Carolyn J. Horkins

The Applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the Real Estate Council of Ontario, which held that its jurisdiction to award costs under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 was limited by section 17.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court determined that the applicable standard of review was reasonableness, as the Tribunal was interpreting its home statute and a closely connected statute.

The Court found the Tribunal's interpretation reasonable, concluding that because REBBA was enacted after February 14, 2000, and does not expressly state that it prevails over the SPPA, the SPPA's costs restrictions apply.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant, who had an extensive litigation history against the respondent municipality, appealed a costs order.

The application judge had declined to award costs on the appellant's application to quash two municipal resolutions banning him from municipal facilities, finding that success would have been divided had the matter been heard on the merits before the resolutions were repealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no error in principle and that it was reasonably open to him to find that success would have been divided.

The client appealed a motion judge's decision that set aside an Assessment Officer's certificate reducing his former law firm's fees.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and restored the Assessment Officer's certificate, ordering the law firm to refund $24,000.

The Court found the motion judge erred by hearing the appeal without the law firm having filed objections, by improperly admitting fresh evidence, and by substituting his own opinion for that of the Assessment Officer without finding a valid error in principle.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim against the respondent telecommunications company for intentional infliction of mental suffering, invasion of privacy, and breach of statute arising from collection calls for an overdue account.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge correctly applied the legal tests for intentional infliction of mental suffering and invasion of privacy, and made no palpable and overriding error in rejecting the appellant's medical evidence.

The court also upheld the finding that the Collection Agencies Act did not apply to the respondent's in-house collection efforts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff law firm appealed a Master's decision dismissing its motion to add the defendant's two brothers as defendants and to amend its statement of claim in an action for unpaid legal fees.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the proposed amended pleading failed to articulate a tenable legal claim against the brothers, as it repeatedly alleged that only the existing defendant was responsible for paying the fees.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash Unimac's application for judicial review of a security for costs order made by a Master in a construction lien action.

Unimac alleged procedural unfairness based on communications between the Master and Metrolinx's counsel, and errors in the Master's treatment of evidence.

The Divisional Court found the communication complaints to be utterly devoid of merit and the evidentiary complaints to be matters for an appeal, not judicial review.

Since the Construction Lien Act prohibits appeals of interlocutory orders, the court held that the judicial review application was an abuse of process attempting to circumvent this prohibition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant appealed a decision enforcing a settlement between the parties.

He argued the motion judge erred by ignoring an alleged fraud against a third party, a payment issue, and the respondent's early departure from the home.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly exercised her discretion, properly credited the appellant for payments made, and correctly interpreted the settlement terms regarding the home.

The court also found the motion judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her appeal of a final order that found no material change in circumstances to justify continuing spousal support.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the appellant failed to prove a material change in circumstances under section 37(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent subcontractor's construction lien claim for unpaid work.

The appellants argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for credibility findings and erred by failing to reduce the claim for incomplete work.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were more than sufficient and deferring to the trial judge's factual finding that the work contemplated by the contracts had been completed before the relationship broke down.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to pay $29,437.38 in credit card debt to the respondent bank.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying section 68(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, claiming he never signed an application and only used the card for business purposes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made reasonable factual determinations based on the appellant's own evidence that he applied for and used the card, establishing liability under the Act.

During a family law proceeding, the motion judge ordered Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario to pay costs to the parties due to a delay caused by a court staffing shortage.

Ontario, a non-party, appealed the costs order, arguing it was made without notice.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle and was plainly wrong to make a costs order against a non-party without notice.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order that dismissed his motion to set aside an earlier order dismissing his action for construction defects.

The appellant had failed to attend the hearing where his action was dismissed.

The Divisional Court found that the appellant was out of time to appeal the original dismissal order and that there was no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the subsequent orders refusing to set it aside.

The appeal was dismissed.

The landlord appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering the return of an $18,984 security deposit to the tenant after the leased commercial premises were destroyed by fire.

The landlord attempted to raise new arguments on appeal that the lease continued despite the fire, which the court rejected due to prejudice and lack of an evidentiary record.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the tenant did not cause the fire and was not responsible under the lease for the landlord's debris removal costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his medical license.

The Committee found he engaged in unwanted touching of hospital employees and coercive sexual activity with a 17-year-old camp counsellor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the penalty, finding the revocation was a reasonable outcome given the serious nature of the misconduct, the need to protect the public, and the lack of evidence regarding the risk of future misconduct.

The moving parties sought an extension of time under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to bring a motion to set aside or vary a decision dismissing their request to stay sanctions imposed by the Ontario Securities Commission for insider trading.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to form the requisite intention to appeal within the four-day window, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that an extension would prejudice the public interest in protecting capital markets.

The court also found no apparent merit to the underlying motion.

The moving parties sought to introduce new evidence on a motion to vary a decision refusing to stay an order of the Ontario Securities Commission.

The new evidence related to steps taken by IIROC regarding the moving parties' conditional registration in Quebec.

The Divisional Court struck the new evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test for fresh evidence as it was not relevant to the decisive issue of whether the motions judge erred in refusing the stay, and it did not meet the reliability criterion.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision regarding a complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation concerning overtime grievances.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Board did not record the proceedings and proceeded by way of consultation rather than a full hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's substantive decisions and remedial orders were reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a Master's reference report in a construction lien action.

The Master found an oral contract for home renovations, which the appellant anticipatorily breached, and awarded damages and costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued procedural fairness was denied when the Master refused to admit an amended Scott Schedule filed out of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law, and held that the Master's refusal to admit the schedule did not affect the outcome as she relied on the appellant's expert witness instead.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Panel's decision was unreasonable because its credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant was fundamentally flawed, incomplete, and lacked transparency.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The plaintiffs commenced Small Claims Court actions for dental malpractice more than two years after the date of the dental surgery, but within two years of the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.

The motion judge dismissed the defendant's motions to strike the claims as statute-barred, finding the limitation period ran from the end of the relationship.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that there is no blanket rule tolling the limitation period until the end of the medical relationship.

Applying the presumption of discoverability under section 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the court found the limitation period commenced on the date of the surgery.

The actions were dismissed as statute-barred.