Corbin Francis Cawkell

The Crown applied during a voir dire to admit crime scene and autopsy photographs of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused argued the photographs were gratuitous, inflammatory, and highly prejudicial.

The court found the photographs were highly probative to illustrate the forensic pathologist's opinions, corroborate testimony, and rebut potential defences such as self-defence or a third-party suspect.

The court concluded the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and granted the application to admit the photographs.

The accused, charged with murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect defence, pointing to his co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact.

The court assessed whether there was a sufficient nexus between the third party and the offence, focusing on motive and opportunity.

Finding that the third party had a severe drug addiction requiring money and was present at the crime scene and with the accused during the relevant times, the court concluded there was some evidence to support the defence.

The application was granted, and the third-party suspect defence was permitted to be put to the jury.

The Crown applied to admit utterances of the accused made to two civilian witnesses as prior discreditable conduct, and two ante-mortem statements made by the victim to the same witnesses.

The accused is charged with first degree murder.

The court found that the accused's prior threats to kill the victim were relevant to animus, motive, and intent, and their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court also ruled that the victim's ante-mortem statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach, as they were reliable, necessary, and highly probative of the victim's state of mind and the relationship between the parties.

The Crown applied to edit letters written by the accused while in custody awaiting trial for second-degree murder.

The defence argued that without significant editing, the letters would invite prohibited propensity reasoning, while the Crown argued they contained highly probative confessions relevant to identity, motive, and the third-party suspect defence.

The court balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect, ordering the removal of references to the accused's knowledge of the legal system and inflammatory language, but retaining passages that amounted to confessions or related to the third-party suspect defence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude audio and videotaped statements made to police following his arrest.

The court found that a specific utterance made during transport to the police station was obtained in violation of the accused's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, as he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel and was seeking clarity on his charges.

This utterance was excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found the subsequent 3.5-hour videotaped statement was voluntary under the Oickle rule and did not violate the accused's s. 7 right to silence, despite his numerous assertions of the right, as police conduct was not oppressive and the accused maintained an operating mind.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of possessing child pornography following a trial.

The court addressed the applicability of the Kienapple principle and imposed sentence.

The defendant, a 24-year-old security guard with no criminal record, had accumulated child pornography on his computer and external hard drive.

The material was discovered when a co-worker accessed the hard drive left at the workplace.

The court found that the Kienapple principle did not apply as the two offences had different factual and legal nexuses.

The court imposed a sentence of ten months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a five-year prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code, DNA order, and sex offender registration for life.

The defendant pleaded guilty to importing child pornography, making child pornography in Cuba, and multiple counts of sexual interference with children under 16 years of age in Cuba.

The court imposed a sentence of two years and one day plus a 10-year long-term offender designation.

The court found that the defendant posed a substantial risk of sexual re-offence and that there was a reasonable possibility of eventual control of risk in the community through the long-term offender regime.

The court rejected the defence submission for time served and a recognizance order, finding that such measures were inadequate given the severity of the offences and the defendant's demonstrated pattern of escalating sexual abuse of children over many years.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking approximately half a kilogram of heroin, the court determined the appropriate sentence within the established appellate range.

The defence argued that heroin trafficking sentences should be reduced because heroin is not demonstrably more harmful than cocaine or methamphetamine.

After reviewing expert evidence, historical arguments, and appellate jurisprudence, the court held that existing authorities establish an eight‑to‑twelve‑year range for trafficking in a half kilogram of heroin and that trial courts are not entitled to lower that range based on the record before them.

The court concluded that even if other drugs are similarly harmful, that would justify increasing sentences for those drugs rather than lowering heroin sentences.

Each offender received an eight‑year penitentiary sentence, with additional concurrent time for possession of proceeds of crime and a fine in lieu of forfeiture against one offender.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts arising from an armed bank robbery committed on October 8, 2008: robbery while armed with an imitation firearm, disguise with intent, auto theft, and auto possession.

The Crown pursued a dangerous offender designation under section 753 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused met the criteria for dangerous offender status based on a pattern of repetitive armed robberies spanning from 1988 to 2008, demonstrating a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of inflicting severe psychological damage on others.

The court imposed a determinate sentence of 13 years imprisonment (with credit for approximately six years of pre-trial detention resulting in two years remaining) followed by a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order, rather than an indeterminate sentence, based on positive developments in the accused's behaviour and mental health stabilization while in custody.

The applicant appealed a Notice of Proposal to suspend its liquor licence for 14 days after police found underage and intoxicated patrons on the premises.

The Tribunal found that the licensee violated the Liquor Licence Act and its regulations by failing to properly inspect identification and permitting drunkenness.

The defence of due diligence was rejected because staff relied on a cursory check by the bartender rather than conducting independent inspections.

The Tribunal reduced the suspension to 5 days, noting the incident was isolated and the licensee had since implemented stricter age verification policies.

The applicant appealed a Notice of Proposal to suspend its liquor licence for 14 days following an incident where underage and intoxicated patrons were served alcohol.

The Tribunal made findings of fact, concluding that three underage patrons were served and three patrons showed clear signs of intoxication.

The Tribunal directed the parties to provide written submissions on the applicable law, aggravating or mitigating factors, and appropriate sanctions based on these findings.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including sexual interference with a minor, making and possessing child pornography, smuggling obscene materials, and breaching recognizance conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe emotional impact on the victim and the accused's flagrant breaches of bail conditions by re-offending.

The accused was sentenced to a global term of 6 years in custody, reduced to 4.5 years net after applying a 1.5:1 enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to physical assaults suffered in jail.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault against a young man whom he had groomed.

The Crown sought 15 to 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought 8 months.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 months' incarceration to be served concurrently, followed by 3 years of probation, along with a lifetime SOIRA order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography and possession of methamphetamine.

The child pornography collection was of moderate size and mostly in the middle range of severity.

The offender was a 52-year-old first-time offender with health issues.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 months' imprisonment for the child pornography charge and time served concurrently for the drug charge, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders including a 10-year section 161 prohibition.

The accused was charged with possession, making, and making available child pornography, as well as possession of methamphetamine.

Following a search of his apartment, police seized hard drives and CDs containing child pornography, along with a small amount of crystal meth.

The court found the accused guilty of possessing the CDs containing child pornography and the methamphetamine.

However, the court acquitted the accused of making child pornography, holding that the Crown failed to prove he copied the files, and further ruling that merely copying child pornography does not constitute 'making' it under section 163.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of importing cocaine, the second of which was committed while on judicial interim release for the first.

He was sentenced to a total of 70 months' imprisonment based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued the sentence did not sufficiently reflect his cooperation with authorities and was based on an incorrect sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with a sentence imposed following a joint submission, especially given the aggravating factor of committing the second offence while on release.