R. Cary Boswell

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

In a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a violent home invasion, the Crown challenged the sufficiency of a defence expert report disclosed under s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence intended to call a cardiologist to testify about the accused’s congenital heart disease and the possible cognitive effects of exertion‑induced hypoxia, which could raise a reasonable doubt about the specific intent required for murder.

The court held that the report provided sufficient disclosure of the expert’s anticipated areas of evidence and the grounds underlying them, though it did not disclose the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding the accused’s symptoms at the time of the offences.

Considering the advanced stage and logistical constraints of the lengthy jury trial, the court declined to order further particulars or other remedial measures.

The issue of the expert’s qualifications to testify about hypoxia‑related cognitive effects was left to a focused Mohan voir dire.

During a murder and attempted murder trial arising from a home invasion, defence counsel alleged that Crown counsel improperly asked a co‑accused witness questions without a good faith basis during cross‑examination.

The defence argued that certain suggestions put to the witness regarding clothing worn during the offence and the cause of injuries to the surviving victim were speculative and inconsistent with the evidentiary record.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in R. v. Lyttle on the scope of permissible cross‑examination and the meaning of a good faith basis.

The judge concluded that the Crown’s questions were grounded in reasonable inference drawn from the available evidence.

Accordingly, the court declined to take any remedial steps.

In a jury trial for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused brought applications for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case.

They argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support inferences of planning and deliberation or the requisite intent for murder and attempted murder, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case required exclusion of those theories.

The court held that the governing test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case does not apply at this stage.

The court found there was evidence capable of supporting inferences that the killing was planned and deliberate and that the accused participated with the necessary intent.

However, the Crown was barred from advancing second degree murder liability against the driver under the common unlawful purpose doctrine due to insufficient evidence of subjective foresight of death.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, the jury sent a note expressing concerns about safety after observing three men enter the courtroom whom they believed might be connected to the accused.

Defence counsel argued the note suggested potential racial bias or juror fear that could compromise impartiality and requested a jury inquiry.

The court conducted a focused inquiry questioning each juror individually about what they observed, whether they had concerns, whether race influenced their reaction, and whether they could remain impartial.

All jurors confirmed they had no concerns and could continue to decide the case solely on the evidence and legal instructions.

The court concluded the presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted and refused defence requests for a further inquiry.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, the accused advanced a third party suspect defence and sought to question the alleged third party about prior criminal charges that had not resulted in convictions.

The court considered whether such evidence was admissible as disposition evidence and whether it could be used to impeach the credibility of the defence’s own witness.

The court held that questioning a witness about prior charges without convictions was improper because it undermines the presumption of innocence and has little probative value.

However, the court found that the underlying facts of certain prior incidents involving firearms and violent activity could be admissible where relevant to the issue of identity and the third party suspect defence.

The court therefore permitted questioning about the underlying facts of most incidents, except a 1996 event involving a knife and pepper spray which lacked sufficient probative value.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

During a criminal jury trial, information emerged that the spouse of a juror had attended the proceedings and made comments supportive of a police witness, including remarks to the investigating officer.

The court had previously conducted an inquiry after learning the juror had received text messages from the spouse about events occurring in the courtroom.

Following new evidence from a detective about additional comments by the spouse, the court considered whether further inquiry of the jury was necessary.

Applying appellate guidance on allegations of improper juror contact, the court held that the potential taint of prejudice required a supplementary inquiry.

The judge directed that limited additional questions be put to the implicated juror to determine whether the spouse’s opinions had been communicated and whether they affected impartiality.

During a multi‑accused jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a staged home invasion, one accused sought to introduce propensity evidence regarding a co‑accused’s violent criminal history to support an alternate‑suspect defence and raise reasonable doubt about his own participation.

The court held that an accused may adduce propensity evidence against a co‑accused where it is relevant to a live issue and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

While much of the proposed material was excluded, limited evidence—including certain gun‑related convictions, a nickname referencing a sniper, and specific tattoos—was admitted because it had probative value on the issue of identity.

The court concluded that the remaining prejudice could be mitigated through limiting jury instructions.

A severance motion brought by the co‑accused was dismissed and the joint trial was ordered to continue.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, one accused sought leave to introduce alternate suspect evidence implicating an uncharged third party.

The proposed evidence consisted primarily of hearsay statements allegedly made by that third party to former partners confessing involvement in the offence.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, focusing on necessity and threshold reliability.

The judge concluded that the utterances possessed sufficient reliability and could be admitted, provided the declarant was first called and denied making them in accordance with the K.G.B. procedure.

The court further held that related propensity evidence affecting a co‑accused could be admitted with appropriate limiting instructions.

In a multi‑accused murder trial arising from a home invasion in which one victim was killed and another survived, a co‑accused sought to exclude a text message sent on the day of the offence stating “To after work ok will be game time.” The moving party argued the text was an ambiguous fragment whose meaning could only be determined through speculation and should therefore be excluded under the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis.

The court distinguished authorities dealing with incomplete overheard utterances, finding the text was a stand‑alone statement capable of interpretation when viewed alongside earlier communications among the accused.

When considered in context with prior text exchanges suggesting planning activity, the message was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity and involvement of the accused.

The court held the text possessed probative value that outweighed any prejudicial effect and declined to exclude it.

The accused had pleaded guilty to luring a child, sexual interference, and making child pornography.

The Crown intended to pursue a dangerous offender application, and a lengthy hearing had been scheduled.

Due to the presiding judge becoming unavailable because of commitments to a lengthy homicide trial, the issue arose whether the sentencing and dangerous offender proceedings should be adjourned or continued before another judge.

Interpreting s. 669.2(1) of the Criminal Code broadly, the court held that another judge may continue proceedings where the original judge is unable to proceed within a reasonable time.

Given the substantial delay that would otherwise result and the interests of justice for both the accused and the complainant, the matter was directed to proceed before another assigned judge.

The plaintiffs sued a residential developer alleging breach of contract regarding the height of a finished basement ceiling in a newly constructed home.

They relied on a structural upgrades price sheet referencing a standard basement ceiling height of approximately 7’10”.

The court found the parties’ agreement of purchase and sale contained no contractual term specifying a basement ceiling height and included an entire agreement clause excluding collateral representations.

The plaintiffs also failed to raise the alleged deficiency during the pre‑delivery inspection or before closing.

The claim was dismissed as the evidence did not establish a contractual breach and the wrong corporate defendant had been named.

Following dismissal of a claim after a short civil trial, the successful defendant sought approximately $61,000 in costs.

The court considered the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including fairness, proportionality, and the purposes of costs awards.

The defendant had made a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable than the judgment obtained at trial, triggering the presumption of substantial indemnity costs after the offer date.

While recognizing the plaintiffs were self‑represented and faced financial hardship, the court held that costs must follow the event and cannot be determined based on sympathy.

Applying proportionality in a simplified procedure action, the court fixed a fair and reasonable all‑inclusive costs award of $50,000 payable by the plaintiffs.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of second degree murder and awaiting a further murder trial, sought a publication ban on evidence and credibility findings arising from an earlier application under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code for access to seized funds to pay legal fees.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to grant a ban and applied the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test balancing freedom of expression against the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The court concluded that publication of the applicant’s admissions of criminal activity and the court’s adverse credibility findings posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice in the upcoming jury trial.

A temporary ban was therefore necessary and proportionate.

The court ordered a time‑limited publication ban on the evidence, the fact of the application, and the earlier decision until completion of the pending murder trial.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code for access to funds seized by police as alleged proceeds of crime in order to pay legal fees while facing multiple serious criminal charges including kidnapping and murder.

The court applied the three‑part test requiring proof of an interest in the funds, the absence of other assets or means to fund legal expenses, and the absence of competing ownership claims.

While the Crown conceded the accused had an interest in the seized funds, the court found he failed to establish that he lacked other available assets.

Given extensive evidence of undisclosed or unaccounted assets and the applicant’s lack of credibility, the court was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that no other means existed to fund counsel.

The accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal after the Crown closed its case on a charge of attempted murder.

The Crown relied primarily on eyewitness recognition evidence from the complainant, who identified the accused through photo line-ups and an in-dock identification.

The defence argued the identification narrative was irreparably tainted by flawed police photo line-up procedures and minimal prior familiarity between the witness and the accused.

The court held that although the December 6, 2010 photo line-up was not ideal and raised legitimate concerns, it still met the threshold reliability required to be left to the jury.

The court concluded that the complainant’s recognition evidence and in-dock identification, if believed, could support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the matter should proceed to the jury.