Craig A. Parry

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case depended entirely on the results of an Approved Screening Device test and subsequent breath samples.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD results because he could not establish the device had been calibrated within the required timeframe, resulting in an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel, as the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to search for counsel of choice, controlled all means of contacting counsel, and withheld information that the accused's father had called with a lawyer's name.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during alleged Charter breaches, including violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained for approximately one hour without lawful authority, unlawfully arrested under section 200 of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and denied her right to counsel.

The court concluded that the breath samples and related evidence were obtained as a result of these Charter violations and excluded all such evidence from trial, rendering the Crown's case fatal.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

Following a trial held in January and March 2016, the court granted sole custody of the children to the mother and sole discretion regarding access to the father.

The Children's Aid Society and the mother sought costs against the father and his counsel.

The court declined to award costs against the father but awarded costs of $500 each against counsel for bringing and withdrawing a patently unmeritorious Charter motion that was admittedly irrelevant to the proceedings.

Following a child protection trial resulting in custody being granted to the mother, the applicant society and the mother sought costs against the father and his counsel.

The court reiterated that costs are rarely awarded in child protection proceedings because parents are entitled to require the state to prove its case.

While the father pursued an unrealistic litigation strategy, the court declined to order costs against him.

However, the father’s counsel was found to have wasted costs by bringing a frivolous Charter application that was later withdrawn as irrelevant to the disposition phase of the proceeding.

Applying the test for personal costs against counsel, the court concluded the motion was patently unmeritorious and ordered counsel personally to pay modest costs to the society and the mother.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit and operating a motor vehicle while her ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was impaired by alcohol, relying instead on an ambiguous admission by the accused that she would "blow over" without clarifying what threshold she meant.

The court concluded that the officer conducted an unreasonable search and seizure and arbitrarily detained the accused in violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society following the apprehension of three young boys.

The parents consented to a finding that the children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of emotional harm.

The father's authoritarian parenting style, combined with his voluntary withdrawal from the children's lives for nearly two years following a high-conflict marital separation, resulted in significant emotional harm to the children.

The court granted full custody to the mother with sole discretion over access, finding that the father's intransigence and refusal to cooperate with the Society made supervised access futile and potentially harmful to the children.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to cross-examine the complainant regarding whether she claimed to have previously engaged in sexual activity with a 30-year-old man.

The Crown objected, arguing that such questioning constituted an attempt to elicit evidence of prior sexual activity under section 276 of the Criminal Code and therefore required a formal section 276 application.

The court ruled that section 276 was not engaged because the defense sought to prove that the statement was made, not for the truth of its contents, but to establish that the complainant was attempting to present herself as older.

The court distinguished between evidence of prior sexual activity and evidence of a claim of prior sexual activity made for a non-truth purpose.