Barry Fox

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge during trial.

The defence raised Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded a section 8 breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device breath demand.

The court found that while a technical Charter breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, made in good faith, and had limited impact on the accused's rights.

The court also found the breath tests were conducted "as soon as practicable" within the statutory requirement.

The accused was convicted of the "over 80" offence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from a civilian witness who observed a red Toyota Venza run a red light at high speed, jump a curb, and enter a ditch, and from a police officer who found the accused attempting to change a damaged tire in a parking lot shortly thereafter.

The Crown withdrew the over-80 charge due to procedural defects in the breath sample collection.

The court convicted the accused of impaired operation/care or control based on the totality of evidence establishing both that the accused was the driver of the vehicle and that his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The requesting state sought an order committing the person sought for extradition in relation to alleged importation and distribution of more than 130,000 ecstasy pills.

The responding party argued that the cooperating witness’s evidence was manifestly unreliable and that the identification evidence was weak.

Applying the Shephard test under the Extradition Act, the court held that the evidence need only disclose a case upon which a properly instructed jury could convict and must not be manifestly unreliable.

The court found corroboration through intercepted communications and law enforcement evidence, and concluded that although the identification evidence was weak, it was not manifestly unreliable.

The court ordered committal for extradition, leaving surrender to be determined at the ministerial stage.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and obstructing police following a traffic stop on January 7, 2012.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2013, and continued on December 23, 2013, with a further continuation scheduled for September 3, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, arguing that approximately 31.5 months had passed from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled completion of trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was significant, it did not constitute unreasonable delay under the Morin framework.

The court apportioned the delay among inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional constraints, concluding that the majority of delay was attributable to inherent case requirements and defence preparation rather than Crown or institutional failures.

The applicant was arrested for drinking and driving offences on April 24, 2011, with his trial scheduled for July 24, 2012—a delay of 15 months.

The applicant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the application, finding that after accounting for periods attributable to defence conduct, inherent time requirements, and institutional factors, the remaining delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines for straightforward provincial court trials.

The applicant suffered minimal prejudice, and no violation of his Charter rights was established.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood and refusal to provide a breath sample.

Police found the defendant sleeping in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot.

The Crown called an arresting officer and a qualified technician.

The defendant testified that he consumed three beers, received a call from his wife advising against driving, and decided to sleep in his vehicle until he felt better.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle but acquitted on both charges due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment and the refusal charge.

The accused was charged with production of cannabis and possession for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused brought a Charter motion under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) seeking to quash the search warrant and exclude evidence obtained as a result of alleged breaches.

The court found that the Information to Obtain the search warrant contained material misrepresentations and failed to meet the requirement of full, frank, and fair disclosure.

Specifically, the detective overstated his expertise in marijuana grow operations when interpreting hydro consumption data, failed to adequately substantiate the reliability of an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that was eight and one-half months old, and conducted only cursory surveillance.

The court concluded that without the detective's unsupported expert opinions regarding hydro readings, the remaining evidence fell short of establishing reasonable grounds to believe a marijuana grow operation was occurring at the residence.