Barry Fox

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

He challenged his detention on Charter grounds, alleging violations of his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) and section 12 rights (freedom from cruel and unusual treatment).

The defendant was held in a cold basement cell for three hours while inadequately clothed, with a blanket provided only in the final 45 minutes.

The court found no breach of either Charter right, holding that the police followed appropriate prisoner care policies and released the defendant as soon as practicable.

The court rejected the defendant's application for a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with importing opium, possession for the purpose of trafficking in opium, and conspiracy to commit both offences.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The total delay from arrest to scheduled trial was 20.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R v Jordan.

The court found no defence delay attributable to the defendant and rejected the Crown's arguments regarding exceptional circumstances and transitional exceptions.

The court concluded that the delay, particularly the Crown's failure to prioritize the case and complete disclosure in a timely manner, constituted a breach of the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The proceedings were stayed.

The applicant, Irina Gordon, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 33 months and 3 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

However, the court deducted 6 months and 2 days attributable to defence waiver, bringing the net delay to 27 months and 1 day, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

Furthermore, as a transitional case, the Crown satisfied the court that the delay was justified based on reasonable reliance on the pre-Jordan law (R. v. Morin guidelines), under which the actionable delay was less than the 18-month guideline.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge during trial.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device breath demand.

The court found that while a technical Charter breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, made in good faith, and had limited impact on the accused's rights.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" within the statutory requirement.

The accused was convicted of the "over 80" offence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal suspending its liquor licence for 55 days after a patron was overserved, became intoxicated, and was subsequently struck and killed by a vehicle.

The Divisional Court found that the tribunal reasonably concluded the appellant breached the Liquor Licence Act by serving an intoxicated person and permitting drunkenness on the premises.

The court held that the tribunal applied the correct legal tests, properly weighed the evidence, and imposed a reasonable penalty.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from a civilian witness who observed a red Toyota Venza run a red light at high speed, jump a curb, and enter a ditch, and from a police officer who found the accused attempting to change a damaged tire in a parking lot shortly thereafter.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge due to procedural defects in the breath sample collection.

The court convicted the accused of impaired operation/care or control based on the totality of evidence establishing both that the accused was the driver of the vehicle and that his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused were jointly tried for fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme using a stolen and forged TD bank draft to obtain approximately $1.9 million in gold bullion from a Montreal dealer.

The Crown’s case was largely circumstantial and relied on telephone records, cell tower data, and evidence concerning the acquisition and subsequent disposition of Perth Mint gold bars.

The trial judge assessed the evidence under the principles governing circumstantial cases and the framework in R. v. W. (D.).

The court rejected the explanations advanced by the accused and concluded that they had acted together to present the fraudulent draft, obtain the gold, and distribute or conceal it afterward.

The applicants, charged with defrauding a bank of over $1.8 million, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total time from charge to trial was approximately four years.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that while the 22 months of institutional delay exceeded the administrative guidelines, the delay was not unreasonable given the complexity of the case, the involvement of multiple accused, and the significant delay caused by the actions of the co-accused.

The court also found no meaningful prejudice arising from the delay itself.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for stunt driving and 'over 80'.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications regarding the right to privacy (video surveillance in cells), right to counsel, right to know the reason for detention, and the validity of the roadside breath demand.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in applying different privacy standards to men and women in cells, but correctly refused to order a stay of proceedings.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach regarding the roadside demand, as the demanding officer was entitled to rely on the reasonable suspicion of another officer.

The court conducted its own section 24(2) analysis for a section 9 breach (failure to advise of reasons for detention) and concluded the breath samples should not be excluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The requesting state sought an order committing the person sought for extradition in relation to alleged importation and distribution of more than 130,000 ecstasy pills.

The responding party argued that the cooperating witness’s evidence was manifestly unreliable and that the identification evidence was weak.

Applying the Shephard test under the Extradition Act, the court held that the evidence need only disclose a case upon which a properly instructed jury could convict and must not be manifestly unreliable.

The court found corroboration through intercepted communications and law enforcement evidence, and concluded that although the identification evidence was weak, it was not manifestly unreliable.

The court ordered committal for extradition, leaving surrender to be determined at the ministerial stage.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and obstructing police following a traffic stop on January 7, 2012.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2013, and continued on December 23, 2013, with a further continuation scheduled for September 3, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, arguing that approximately 31.5 months had passed from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled completion of trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was significant, it did not constitute unreasonable delay under the Morin framework.

The court apportioned the delay among inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional constraints, concluding that the majority of delay was attributable to inherent case requirements and defence preparation rather than Crown or institutional failures.

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, applied for further disclosure of communications between Canadian and American authorities regarding efforts to locate her.

She argued that the requesting state lied about its efforts to find her and that the seven-year pre-extradition delay constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, finding no air of reality to the claims of prejudice from delay or deliberate deception by the requesting state that would justify ordering disclosure at the committal stage.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, applied for a review of a detention order under section 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

The bail judge had denied release on the secondary ground, citing the unexplained and extremely violent nature of the offence and finding the proposed sureties unsuitable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, concluding there was no realistic likelihood that a panel would find the bail judge erred in denying interim release.

The applicant was arrested for drinking and driving offences on April 24, 2011, with his trial scheduled for July 24, 2012—a delay of 15 months.

The applicant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the application, finding that after accounting for periods attributable to defence conduct, inherent time requirements, and institutional factors, the remaining delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines for straightforward provincial court trials.

The applicant suffered minimal prejudice, and no violation of his Charter rights was established.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood and refusal to provide a breath sample.

Police found the defendant sleeping in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot.

The Crown called an arresting officer and a qualified technician.

The defendant testified that he consumed three beers, received a call from his wife advising against driving, and decided to sleep in his vehicle until he felt better.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle but acquitted on both charges due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment and the refusal charge.

The accused was charged with production of cannabis and possession for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused brought a Charter motion under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) seeking to quash the search warrant and exclude evidence obtained as a result of alleged breaches.

The court found that the Information to Obtain the search warrant contained material misrepresentations and failed to meet the requirement of full, frank, and fair disclosure.

Specifically, the detective overstated his expertise in marijuana grow operations when interpreting hydro consumption data, failed to adequately substantiate the reliability of an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that was eight and one-half months old, and conducted only cursory surveillance.

The court concluded that without the detective's unsupported expert opinions regarding hydro readings, the remaining evidence fell short of establishing reasonable grounds to believe a marijuana grow operation was occurring at the residence.

The appellant appealed a forfeiture order, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the preparation of a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's finding that the note was likely prepared after the seizure of the money was not supported by the evidence.

However, the Court held that this erroneous finding did not taint the trial judge's conclusion, as the forfeiture order was otherwise amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for large-scale counterfeiting, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to exclude evidence seized from his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found that the search warrant was insufficient, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach, but admitted the evidence because the police conduct was not below the requisite level of care and the evidence was crucial to the prosecution.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the s. 24(2) framework and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be relatively heavy but not outside the acceptable range, and held that the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing a custodial term.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of six drug-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the W.(D.) credibility framework, the separation of counts, and the definition of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals on the first three grounds, finding the charge as a whole was sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the possession count, finding the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that responsibility for a bedroom was sufficient for possession of drugs found in an adjacent cupboard and ceiling.

A new trial was ordered for that count, and the global sentence was reduced from seven to six years.