Dickson

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the respondent, attributing dividends paid to his wife on her Class B shares to his income under s. 56(2) of the Income Tax Act.

The dividends were declared pursuant to a discretionary dividend clause in the company's Articles of Incorporation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the discretionary dividend clause was valid under corporate law and did not violate the common law presumption of equality among shares.

The Court further held that s. 56(2) generally does not apply to dividend payments, and the dividends paid to the wife were a legitimate return on her investment and contribution to the company, not a tax avoidance scheme.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant residents association challenged a municipal rezoning that permitted a condominium development, arguing that a municipal councillor who had previously supported the development was disqualified by a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the strict test for reasonable apprehension of bias does not apply to municipal councillors acting in their legislative capacity, unless they have a personal interest.

A councillor is only disqualified for prejudgment if their mind is so closed that any representations would be futile.

The Court also found that the rezoning application complied with statutory requirements and conformed to the city's development plan.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant suffered severe spinal injuries when a pleasure craft he was on struck rocks in tidal waters.

He sued the respondents in tort.

The respondents sought to limit their liability under ss. 647 and 649 of the Canada Shipping Act.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of these provisions, arguing they fell under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are intra vires Parliament as they are in pith and substance legislation in respect to Canadian maritime law, which extends to torts committed on navigable waters, including those involving pleasure craft.

The appellant was charged with trafficking in a narcotic.

During his trial, defence counsel sought to cross-examine a police officer in a manner that would reveal the identity of a police informer.

The Crown objected and stayed the proceedings under s. 508 of the Criminal Code to protect the informer's identity, subsequently recommencing the proceedings.

The appellant argued this constituted an abuse of process and that the second trial judge's refusal to allow the cross-examination, issue a material witness warrant, or reopen the case to hear a witness on entrapment denied him the right to make full answer and defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown acted properly to protect the informer's identity and that the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary rulings.

The appellant union sought a successorship declaration after a unionized construction company set up a parallel non-unionized company to bid on non-union projects, a practice known as double breasting.

The Labour Relations Board granted the declaration, finding a disposition of business had occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was patently unreasonable because there was no evidence of a transfer or disposition of assets, work, or expertise from the unionized company to the non-unionized company.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the quashing of the Board's order.

The accused was convicted of failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

A new trial was ordered on appeal.

At the second trial, the Crown cross-examined the accused on inconsistencies between his current testimony and his testimony at the first trial to impeach his credibility.

The accused was convicted again, but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination violated s. 13 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that using a prior inconsistent statement from a former proceeding solely to impugn the credibility of an accused does not incriminate that person and therefore does not violate s. 13.

The appellant college and respondent faculty association were parties to a collective agreement containing a mandatory retirement clause at age 65.

Two faculty members filed a grievance challenging the clause under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The arbitrator held in a preliminary award that the college was a Crown agency subject to the Charter and that the collective agreement constituted 'law'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the college's appeal, holding that the college is a Crown agency performing acts of government, making its actions subject to the Charter.

The Court further held that an arbitration board has jurisdiction under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to determine Charter issues arising in the course of exercising its statutory mandate.

The respondents were retired at age 65 pursuant to the university's mandatory retirement policy.

They sought declarations that the policy violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and that the definition of 'age' in the provincial Human Rights Act, which restricted protection to those under 65, also violated s. 15(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter does not apply to the university as it is not 'government' under s. 32.

The Court further held that while the age restriction in the Human Rights Act violates s. 15(1), it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit.

The police installed a video camera without prior judicial authorization to monitor activities in a hotel room registered to the appellant, suspecting it was being used as a common gaming house.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the video surveillance violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding s. 8 was not violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless video surveillance violated the appellant's reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court concluded that the admission of the videotape evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith based on a reasonable misunderstanding of the law prior to the Charter's full development in this area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The police conducted a warrantless perimeter search of the appellant's residence based on suspicion of marijuana cultivation.

During the search, they detected the odour of marijuana and heard electrical humming, which provided the grounds to obtain a search warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the warrantless perimeter search was a trespass and violated the appellant's rights under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court further held that the evidence obtained from the subsequent warranted search must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was a flagrant violation of constitutional rights and its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault based in part on wiretap evidence.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without opening the sealed packet.

The Court of Appeal opened and edited the packet but denied the appellant the right to cross-examine the affiant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellant had established a basis to cross-examine the affiant because the affidavit was misleading regarding the use of a police informant, which bore directly on whether other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications.

The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence.

The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.

The respondent, declared a criminal sexual psychopath in 1953, served almost 37 years in prison under an indeterminate sentence.

Despite numerous psychiatric recommendations for his supervised release and the unavailability of necessary treatment, the National Parole Board repeatedly denied him parole based on minor infractions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the dangerous offender provisions are constitutional, the Parole Board erred in applying the statutory criteria for release.

The inordinate length of the respondent's incarceration had become grossly disproportionate to his circumstances, violating his right against cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming his release.

The appellants sought judicial review of a decision by the Canadian Import Tribunal, which found that the subsidization of U.S. grain corn caused material injury to Canadian producers.

The Tribunal interpreted the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) in light of the GATT Subsidies Code, considering potential imports as well as actual imports.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the applications for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Tribunal's interpretation of its constitutive legislation was not patently unreasonable and that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to consult the GATT in interpreting SIMA.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit extortion and related offences.

Following their committal, their trial was delayed for almost two years, primarily due to institutional problems and a lack of resources in the judicial district.

The appellants moved for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the delay was clearly excessive and unreasonable, establishing a framework for assessing s. 11(b) claims that considers the length of delay, explanation for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was directed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine.

At trial, he claimed he only pretended to participate in the conspiracy to regain the affections of his former mistress.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant on why he had not disclosed this defence to authorities upon his arrest.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to ignore these questions and answers, despite an undertaking to do so.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The failure to instruct the jury caused irreparable prejudice that could not be cured by the proviso in section 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to import marijuana based on private communications intercepted under three judicial authorizations.

The authorizations included a 'resort to' clause permitting interception at any place in British Columbia resorted to by the named persons, which the police used to tap public pay telephones and surreptitiously enter residential premises.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the 'resort to' clauses were lawful under the Criminal Code, the failure to include minimizing conditions for public pay telephones and the surreptitious entry into private dwellings without specific authorization violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) because the police acted in good faith based on the law as it was understood at the time, and dismissed the appeal.

The parties separated after a 25-year marriage.

The respondent had retired from the armed forces and was receiving monthly pension payments.

The trial judge included the pension as a matrimonial asset and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant half of the future monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, finding the pension was income, not a matrimonial asset.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that pensions are matrimonial assets subject to equal division under the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act.

The Court found no operational conflict between the provincial property legislation and the federal Canadian Forces Superannuation Act's prohibition against alienation.

The respondent and an accomplice committed a break and enter during which the accomplice shot and killed two people.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(a) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective foresight of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1 of the Charter, and the appeal by the Crown was dismissed.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder after an accomplice shot and killed a victim they had kidnapped for ransom.

The trial judge instructed the jury on constructive murder under s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal struck down s. 213(a) based on R. v. Vaillancourt and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 213(a) violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1, for the reasons given in R. v. Martineau.

The Court also declined to apply the curative proviso, as a properly instructed jury would not necessarily have convicted the respondent.