Barbara Walker-Renshaw

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and incapacity to consent to treatment for an eating disorder.

Following the hearing, the appellant was discharged, regained capacity, and her community treatment order was terminated.

The respondent moved to admit fresh evidence of these developments and argued the appeal was moot.

The Superior Court allowed the fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal as moot, finding no live controversy or special circumstances to justify hearing it.

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits, as the Board's decisions were reasonable and free of palpable and overriding error.

The defendants in a medical malpractice and wrongful death action brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Family Law Act claims of the deceased's partner, arguing he did not meet the definition of a spouse.

The defendants also moved to remove him as the litigation guardian for the deceased's minor grandchildren.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the partner's spousal status based on conflicting evidence.

The court also dismissed the motion to remove the litigation guardian, finding him qualified, indifferent to the outcome, and not adverse in interest to the minors.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's decision was unreasonable and raised procedural fairness issues regarding the hearing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant was unable to recognize the manifestations of his illness and could not apply relevant information to his own circumstances to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, argued the Board unfairly characterized his evidence and erred in applying the capacity test by focusing on his disagreement with the schizophrenia diagnosis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant lacked capacity because he was unable to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental illness, preventing him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission and finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decisions on a standard of reasonableness.

The court found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant met the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act due to the risk of serious bodily harm to her mother.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the capacity to consent to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, as her delusions prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming an involuntary psychiatric admission and finding the appellant incapable of consenting to certain forms of treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

By the time the appeal was heard, the appellant had been discharged from the treating facility and was under the care of a different physician, with subsequent admissions and new incapacity findings having occurred.

The court concluded there was no longer a live controversy between the parties because the treatment relationship underlying the Board decision had ended.

Applying the mootness principles articulated in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), the court declined to exercise its residual discretion to hear the matter.

The appeal was dismissed as moot, leaving the Board’s earlier decision as the final disposition of the application.