David Watt

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding spousal support, child support, and net family property, the respondent sought costs of $13,585 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant suggested $10,000, citing modest success and unproven economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive, noting the appeal was heard in writing, and ordered the costs enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl, raising three grounds: a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, an unlawful search of a co-accused's cellphone under s. 8, and a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant repeatedly waived his right to counsel until 1:30 a.m., and that the subsequent breach was minor.

The court declined to consider the s. 8 claim due to an inadequate evidentiary record, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Finally, the court found the circumstantial case for trafficking was strong and the trial judge's reasons were unassailable.

The appellant, a private informant, laid an information alleging that a police force and several officers committed seven indictable offences based on his partner's workplace grievances.

Following a pre-enquete, a justice of the peace refused to issue process on six counts due to a lack of evidence on essential elements, and the Crown stayed the seventh count.

The appellant applied for orders in lieu of mandamus and certiorari, which the application judge dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error by the justice of the peace and no flagrant impropriety in the Crown's stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on the complainant's credibility.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed several errors in assessing credibility, including failing to adequately address the complainant's motive to fabricate, failing to resolve material inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster the complainant's credibility, and failing to apply the W.(D.) principles to determine if the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and attempting to distribute child pornography, and obstructing police.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on discreditable conduct evidence and by making personal observations of his hand movements to determine his physical ability to operate a cell phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted to prove identity, and noting the appellant had expressly invited the trial judge to observe his hands during testimony.

The appellants were convicted of unlawful act manslaughter for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their 27-month-old daughter, who died of what trial experts concluded was a combination of asthma and malnutrition.

On appeal, the appellants sought to introduce fresh expert evidence from a forensic pathologist and a pediatric bone disorder expert, challenging the trial evidence on the cause of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it was highly cogent and undermined the Crown's theory of liability at trial.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal support, child support, net family property, and costs.

He argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to him and under-attributing income to the respondent.

The respondent conceded minor calculation errors regarding her 2017 income and the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal corrected the conceded errors but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments, income imputations, and costs award were entitled to deference and revealed no errors in principle.

The appellant, a police officer, was criminally charged following an SIU investigation into a training exercise explosion.

After the charges were stayed, he sued his fellow officers and the police board for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office, alleging they intentionally misled the SIU.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding it was a workplace dispute governed exclusively by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the claim involved an independent criminal investigation outside the workplace, and therefore the court's jurisdiction was not ousted.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to sexual interference.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by departing from the parties' agreement on ancillary orders, specifically a section 161 prohibition and probation terms, without applying the Anthony-Cook joint submission standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement on ancillary orders did not constitute a joint submission on the core sentence, as the parties disagreed significantly on the length of custody.

The Court also held that the trial judge's discretionary orders were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Following the quashing of the appellant's conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to address the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had improperly grounded the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence on convictions for failure to comply with an undertaking, which are not serious personal injury offences.

The Court set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, substituting concurrent 30-day sentences for the failure to comply convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breaches of probation, as well as his 40-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge unevenly scrutinized his credibility compared to the complainant cab driver, and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the jump principle and give appropriate weight to his rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the increased violence of the robbery justified the sentence and the judge properly considered the appellant's rehabilitation efforts, except the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography after police obtained his subscriber information via a production order and subsequently searched his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the production order was invalidly issued based on a standard of 'reasonable suspicion' rather than 'reasonable grounds to believe'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the production order and subsequent search warrant violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine following a lengthy police surveillance operation dubbed 'Project Odyssey'.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his handling of a confidential informant privilege application, in refusing to stay proceedings for alleged police misconduct, and in rendering unreasonable verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the in camera, ex parte procedure used for the privilege claim, upholding the trial judge's factual findings regarding police conduct, and concluding the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of indecent assault and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence but passed away shortly after perfecting the appeal.

The parties jointly consented to dismiss the appeal as abated.

The Court of Appeal applied the test for moot appeals and found no exceptional circumstances or continuing controversy that would justify departing from the general rule that the death of an accused renders an appeal moot.

The appeals were dismissed as abated without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available, arguing that the search of his rooming house and electronic devices violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrant was not overbroad, was executed reasonably, and explicitly authorized the search of the seized electronic devices.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and sexual assault of his then-wife, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's motive to fabricate, the meaning of a WhatsApp message, and prior disclosure to her family.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, concluding the trial judge's findings were supported by the record.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the victim surcharge was set aside on consent.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to eight years.

He appealed, arguing that the warrantless search of the vehicle he was a passenger in, the seizure of his jacket, and the search of the jacket violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the search and seizure were not lawfully incidental to his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

Because the record was insufficient to conduct a proper s. 24(2) analysis regarding the exclusion of evidence, the court allowed the appeal and directed a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual and physical assaults against his former common-law spouse and her children.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the primary complainant, improperly used his criminal record, failed to resolve material inconsistencies, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The Crown appealed acquittals for making and distributing child pornography and child luring arising from sexualized text messages sent by an adult to a 14‑year‑old boy about the boy's friend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed legal errors in interpreting ss. 163.1 and 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

Private electronic communications can constitute “written material” capable of meeting the statutory definition of child pornography, and the analysis must focus objectively on the content of the communications rather than the accused's claimed joking motive.

The trial judge also erred by importing a requirement that luring be for a sexual purpose and by failing to consider the facilitation element of s. 172.1.

Because the legal errors affected the acquittals, the court set them aside and ordered a new trial on all counts.