Stephen T. Lyon

Following a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court addressed post‑charge objections raised by the Crown and several defence counsel regarding the jury instructions.

The objections concerned the adequacy of instructions on forcible confinement, party liability, the mental state required for planned and deliberate murder, and the temporal‑causal connection required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the charge, when read as a whole, correctly conveyed the applicable legal principles and adequately reflected the parties’ positions.

With one limited exception, the court declined to give additional corrective instructions, finding the charge clear and legally sufficient.

The defendants, on trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, raised numerous objections to the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown misstated evidence, improperly referenced out-of-court statements, and undermined the presumption of innocence, seeking a mistrial or the right to make reply submissions.

The court reviewed the objections and found that while some of the Crown's comments required corrective instructions in the final jury charge, the conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.

The applications for a mistrial and for reply submissions were dismissed.

During a lengthy jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the court ruled on several pre‑charge issues affecting the jury instructions and evidentiary materials.

The court addressed whether transcripts of recorded police statements should accompany the jury, whether certain medical records required redaction, and whether instructions on wilful blindness and alternative routes to first‑degree murder should be given.

The court allowed transcripts of most recorded statements to go to the jury but excluded the transcript of one accused’s statement due to lack of probative value.

Medical records referring to “severe hypoxia” were admitted without redaction.

The court declined to instruct the jury on wilful blindness for the driver accused, finding insufficient specificity of suspicion to impute knowledge.

During a multi-accused jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the Crown sought to revisit a pre‑trial editing ruling that had excluded a portion of one accused’s police statement referencing a conversation with a co‑accused driver.

The Crown argued that subsequent cross‑examination created a material change in circumstances because the witness acknowledged misleading the driver about the purpose of the trip, making the excluded statement relevant as a prior inconsistent statement and to credibility.

The court held that the threshold for revisiting the ruling was met but declined to change the original decision.

Although the probative value of the statement had increased, its prejudicial effect against the co‑accused—against whom it remained inadmissible—continued to outweigh its value, particularly given the stage of the trial and fairness concerns.

The Crown’s application was therefore dismissed.

During a jury trial for murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to testify that a congenital heart condition could have caused hypoxia leading to confusion and impaired cognition during the incident.

The Crown opposed the evidence, arguing it lacked relevance, necessity, and proper qualification and risked misleading the jury.

Applying the Mohan framework as refined in White Burgess and Abbey, the court held the proposed expert testimony was logically relevant, necessary to explain the accused’s serious medical condition, and within the expert’s qualifications.

The court further concluded that any limitations in the opinion affected weight rather than admissibility and that the probative value of the defence-led evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted for consideration by the jury.

During a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused sought to call a cardiologist to provide expert evidence regarding congenital heart disease and its potential impact on mental functioning.

The Crown challenged the admissibility of the expert testimony, arguing issues of relevance, qualification, and reliability under the Mohan framework.

The court determined that a focused Mohan voir dire was required to clarify the precise opinion and assess the expert’s qualifications.

The judge held that the expert could testify on the voir dire only to identify the proposed opinion and establish qualifications, and that broader cross-examination was unnecessary for the admissibility determination.

During a jury trial for offences arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown sought to revisit a prior evidentiary ruling that had ordered references to the accused’s consultation with duty counsel removed from a police statement.

The Crown argued that subsequent testimony placing the reliability of the statement in issue increased the probative value of the fact that the accused had received legal advice before speaking to police.

The court reconsidered the issue under the residual discretion to exclude evidence where prejudicial effect outweighs probative value.

The judge held that the probative value of the consultation with counsel remained slight and that admitting the evidence would invite improper speculation about privileged communications.

The earlier ruling requiring redaction was therefore maintained.

In a jury trial for murder and attempted murder arising from a violent home invasion, the Crown challenged the sufficiency of a defence expert report disclosed under s. 657.3(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence intended to call a cardiologist to testify about the accused’s congenital heart disease and the possible cognitive effects of exertion‑induced hypoxia, which could raise a reasonable doubt about the specific intent required for murder.

The court held that the report provided sufficient disclosure of the expert’s anticipated areas of evidence and the grounds underlying them, though it did not disclose the expert’s ultimate opinion regarding the accused’s symptoms at the time of the offences.

Considering the advanced stage and logistical constraints of the lengthy jury trial, the court declined to order further particulars or other remedial measures.

The issue of the expert’s qualifications to testify about hypoxia‑related cognitive effects was left to a focused Mohan voir dire.

In a jury trial for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a home invasion, the accused brought applications for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case.

They argued the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support inferences of planning and deliberation or the requisite intent for murder and attempted murder, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case required exclusion of those theories.

The court held that the governing test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, and that the rule in Hodge’s Case does not apply at this stage.

The court found there was evidence capable of supporting inferences that the killing was planned and deliberate and that the accused participated with the necessary intent.

However, the Crown was barred from advancing second degree murder liability against the driver under the common unlawful purpose doctrine due to insufficient evidence of subjective foresight of death.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, defence counsel for one of the co-accused sought to create a summary chart of a key Crown witness's testimony on an easel pad during cross-examination.

The Crown and counsel for another co-accused objected, arguing the chart was unnecessary, cumulative, and potentially misleading.

The court allowed the use of the demonstrative aid, finding that it was a useful organizational tool, met threshold reliability, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any trial management or trial fairness prejudice.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, the jury sent a note expressing concerns about safety after observing three men enter the courtroom whom they believed might be connected to the accused.

Defence counsel argued the note suggested potential racial bias or juror fear that could compromise impartiality and requested a jury inquiry.

The court conducted a focused inquiry questioning each juror individually about what they observed, whether they had concerns, whether race influenced their reaction, and whether they could remain impartial.

All jurors confirmed they had no concerns and could continue to decide the case solely on the evidence and legal instructions.

The court concluded the presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted and refused defence requests for a further inquiry.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion, the co-accused applied to redact portions of two videotaped police statements made by two of the accused.

The applicants argued that the statements contained inadmissible hearsay that was highly prejudicial to the non-makers.

The court applied the principles for editing co-accused statements, balancing the probative value of the narrative context against the prejudicial effect.

The court ordered the redaction of gratuitous police comments, irrelevant bad character evidence, and highly prejudicial post-offence conduct (wiping a coffee cup), but retained the core narrative descriptions of the events, holding that limiting instructions would adequately protect the co-accused.

The applicants, charged with extortion and uttering death threats, brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was over 4.5 years.

The court found that the Crown's decision to jointly indict the applicants with subsequently charged co-accused caused significant and avoidable delay, particularly since the Crown did not seek a direct indictment to expedite the process.

The court concluded that the applicants suffered prejudice to their liberty and security interests, and the delay was unreasonable.

The proceedings were stayed.