Dickson

The appellant was arrested at an airport ostensibly for outstanding traffic warrants, but was subsequently subjected to a rectal examination which yielded heroin.

The Crown conceded that the appellant's rights under ss. 8 and 10 of the Charter were violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the evidence must be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the search and used the traffic warrants as an artifice, rendering the highly intrusive search a serious Charter violation that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the evidence were admitted.

The appellants' fishing vessel sank at its berth due to the ingress of sea water caused by corroded cap screws and a valve left open.

The marine insurance policy covered 'perils of the sea'.

The trial judge found the loss was fortuitous and covered, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding the sinking was not a foreseeable consequence of the negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a peril of the sea must be fortuitous and of the sea.

The loss was fortuitous because it was not intentional or inevitable, and the failure of the cap screws was due to negligent installation, not ordinary wear and tear or inherent vice.

The Court emphasized that foreseeability of loss is not a necessary condition for recovery under a marine insurance policy.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against his natural daughter.

At trial, the central issue was credibility.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence from the daughter of the accused's common law wife, alleging that the accused had previously engaged in similar sexual misconduct with her after establishing a father-daughter relationship.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was properly admitted.

The Court affirmed that while evidence adduced solely to show propensity is generally inadmissible, similar fact evidence may be admitted if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

In this case, the evidence was highly probative on the issue of credibility.

The respondent, a director of education, was dismissed by the appellant school board on three months' notice without cause.

The respondent sued for wrongful dismissal, alleging a breach of procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the respondent held an office at pleasure and could be dismissed without cause, the board owed him a duty of procedural fairness.

However, the Court found that the duty was met because the respondent knew the reasons for his dismissal and had an opportunity to be heard during negotiations.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment dismissing the action was restored.

Zutphen brought an application in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court to add the Crown as a third party to an action commenced against it by Dywidag.

The chambers judge dismissed the application, rejecting the argument that the Federal Court Act and Crown Liability Act provisions giving the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the Crown violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the decision, finding a s. 15 violation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a corporation cannot avail itself of s. 7 protection, and that the impugned provisions do not constitute discrimination under s. 15(1).

The appellant was investigated for a hit and run accident at his home.

Police informed him of his right to counsel at the outset of the investigation.

Ten minutes later, police made a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was convicted of failing to comply with a breathalyzer demand.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the breathalyzer demand constituted a detention under s. 10 of the Charter.

However, the Court found that the Charter warning given at the beginning of the interview was sufficiently connected to the subsequent detention to satisfy s. 10(b).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing his plea of autrefois acquit.

The Crown had withdrawn two informations after the appellant pleaded not guilty but before any evidence was adduced, and immediately issued a new consolidated information.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the withdrawal was purely technical, did not represent a decision on legal or factual grounds, and occurred before any evidence was adduced, thus not constituting an acquittal.

The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death after driving through a red light and striking another vehicle, resulting in a fatality.

The appellant had been drinking but showed little sign of impairment.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the conduct was not a marked departure from the norm, but made comments suggesting consequences and intention were irrelevant.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial based on these comments.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's finding of reasonable doubt was supported by the facts and the comments did not affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed decisions acquitting the respondents of taking part in an illegal strike.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Act respecting remuneration in the public sector and the Act respecting the conditions of employment in the public sector, arguing that sessional papers forming the essence of the legislation were tabled in French only.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, adopting the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal and holding that the legislation was unconstitutional as it violated the bilingual enactment requirements of s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appellants, A, B, and C, sought an order of certiorari to quash a subpoena compelling A to testify in a criminal trial, or alternatively, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to perceived threats to their security.

B and C were living outside Canada.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that a Charter remedy was not available to persons outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider the safety of the appellants and in finding that remedies were unavailable to persons outside the country in these special circumstances.

A new hearing was directed.

The applicant applied to vary an order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The original order was made on the basis of written material only.

After the refusal, it was brought to the Court's attention that the lower court had relied on a decision that was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Court held that while Rule 50 is narrow and reflects the common law rule of functus officio, Rule 7 empowers the Court to remedy an injustice where the rules are deficient.

The Court concluded it had jurisdiction to reconsider the decision and granted leave to appeal to the applicant.

The appellant was charged with conspiracy to import a narcotic after his conversations with an undercover police officer and an informer were surreptitiously recorded without judicial authorization, but with the consent of the officer and informer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Criminal Code exception for participant surveillance is not unconstitutional per se, the state's use of participant surveillance without prior judicial authorization violates the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith based on the law as it was understood at the time, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic after a police informer recorded their conversations using a body pack without judicial authorization.

The appellant appealed, arguing the electronic surveillance violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while participant electronic surveillance without prior judicial authorization infringes section 8, the admission of the recordings in this case would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a Chief Fire Prevention Officer, was mandatorily retired at age 60 pursuant to a collective agreement.

He filed a human rights complaint alleging age discrimination.

The Board of Inquiry found the mandatory retirement was a reasonable occupational qualification under the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, applying the Etobicoke test.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that individualized testing should have been considered and that the union violated the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the Board's decision that the mandatory retirement policy was justified and that the union did not discriminate.

The appellant newspaper challenged Alberta legislation restricting publication of details from matrimonial proceedings and pre-trial civil materials.

The Supreme Court of Canada held, by majority, that s. 30(1) and (2) infringed freedom of expression and were not justified under s. 1 because the restrictions were overly broad and insufficiently tailored to privacy and fair trial objectives.

The court emphasized the constitutional importance of the open court principle and the press's role in informing the public about judicial proceedings.

The majority did not find it necessary to decide the s. 15 issue.

The respondent owners hired contractors to build a retaining wall.

The contractors obtained a building permit from the appellant municipality based on a rudimentary and inadequate sketch.

The municipality issued the permit but relied on on-site inspections to ensure compliance.

The owners and contractors failed to notify the municipality when the project reached the stage requiring inspection.

The wall later cracked and collapsed, causing damage.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the municipality owed a duty of care to the owner-builders, despite their failure to give notice, because the municipality had issued a permit based on an obviously deficient design.

Liability was apportioned 70% to the municipality and 30% to the owners.

The appellant was subjected to a warrantless "frisk" search for drugs based on an informant's tip.

The police found speed and then arrested the appellant, advising him of his right to counsel.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the search unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant was detained and his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated by the delay in informing him, the search itself was reasonable under s. 8.

The Court further held that the real evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was severely injured and his daughter killed when a boulder fell onto their car on a provincial highway.

He sued the province for negligent highway maintenance.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed the action, finding the province's system of rock slope inspections was a policy decision immune from tort liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the province owed a duty of care to highway users and that the manner and frequency of inspections were operational decisions, not true policy decisions.

A new trial was ordered to determine if the province met the requisite standard of care.

The appellants' basement was flooded and sustained substantial damage due to a blocked storm sewer operated by the respondent municipality.

The trial judge allowed the appellants' claim in nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding no negligence and applying the defence of statutory authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while Rylands v. Fletcher did not apply, the flooding constituted an actionable nuisance.

The Court found that the defence of statutory authority was not available to the municipality, as the authorizing legislation was permissive and the municipality failed to establish that the nuisance was the inevitable consequence of its statutory mandate.