Colin P. Stevenson

The respondents purchased property formerly used as a municipal dump and sued the appellant municipality for negligence after discovering contamination.

The trial judge awarded damages for additional construction costs and stigma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal, finding that the causal link was broken when the respondents rejected an offer to reverse the sale and chose to proceed with construction despite knowing the site was contaminated and would require significant remediation.

The applicant sought costs of $90,180 plus disbursements on a substantial indemnity basis against both the Ministry of Natural Resources and Mr. Duncan following a successful application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs against the Ministry, finding the real dispute was between the applicant and Mr. Duncan.

The court also rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting Mr. Duncan's conduct was not harsh or vexatious.

After reducing the claimed amount for excessive fees, including those of a retired lawyer acting as a witness, the court fixed costs at $30,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements payable by Mr. Duncan.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a product liability class action against Whirlpool for pure economic losses related to allegedly negligently designed front-loading washing machines that were prone to biofilm buildup.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding it plain and obvious that the plaintiffs had no tenable cause of action in contract, breach of statute, negligence, or waiver of tort.

Specifically, the court held that there is no recovery in negligence for pure economic losses for a shoddy but non-dangerous consumer product.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash a motion for leave to appeal from a decision of the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously set aside an order finding a violation of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal held that under sections 11(2) and 15 of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, the decision of the Divisional Court is final and there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was quashed.

The applicant cottagers association sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to grant a pit licence to the respondent landowner under the Aggregate Resources Act.

The licence was issued based on a municipal confirmation that the pit was a legal non-conforming use.

The Divisional Court found that the confirmation was based on misinformation, as there was no evidence the property was used as a pit prior to the relevant zoning by-laws.

The Court held the standard of review was correctness and set aside the Minister's decision, referring the matter back for reconsideration.

The appellants, former agents of the respondent insurance company, appealed the dismissal of their motion for certification as a class action.

They claimed termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, alleging constructive dismissal due to the employer's change in its business model.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the claims required highly individualized inquiries regarding the impact of the changes, reasonable notice, and mitigation, and therefore lacked commonality.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement fixing the costs of the appeal.

Costs were fixed in the amount of $9,000 inclusive of disbursements, plus HST, payable forthwith by the respondents to the appellant.

The appellants appealed an order regarding an arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not clearly show the arbitration agreement was incapable of performance.

The court varied the motion judge's order, referring the matter back to the Crown Heights Beth Din to proceed with the arbitration on a fixed timetable or clearly indicate its refusal to deal with the matter.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants purchased property under an agreement that required them to pay a bonus if they obtained a density increase in 'final form'.

The municipality approved an Official Plan Amendment increasing the density, but the implementing zoning by-law included a holding provision under s 36 of the Planning Act.

The appellants argued the bonus was not payable until the hold was removed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment for the respondents, finding the agreement unambiguous and that the density increase was granted in final form when the Official Plan Amendment was approved, regardless of implementation issues.

The appellant purchased land for $20 million from a bank exercising its power of sale.

The appellant acquired the land as trustee for a group that already held a 69% beneficial interest in the property prior to the sale.

The appellant argued that land transfer tax should only be paid on the 31% increase in beneficial interest ($6.172 million).

The Minister assessed tax on the full $20 million purchase price.

The Court of Appeal upheld the assessment, finding that the bank sold the property for its own benefit and the gross sale price of $20 million was the value of the consideration for the conveyance under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its summary judgment motion and its appeal of a land transfer tax assessment by the Minister of Finance.

The dispute involved whether a transfer of land under a power of sale constituted a transfer from a trustee to another trustee, which would reduce the tax payable.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly dismissed the summary judgment motion but erred in dismissing the appeal itself, as the factual context, beneficial ownership, and statutory interpretation required a full trial.

The Ontario Securities Commission found the respondent guilty of insider trading and imposed a 15-year suspension of his registration, along with a costs award of $186,052.30.

The Divisional Court upheld the liability finding but reduced the suspension to four years and remitted the costs award with specific procedural instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Commission's appeal, restoring the 15-year suspension on the basis that the Commission's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The Court of Appeal also remitted the costs issue to the Commission, but without the Divisional Court's specific procedural instructions, requiring only that the process be fair.

The appellants, developers of a residential subdivision, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision requiring them to pay $568,391 as their proportionate share of municipal infrastructure costs previously front-ended by a neighbouring developer.

The appellants argued that the Development Charges Act, 1989 prohibited the imposition of such charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the Act prohibited imposing a charge by way of agreement, it did not prohibit the OMB from imposing the charge directly as a condition of draft plan approval under section 51(25) of the Planning Act to ensure a fair and equitable allocation of infrastructure costs.

The developer of a multi-phased condominium project marketed the development as having an outdoor recreational area.

The disclosure statement and related documents provided that the recreational area might not be built.

The developer later decided to build townhouses on the recreational lands instead.

The condominium corporation opposed this and obtained a permanent injunction at trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the developer did not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of good faith to prospective purchasers during the pre-contractual phase.

The developer's obligations were circumscribed by the statutory disclosure requirements, which clearly stated the developer was under no obligation to build the recreational facilities.