Dennis W. Brown

The appellant mining company appealed an interim injunction that halted its exploration activities and required consultation with the respondent First Nation.

Prior to the appeal, the Mining Amendment Act, 2009 came into force, establishing a new legislative regime for exploration plans and permits involving Aboriginal interests.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the appeal, finding it moot because the rights and obligations of the parties now rested on the new statutory foundation, rendering the propriety of the original injunction an academic exercise.

The plaintiff commenced an intended class proceeding against the Crown arising from a criminal proceeding where his Charter rights were infringed due to an incompetent interpreter.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to provide the requisite 60 days' written notice under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff argued that a release signed in relation to a costs settlement in the criminal matter, along with the application record and factum, constituted sufficient notice.

The court held that the documents did not provide sufficient particulars to identify the occasion out of which the civil claim arose, leaving the Crown to guess its potential liability.

The action was dismissed as a nullity.

The moving party, a mining exploration company, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction that restrained it from engaging in mineral exploration activities on lands subject to asserted treaty and Aboriginal rights of the responding First Nation.

The motion judge had granted the injunction based on the Crown's failure to consult and accommodate, finding that the operational aspects of the duty to consult had been delegated to the mining company.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the company had a delegated duty to consult and that an injunction could be issued against a third party based on the Crown's failure to consult.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a transportation corridor.

The applicant argued that the Terms of Reference conflicted with the Growth Plan under the Places To Grow Act, 2005, because they did not restrict the study to the existing highway route.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Growth Plan did not preclude considering alternative routes and that the Minister's decision was reasonable.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision allowing a subdivision application to proceed to a hearing.

The central issue was whether the Board had jurisdiction under the Planning Act despite amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act requiring a development permit before any development decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the mandatory language of the amended legislation.

The Court further held that the respondent did not have a vested right to a hearing before the Board.

A 14-year-old child was apprehended and eventually placed in a secure treatment centre by court order.

The child's family sued the treatment centre and its social worker for negligence, claiming $40,000,000 in damages on the basis that the defendants treated the child as if she had been abused by her parents, which allegedly prevented her reintegration into the family.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that recognizing a duty of care owed by child protection service providers to the family of an apprehended child would create a serious potential for conflict with their paramount statutory duty to act in the best interests of the child.

The Court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim.

The applicants, the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) and a professional engineer, brought an application for judicial review challenging the validity of amendments to the Building Code.

They argued that the amendments unlawfully established a duplicate registration and disciplinary scheme for PEO licence holders who design or conduct general reviews of buildings.

The Divisional Court held that while the sub-delegation of examination administration was lawful, certain provisions of the Building Code exceeded the regulatory authority granted by the Building Code Act.

Furthermore, the court applied the modern rule of statutory interpretation to find that the Building Code Act did not authorize regulations that impinge on the PEO's exclusive statutory authority to regulate the character, competence, and conduct of professional engineers.

The court declared the conflicting provisions invalid or inapplicable to PEO licence holders.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the Ontario Provincial Police appealed a motions judge's order refusing to dissolve an injunction against Aboriginal protestors occupying a residential development, and requiring the Attorney General to take carriage of criminal contempt proceedings while reporting back to the court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It held that the motions judge erred in refusing to dissolve the injunction after the Ontario government purchased the property and consented to the occupation.

The Court maintained the referral of the contempt matters to the Attorney General, but imposed strict conditions, finding that the motions judge's previous contempt process was fundamentally flawed for denying procedural fairness and improperly interfering with police and prosecutorial discretion.

The plaintiffs, a special needs child and his mother, brought a proposed class action against Ontario for negligence and misfeasance in public office, alleging the government unlawfully terminated special needs agreements under section 30 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action.

The court found that the statutory discretion to enter into voluntary agreements did not create a private law duty of care, and the plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts demonstrating intentional wrongdoing by a public officer required for misfeasance in public office.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order was set aside.

The plaintiffs sued Ontario in negligence, alleging the province failed to prevent the outbreak of West Nile Virus in 2002, resulting in the deceased contracting the virus and dying from complications.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motions judge and Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that the Health Protection and Promotion Act imposes a general public law duty to protect health, but does not create a private law duty of care owed to specific individuals to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Apotex Inc. sought judicial review of the Respondents' decision to remove the designation of its generic drug, Apo-Flavoxate, as an interchangeable drug product under the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act (DIDFA) and to delist it from the Comparative Drug Index.

The Divisional Court found that the decision to delist the drug under DIDFA was not rationally connected to the decision to delist it as an eligible benefit under the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

The majority held that the circumstances surrounding the decision constituted a denial of natural justice and quashed the regulation, restoring the drug's interchangeable status.

A dissenting opinion would have upheld the decision as a valid exercise of public interest discretion.

The appellant Ministry appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal's supervisory jurisdiction over the implementation of its previous orders.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry acted in bad faith in attempting to comply with an order mandating a human rights training program to address a poisoned work environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal retained jurisdiction under s. 41 to recast its orders and impose system-wide remedies.

The Court also rejected the Ministry's argument that it was denied procedural fairness, concluding it had sufficient notice of the allegations of bad faith.

The appellant, a generic drug manufacturer, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application challenging the vires of the Ontario government's drug pricing policy.

The policy imposed a price freeze on generic drugs and regulated their prices as a percentage of the equivalent brand name drug (the 70/90 rule).

The appellant argued the regulations were ultra vires the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act and the Ontario Drug Benefit Act, and were arbitrary and discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the amended legislation explicitly authorized the Minister to consider the prices of other drug products when setting the drug benefit price.

The court also held that the policy was not arbitrary or discriminatory, as its purpose was to achieve the lowest prices for drug products in the public interest.

The respondent, owner of lands east of Lake Superior Provincial Park, sought to use a road within the Park to access its lands for timber harvesting.

The Acting Park Superintendent denied the request based on the 1995 Lake Superior Provincial Park Management Plan.

The application judge granted judicial review, finding the Superintendent's interpretation incorrect and procedurally unfair.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the application judge erred by applying a correctness standard.

Applying a pragmatic and functional approach, the Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness or patent unreasonableness, and found the Superintendent's interpretation of the policy document was not unreasonable.

The applicants brought applications for judicial review.

During the hearing, counsel for a third party requested an adjournment to review the filings and potentially seek intervenor status, as the third party had not been served.

The court granted the adjournment to allow the third party to decide whether to intervene.

The court also issued an interim order delaying the effective date of the third party's generic drug listings pending the resumption of the hearing.

The applicant generic drug manufacturers brought an urgent motion under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act to proceed with an application for judicial review before a single judge of the Divisional Court.

The applicants alleged that a competitor had obtained an unfair advantage regarding the upcoming release of a new schedule for the drug formulary.

The court found that the applicants would suffer irreparable harm due to the permanent loss of market share associated with the first-to-market advantage, and that the prerequisites of s. 6(2) were met.

The application for judicial review was permitted to continue.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed a decision of the Human Rights Board of Inquiry finding that the Ministry failed to comply with a 1998 remedial order regarding a racially poisoned work environment.

The Board had ordered a human rights training program, which was not implemented within the required timeframe or in the approved manner.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board had the supervisory jurisdiction to remain seized of the matter, hear evidence of continuing discrimination, and recast its original orders to ensure an effective remedy.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which upheld the Chief of Police's decision to dismiss a misconduct complaint.

The Chief's designate had dismissed the complaint at the preliminary stage by making findings of fact and credibility regarding the officer's good faith in misrepresenting polygraph results.

The Divisional Court held that findings of fact and credibility should be determined at a hearing, not at the preliminary screening stage.

The applicable test is whether there is a reasonable basis to the complaint or an 'air of reality' to the evidence.

The Commission's decision was found to be patently unreasonable, quashed, and the matter remitted for redetermination.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which upheld a decision by the Chief's designate regarding a police misconduct complaint.

The Chief's designate had found that the officer acted in good faith when misrepresenting polygraph results to the complainant and concluded there was insufficient proof of misconduct.

The Divisional Court quashed the Commission's decision, holding that the Chief's role under ss. 64(6) and (7) of the Police Services Act is not to make findings of fact or credibility at the preliminary stage, but rather to determine if there is a reasonable basis or an 'air of reality' to the complaint.

The matter was remitted to the Chief or a different designate for redetermination.

The applicant applied for judicial review to quash an adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of records relating to the costs of bringing witnesses from India to Canada for a murder trial.

The adjudicator had ordered the records disclosed with the witnesses' names and signatures expunged.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator reasonably interpreted and applied the exemptions under the applicable legislation and correctly found that the exemption under s. 19 did not apply.