, and misapprehended evidence about his hat.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence, including the appellant's own admissions, to support the conclusion that he was part of the circle of intimidation and that the conviction was safe.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and corrupting morals, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons for treating the complainant's testimony differently across the charges and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge clearly explained his reasoning for acquitting on the sexual assault count while convicting on the others, and that there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding frailties in the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his prior criminal record if he testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately addressed the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting she properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and appropriately sanitized the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing for a long-term offender designation and a determinate sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's finding that the appellant's risk of sexually re-offending and committing domestic assaults could not be managed in the community, even as he aged.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly credit pre-trial custody and consider his guilty plea and status as an Aboriginal offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the pre-trial custody did not relate to the charge and was aware of the mitigating factors.

Given the seriousness of the offence, the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was defective.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. Rhee and found no reason to interfere with the majority of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the charge was in substantial compliance with the principles articulated in Lifchus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the jury address by Crown counsel was inflammatory and resulted in an unfair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the address was repugnant to the role of Crown counsel, but the majority held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were adequate to prevent an unfair or partial trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving causing death.

After a 22-month pre-trial delay, the trial judge stayed the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay after a 15-month appellate delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-trial delay was not unreasonable given the accommodations made for both parties.

The Court further held that s. 11(b) does not apply to appellate delay, and the appellate delay in this case did not violate s. 7 of the Charter as it was not unreasonable and caused no real prejudice.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault on a child and committed for trial 21 months later.

He successfully applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay 14 months later.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that neither the pre-trial delay nor the appellate delay was unreasonable or caused real prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant challenged both the common law rule allowing the Crown to raise insanity over an accused’s objection and the Criminal Code provision requiring automatic detention of an insanity acquittee pending the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor.

The Court held that the common law rule violated s. 7 because it impermissibly deprived an accused of control over the conduct of the defence, and it reformulated the rule so that the Crown may generally raise insanity only after the trier of fact has otherwise concluded the accused is guilty, or where the accused has put mental capacity in issue.

The Court further held that s. 542(2) was intra vires Parliament’s criminal law power, but violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter because it mandated automatic, arbitrary, and indeterminate detention without a hearing and without standards.

The appeal was allowed, a judicial stay of proceedings was entered, and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for six months with interim detention limits.