Craig A. Parry

The defendant, Rijah Martin, was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 320.15 of the Criminal Code and a Highway Traffic Act offence.

She pleaded guilty to the HTA charge and not guilty to the Criminal Code charge, asserting a reasonable excuse due to an anxiety attack.

The court rejected her defence, finding her testimony untruthful and her failure to provide a breath sample deliberate.

The court also clarified the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse defence, holding that following the repeal of s. 794(2) of the Criminal Code, the accused only bears an evidentiary burden to establish an 'air of reality,' after which the Crown must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with Charter values.

Thomas Dyer was sentenced for uttering threats against the Prime Minister at a campaign event.

The court emphasized the seriousness of threatening a high-ranking elected official and the anti-democratic nature of such conduct, highlighting the need for denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the accused's traumatic brain injury, subsequent rehabilitation, and family responsibilities as mitigating factors, the court found the Crown's proposed fine and probation too lenient.

A 60-day conditional sentence was imposed, along with 12 months of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a DNA order.

The court declined a new weapons prohibition due to an existing lifetime ban.

The accused, Brian Foreman, faced charges of impaired driving and "80 Plus" after crashing his car.

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath samples and observations of alcohol odour, alleging violations of his rights against arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure, and right to counsel.

The court found that while reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand existed, the police officer failed to immediately inform the accused of his right to counsel and delayed facilitating access to counsel.

Despite the minimal impact on the accused's rights, the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the officer's dishonesty in testimony and persistent ignorance of constitutional obligations, led the court to exclude the breath samples and related observations under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

With the exclusion of this key evidence, the Crown lacked sufficient proof, leading to acquittals on both charges.

The accused, Michael Meinzinger, pleaded guilty to careless storage of a firearm and possessing a loaded restricted handgun.

The offences occurred during a severe mental health crisis where he expressed suicidal ideations and a desire for "suicide by police" via text messages and photographs of a handgun.

Police apprehended him under the Mental Health Act.

The court found a causal link between his transient mental health crisis and the offending conduct, which attenuated his moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with concurrent probation orders for 12 months, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, emphasizing rehabilitation over strict denunciation given the unique circumstances.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence for a young person, M.B., who was found guilty of numerous serious offences, including a targeted shooting and subsequent firearm and drug offences.

The court considered the two-part test under section 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act: whether the Crown rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and whether a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court found that M.B.'s actions, while serious, did not demonstrate adult maturity or sophistication, citing his background as a refugee, cognitive challenges, susceptibility to negative peer influence, and amateurish conduct during the offences.

The court also noted M.B.'s significant progress and rehabilitation while in custody.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, and the application for an adult sentence was dismissed, with the court concluding that a maximum youth sentence could adequately hold M.B. accountable.

The accused, Ranveer Singh, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant's evidence regarding lack of consent and the precise nature of the touching raised credibility and reliability concerns due to inconsistencies between her stated feelings/motives and actions, and contradictory factual accounts.

The accused claimed the complainant consented through her conduct, which he perceived as sexual advances.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and also failed to disprove the accused's honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit after moving her car from one friend's driveway to another.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) the roadside screening demand was not made "forthwith" as required by statute, as the investigating officer deliberately delayed making the demand to provide training to a junior officer; and (2) the accused's use of the toilet in her cell was videotaped without a valid waiver of her privacy rights, despite the police offering a privacy sheet that the accused was unaware of.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence as a remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the long-term interests of justice favoured exclusion despite the seriousness of impaired driving offences.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit.

The Crown's evidence showed breath samples with a BAC of 100-110 mg/100ml.

The accused challenged the validity of the police investigation on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arbitrary detention, and right to counsel.

While the court found the approved screening device demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion, it found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel of choice by steering him toward duty counsel without providing him with the means to select a lawyer of his choosing.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police breached the accused's right to counsel in three respects: (1) by denying him access to his cell phone to contact counsel of his choice; (2) by steering him toward duty counsel while ignoring his repeated statements that he did not understand the legal advice provided; and (3) by failing to re-advise him of his right to counsel when he expressed confusion about his legal options.

The court excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

An aboriginal first-time offender was sentenced for trafficking in marijuana over 3 kg, possession of marijuana over 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking.

The offender operated a marijuana dispensary and later supplied other dispensaries during a period of uncertain law enforcement.

The court imposed a 45-day intermittent sentence, considering the evolving social attitudes toward marijuana, the offender's benevolent intentions, his aboriginal status and family background, his lack of prior record, and his strong rehabilitation prospects since arrest.

The defendant pleaded guilty to six charges including theft under $5000, operation of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, impaired operation of a motor vehicle (twice), failure to provide a breath sample, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown sought to treat the driving offences as third offences based on prior convictions from 1985 and 2008, triggering a mandatory minimum penalty of 120 days.

The defence argued that the 1985 conviction under section 234 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970 should not be treated as a prior offence for purposes of section 255(4) of the current Criminal Code.

The court found that the 1985 conviction did not constitute a prior offence within the meaning of section 255(4), as the legislative amendment involved substantive changes beyond mere renumbering.

The driving offences were therefore treated as second offences with a mandatory minimum of 30 days imprisonment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit of 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to inform him immediately of his right to counsel and by failing to facilitate his access to counsel at the first reasonable opportunity.

The court found that the police breached both the informational and implementational duties under section 10(b).

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the state conduct and the officer's ongoing ignorance of fundamental constitutional obligations.

A child protection trial involving six children where the Children's Aid Society sought findings that all children were in need of protection and sought Crown wardship for the four oldest children and a supervision order for the two youngest twins.

The respondent parents denied virtually all allegations.

The court conducted a complex hearsay voir dire regarding children's out-of-court statements and ultimately found all six children in need of protection based on evidence of harsh, authoritarian parenting, excessive physical discipline, emotional abuse, and exposure to domestic violence.

The court made three of the four oldest children Crown wards and ordered the youngest child returned home under intensive supervision, with the second-oldest child also returned home under supervision to maintain sibling bonds.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against the same complainant on December 20, 2012, and January 22, 2013.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the admissibility of the accused's police interview, which was ultimately admitted.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's evidence and the accused's police statement.

The defence raised the issue of consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found that the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual contact on three separate occasions and rejected his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding instead that he was reckless as to the existence of consent or willfully blind to the possibility that the complainant might not consent.

The accused was charged with four sexual offences against a child complainant: two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference (touching for a sexual purpose), occurring during two distinct time periods.

The first alleged incident (the "shopping incident") occurred in May or June 2011 when the accused was left alone with the complainant.

The second set of allegations (the "babysitting incidents") involved repeated alleged touching over approximately 18 months between January 2012 and June 2013.

The Crown called the complainant and her mother as witnesses.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations and providing alternative explanations for the complainant's account.

The trial judge found significant credibility and reliability issues with the Crown's evidence, including material inconsistencies in the complainant's account, the absence of the grandmother as a witness despite her alleged presence during most of the alleged abuse, and implausibilities regarding the complainant's delayed disclosure.

While the judge concluded the accused was "probably guilty," the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts but was subject to a common law peace bond for three years.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case depended entirely on the results of an Approved Screening Device test and subsequent breath samples.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD results because he could not establish the device had been calibrated within the required timeframe, resulting in an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel, as the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to search for counsel of choice, controlled all means of contacting counsel, and withheld information that the accused's father had called with a lawyer's name.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during alleged Charter breaches, including violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained for approximately one hour without lawful authority, unlawfully arrested under section 200 of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and denied her right to counsel.

The court concluded that the breath samples and related evidence were obtained as a result of these Charter violations and excluded all such evidence from trial, rendering the Crown's case fatal.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

Following a trial held in January and March 2016, the court granted sole custody of the children to the mother and sole discretion regarding access to the father.

The Children's Aid Society and the mother sought costs against the father and his counsel.

The court declined to award costs against the father but awarded costs of $500 each against counsel for bringing and withdrawing a patently unmeritorious Charter motion that was admittedly irrelevant to the proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit and operating a motor vehicle while her ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was impaired by alcohol, relying instead on an ambiguous admission by the accused that she would "blow over" without clarifying what threshold she meant.

The court concluded that the officer conducted an unreasonable search and seizure and arbitrarily detained the accused in violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society following the apprehension of three young boys.

The parents consented to a finding that the children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of emotional harm.

The father's authoritarian parenting style, combined with his voluntary withdrawal from the children's lives for nearly two years following a high-conflict marital separation, resulted in significant emotional harm to the children.

The court granted full custody to the mother with sole discretion over access, finding that the father's intransigence and refusal to cooperate with the Society made supervised access futile and potentially harmful to the children.