David L. Corbett

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $6,000.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Kimmel J. dated June 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party sought an extension of time to review a motion judge's decision under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge had previously dismissed a motion to extend the time to seek judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision, finding no apparent merit to the application because the moving party lacked standing and the challenged program was protected under s. 14(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court panel agreed with the motion judge, finding no error in principle and a reasonable result, and dismissed the motion.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle collision and settled his claims for statutory accident benefits with the respondent insurer, providing a full and final release.

He later sought additional benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder, which the insurer denied based on the settlement.

The License Appeal Tribunal dismissed his claim because he had not returned the settlement funds as required by s. 9.1(8) of Regulation 664.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that repayment of settlement funds is a mandatory precondition to applying to the Tribunal, and there is no exemption for impecuniosity.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $2,200.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his complaint as abandoned after he failed to respond to a single email inquiring about the status of related WSIB proceedings.

The Tribunal had refused to reconsider the dismissal, focusing solely on whether the email was delivered rather than conducting a contextual analysis of abandonment.

The Divisional Court held that inferring abandonment from the failure to respond to one email, given the applicant's history of compliance and the ongoing nature of the WSIB proceedings, was unreasonable.

The application was granted, the dismissal order was quashed, and costs were awarded to the applicant.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Kimmel J. dated December 13, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $2,200 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Justice Chalmers dated November 5, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable to the responding party in the amount of $5,593.50.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs fixed at $10,000 payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision confirming the cancellation of his nomination approval under the Ontario Immigrant Nominee Program.

The nomination was cancelled because the applicant failed to apply for a work permit within the six-month validity period of his work permit support letter, citing COVID-19 travel restrictions in China and family responsibilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the internal reviewer's decision reasonable and concluding there was no breach of procedural fairness, no veiled credibility finding, and that adequate reasons were provided.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a university grading decision.

During the hearing, the respondent university argued that the applicant had not formally raised the Associate Dean's decision not to reassess his course work in the Notice of Application.

To ensure procedural fairness, the Divisional Court adjourned the hearing, permitted the applicant to amend his Notice of Application to include the reassessment decision, and allowed the university to assemble a complete record on that issue.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the Crown could not be compelled to answer questions on an examination for discovery in an action brought under the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming binding Court of Appeal precedent that the Crown's privilege to refuse discovery can only be taken away by express statutory words.

The court also rejected the argument that the Crown had attorned to the court's jurisdiction for discovery purposes by defending the action and voluntarily participating in some discovery.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision and reconsideration decision which found his motor vehicle accident injuries were subject to the $3,500 Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) limit.

The applicant argued his pre-existing shoulder injury, psychological symptoms, and chronic pain warranted removal from the MIG.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that while the adjudicator made a minor factual error regarding a physiotherapy visit, the overall conclusion was well-supported by medical evidence, including reports from the respondent's assessors.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the decision of Steele J. dated October 30, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed multiple decisions of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) denying her Income Replacement Benefits and medical benefits following a motor vehicle accident, as well as decisions denying an extension of time and a reconsideration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory extension and reconsideration decisions.

Regarding the merits, the court held that the LAT's procedural choice to proceed in writing was fair and that the appellant's substantive arguments raised questions of fact, not extricable errors of law.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review of the Ministry's decisions to amend a Crown Land Use Policy Atlas and transfer a parcel of Crown land to the Municipality of Red Lake for housing development.

The applicants argued the Ministry breached its duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and failed to obtain their consent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Treaty No. 3 allows the Crown to take up land subject to a duty to consult, which does not amount to a First Nation veto.

The court held that the duty to consult was at the lower end of the spectrum and that the Ministry's consultation process was reasonable and fulfilled its constitutional obligations.

The applicant appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision upholding the insurer's denial of medical and rehabilitation benefits beyond the $3,500 Minor Injury Guideline limit.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in finding he did not suffer from chronic pain, misapplied the AMA Guides, misapplied the pre-existing condition exception under s. 18(2) of the SABS, and breached procedural fairness by disregarding illegible clinical notes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and application, finding the Tribunal's factual conclusions were reasonable, it was entitled to weigh the expert medical evidence, and there was no breach of procedural fairness in a written hearing where the applicant provided illegible records.