Charles T. Hackland

The accused, Patrick King, was sentenced for offences including mischief, counselling mischief, counselling obstruction of police, and disobeying a court order arising from his leadership role in the 2022 "Freedom Convoy" protest in Ottawa.

The Crown sought a ten-year prison sentence, arguing the protest constituted an unprecedented occupation of the nation's capital, while the defence argued for time served and probation.

Justice Hackland rejected the Crown's position, noting that while the protest caused significant community harm, a ten-year sentence was disproportionate and lacked precedent.

The court sentenced the accused to a total of 12 months, consisting of nine months of pre-sentence credit and a three-month conditional sentence, followed by 12 months of probation.

This decision concerns the entitlement to the former home of Yvette Poirier and certain funds allegedly misappropriated from her bank account by her late son, Paul Poirier.

The applicant, Lyse Scharfe (Yvette’s daughter and attorney for property and personal care), sought to set aside a 2016 conveyance of the property to Paul, arguing Yvette lacked capacity and was subject to undue influence.

The court found that Yvette Poirier lacked capacity at the time of the transfer and that the presumption of undue influence was not rebutted.

The 2016 conveyance was set aside, and the property was to be re-vested in the joint names of Yvette Poirier and Paul’s estate.

The court also addressed the improper registration of a mortgage on the property by respondent’s counsel.

The plaintiff, Henry Brent Shelp, brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against GoSecure Inc. The main issues were the period of common law reasonable notice and the calculation of income loss, particularly entitlement to sales commissions during the notice period.

The court found the matter suitable for summary judgment and determined that the reasonable notice period was six months.

The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages including base salary, commissions, benefits, and cell phone allowance for the notice period, less mitigation income and amounts already paid.

The total damages awarded were $163,659.92 plus pre-judgment interest.

At the opening of trial, the plaintiff and self-represented Third Party sought leave to admit late expert evidence under Rule 53.03(4) and an adjournment of the trial.

The professional negligence claim, involving tax returns and CRA re-assessments, had been ongoing for nine years.

The plaintiff, having been represented by multiple lawyers, acknowledged the need for new counsel to properly present the complex case, especially given the preliminary nature of the expert report.

The court granted leave for the expert report and adjourned the trial, striking it from the list, to allow the plaintiff to retain counsel and properly prepare, while also ensuring fairness to the defendant by awarding costs thrown away and setting a deadline for expert reports.

Criminal trial arising from the accused’s role in the downtown Ottawa convoy occupation in early 2022.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was an organizer, leader, and online influencer who counselled and participated in mischief by encouraging blockades, horn honking, resistance to police efforts to clear the area, and later breaches of an injunction prohibiting the use of air horns and train horns.

The court acquitted on intimidation counts, holding the specific intent required by s. 423 of the Criminal Code was not established because the pressure tactics were directed at changing government policy rather than intimidating identified persons within the meaning of the provision.

The accused was convicted of counselling obstruction of police but acquitted of personal obstruction, and the defence of officially induced error was rejected for lack of an air of reality.

The defendant insurer, Aviva, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for unidentified motorist coverage.

Aviva argued that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable due diligence to identify the at-fault driver and did not comply with statutory notice requirements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the plaintiff's capacity to gather information immediately after the collision due to head trauma and whether equitable relief from forfeiture should be granted for the notice breaches.

The defendant successfully brought a summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's action for solicitor negligence on the basis of lack of standing, res judicata, and abuse of process.

The defendant sought costs of the motion and the action on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found the hours expended and rates charged by the defendant's counsel to be reasonable and modest.

Costs were awarded to the defendant in the fixed sum of $7,960 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court considered interim costs submissions following the first stage of a bifurcated trial, which had dismissed the plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief.

The plaintiff argued that a costs award at this stage was premature, citing precedents that costs are typically awarded at the conclusion of the second stage of bifurcated proceedings.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that a full appreciation of overall success and all relevant Rule 57 considerations, including Rule 49 offers, could only be made after the entire trial.

Consequently, the determination of costs was deferred to the completion of the proceedings.

The Corporation of the Township of Augusta brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a claim by residential landowners (plaintiffs) alleging the Township breached a duty of care and acted in bad faith regarding site plan approvals for an adjacent trucking terminal.

The plaintiffs contended the Township's decisions were operational, not policy, and demonstrated bad faith by approving a non-permitted use and later an expanded site plan despite ongoing nuisance complaints.

The court found the Township's decisions were policy decisions, protected by statutory and common law immunity, provided they were made in good faith.

The plaintiffs failed to meet the high burden of proving bad faith, which requires demonstrating arbitrary, capricious, dishonest, or ulterior motives, or actions so patently unreasonable as to exceed governmental discretion.

The court dismissed the claims against the Township, but noted the plaintiffs could still pursue claims against the trucking company for negligence and nuisance.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action after being summarily terminated without cause following 18.5 years of service as Vice President.

The defendant failed to attend the trial, and its pleadings were struck.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to a 24-month common law notice period.

Additionally, the court awarded $50,000 in aggravated damages and $50,000 in punitive damages due to the defendant's bad faith, which included making defamatory statements, accusing the plaintiff of criminality, and pursuing a baseless counterclaim.

The plaintiff property owner sought declarations that her building was originally constructed as two semi-detached units or, alternatively, that she was entitled to four residential units based on a legal non-conforming use.

The municipality had placed a stop-work order on her renovations.

Relying on expert architectural and engineering evidence, the court found the building was originally constructed in 1906 as a single-family dwelling with internal access between areas.

The court also found no evidence that the building ever contained four residential units prior to the 1977 zoning by-laws.

The requested declarations were dismissed.

The defendant moved to stay a defamation action, arguing it was based on evidence obtained in violation of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01.

The evidence in question was a surreptitious recording voluntarily attached as an exhibit to an affidavit in a separate family litigation proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the deemed undertaking rule applies only to evidence obtained through compulsory discovery mechanisms, not to evidence voluntarily put forward in an affidavit.

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to destroy copies of two allegedly privileged emails produced in the defendant's affidavit of documents.

The emails contained legal advice regarding a property dispute.

The court found that the defendant had waived solicitor-client privilege by producing the documents, allowing them to be used during examinations for discovery without objection, and relying on them in communications with a co-defendant.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, B.S., appealed her conviction for criminal harassment under section 264(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction stemmed from repeated unannounced visits to the former matrimonial home, where her estranged husband (the complainant) and their children resided, in violation of a Family Court Restraining Order.

The appellant argued that there was insufficient evidentiary basis and that her conduct, being non-threatening, would not cause a reasonable person to fear for personal safety.

The trial judge found the complainant credible, accepting that the appellant's conduct caused him significant anxiety, stress, and mental health trauma, which constituted fear for personal safety.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, affirming that "fear for personal safety" in harassment cases can include psychological well-being, even in the absence of physical threats, and that the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable.

This case involved an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found the appellant, Gina Benz, mentally incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment for her mental disorder with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred by conflating her disagreement with her diagnosis with incapacity.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed as moot because the appellant had been discharged from the hospital and was residing in the community, no longer under the respondent's care.

The court confirmed that despite the dismissal, the appellant's future right to apply for a review of any finding of incapacity would not be barred due to the passage of time.

This supplementary endorsement addresses the defendants' cross-motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The defendants argued the claim was vexatious, frivolous, or an abuse of process, being an attempt to re-litigate matters previously decided in Federal Court.

The court found that the plaintiff's current claims for monetary damages, including allegations of conspiracy, malicious prosecution, negligence, defamation, and employment rights violations against the RCMP, had been extensively litigated and conclusively decided against him in numerous prior Federal Court proceedings (8 actions, 2 judicial review applications, 12 appeals).

Applying principles of res judicata and abuse of process, the court determined the claim was a clear abuse of process and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend, declining to award costs.

The plaintiff, Gary Sauve, brought a motion seeking procedural relief to pursue claims, primarily against his former employer, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), for alleged harms leading to his discharge.

He also sought to re-litigate multiple proceedings previously pursued in the Federal Court of Canada.

The court found the plaintiff's materials incomprehensible and unsupported by admissible evidence.

The motion was dismissed, as the continuation of the action was deemed manifestly vexatious, an abuse of process, and the claims were long since statute-barred.

The plaintiff's requests for state-funded counsel, a fee waiver, injunctive relief, and joining additional defendants were also denied due to lack of supporting evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) decision confirming the dismissal of a complaint against a physician.

The physician had accessed the deceased patient's hospital records multiple times after being sued for medical malpractice, without the patient's consent.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the HPARB and the investigating committee unreasonably interpreted the Personal Health Information and Protection Act (PHIPA).

The court held that the physician acted as an agent of the hospital, not a health information custodian, and therefore could not unilaterally access the records outside the civil litigation discovery process.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order to compel the respondent unit owner to allow the removal and replacement of unauthorized garage and front doors, which were modifications to common elements.

The respondent claimed verbal approval for the modifications and cross-claimed for oppression under section 135 of the Condominium Act.

The court found that the respondent had not obtained proper written approval for the modifications and dismissed the oppression claim, distinguishing the facts from a prior case where oppression was found.

The application was granted, ordering the respondent to provide access for the corporation to replace the doors, with the corporation bearing the cost of the new doors.

The Estate of Jackie Cray brought a motion to dismiss an application by Sofie Vaux-Lacelle, who sought a declaration that she was the deceased's common-law spouse for OMERS pension survivor benefits.

The Estate argued that the internal OMERS Dispute Resolution Process was a more suitable forum.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the OMERS process was a valid avenue, the Superior Court application was also appropriate given the factual complexity, credibility issues, significant value of the benefit, and greater flexibility for settlement and witness accommodation in court proceedings.