David L. Corbett

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Justice Belobaba dated October 29, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the responding parties, the plaintiffs, fixed in the amount of $35,000.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 21, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the agreed-upon amount of $6,000.

The moving parties failed to close on a pre-construction home and sued for the return of their deposit.

The action was stayed by a Master due to an arbitration clause in the agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving parties sought to appeal the stay but missed the deadline, and a single judge of the Divisional Court dismissed their motion to extend the time to appeal, finding the appeal was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The moving parties brought a motion to a panel of the Divisional Court to review the single judge's order.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact, and agreeing that section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 is a complete bar to the appeal.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal from an unreported order of Koehnen J. dated March 6, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing, awarding costs of $2,500 to the responding parties.

The court issued a Rule 2.1.01 notice to consider whether the appeal should be summarily dismissed.

The appellant provided submissions arguing that the effect of section 137.1(5) on a motion to discontinue is not settled in the jurisprudence.

The court agreed that the appellant raised a tenable legal argument and declined to dismiss the appeal, ordering the parties to agree on a schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

The applicant Receiver sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision declaring it a successor employer under the Labour Relations Act.

The Receiver had been operating an insolvent debtor's retirement home business for several years.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that the Receiver met the test for a successor employer.

The Court also agreed that section 14.06(1.2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act does not immunize a receiver from prospective collective bargaining obligations, but only from pre-appointment liabilities.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought to quash a permit issued by the conservation authority to the respondent town for work on a beach, which was scheduled before the return of the Piping Plover.

The Divisional Court issued a bottom-line endorsement granting the application in part, quashing the permit, and remitting the matter back to the conservation authority.

The balance of the application was dismissed, with full reasons to follow.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision declaring them 'related employers' under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The union had argued that the employer's use of independent contractors eroded bargaining rights.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB Vice Chair's decision unreasonable because it failed to consider the history of collective bargaining, the collective agreement, and letters of understanding regarding the employer's longstanding practice of contracting out work.

The court held that this failure led to a decontextualized analysis of the employer's control over the contractors.

The court set aside the OLRB decision and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing before a different Vice Chair.

The appellant teacher appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers rejecting a joint submission on penalty.

The joint submission proposed a two-month suspension to be served over the summer months for harassing conduct toward a teaching candidate.

The Committee rejected the summer timing, ordering the suspension to start in September.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Committee erred by misapplying the stringent public interest test from Anthony-Cook.

The Committee impermissibly substituted its own view of a fit penalty without demonstrating that the joint submission was so unhinged from the circumstances that its acceptance would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The plaintiff, acting as litigation guardian for his developmentally disabled daughter, brought a proposed class action against Ontario alleging negligence and section 7 Charter violations regarding the administration of waitlists for adult developmental services.

The motion judge certified the negligence and Charter claims.

Ontario appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court unanimously allowed the appeal regarding the Charter claims, finding no positive obligation on the state to provide social assistance.

A majority of the court also allowed the appeal regarding the negligence claims, holding that the administration of the benefits program is a core policy decision protected by Crown immunity.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay the decision of Sweeny R.S.J. The Divisional Court directed the moving parties to file their materials electronically and advised that motions for leave to appeal are considered in writing under Rule 62.02.

After reviewing the moving parties' materials without requiring responding materials, the panel dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, rendering the motion for a stay moot.

No costs were ordered.

The self-represented moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the motions judge.

The Divisional Court reviewed the materials and found the motion to be entirely without merit.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the responding parties.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal in respect to three of the four issues raised in the notice of motion.

Costs of the motion for leave to appeal were fixed at $6,750, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's order requiring the return of the parties' two children to Nigeria and dismissing her motion for temporary custody in Ontario.

The mother had brought the children from Nigeria to Canada without the father's consent.

On appeal, she argued the motion judge erred in finding the children would not suffer serious harm if returned, in failing to give sufficient weight to the children's views, and in proceeding by way of a long motion rather than a trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the mother failed to meet the test under s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The record did not establish a probability of serious harm, and the motion judge reasonably concluded a trial was unnecessary.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from an unreported decision of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The court ordered that the appeal be expedited and directed the parties to attend a case management teleconference to set a schedule and return date.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision refusing him a certificate of registration as a psychologist.

He failed to comply with previous court orders requiring him to order and pay for transcripts and to perfect his application.

Instead, he requested that the court schedule a hearing.

The court refused to schedule the hearing and ordered the applicant to provide a reasonable explanation for his non-compliance by a specified date, failing which the proceeding would be dismissed.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against two Children's Aid Societies.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01, noting the complaint appeared to be a collateral attack on Superior Court child protection decisions.

After providing the applicant two opportunities to respond, the court found her responses failed to address the collateral attack issue and dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to convert his application for judicial review against the Law Society of Ontario into an action.

The application challenged the Law Society's licensing examinations as ultra vires and alleged Charter violations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting that it is an intermediate appeal and review court that does not hear actions or oral testimony.

The court transferred the matter to the Superior Court of Justice, struck the Notice of Application, and directed the applicant to file a Statement of Claim.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against Employment and Social Service.

The HRTO had dismissed the complaint because the applicant failed to allege a nexus between her long-term unemployment and a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous or vexatious.

After reviewing the applicant's written submissions, the court concluded that the application lacked any arguable legal basis and dismissed it.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion to compel the respondent's deponent to re-attend to complete his cross-examination on an affidavit.

The applicant had terminated the virtual cross-examination after 5.5 hours due to alleged technological issues and objections.

The court found the applicant's conduct during the examination unreasonable and unfocused, noting that the seven-hour limit for discoveries under Rule 31.05.1(1) does not apply to cross-examinations.

The court denied the request for oral re-attendance but permitted the applicant to complete the cross-examination by way of written questions.