Real Estate Law

The appellant's property was sold in a municipal tax sale, resulting in a surplus of over $76,000 which was paid into court.

The appellant missed the one-year statutory deadline to apply for payment out of court by three weeks, resulting in a deemed forfeiture of the funds to the municipality under s. 380(6) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The application judge held he lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act provides jurisdiction to grant relief from the deemed forfeiture, as the statutory scheme does not expressly or implicitly preclude it.

The court granted relief from forfeiture and ordered the surplus paid to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims as statute-barred and granted the respondents' counterclaim for the amount outstanding under a mortgage.

The self-represented appellant requested an adjournment to obtain counsel, which the Court of Appeal refused due to a history of delay.

The Court found no reviewable error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's preference for the respondents' evidence or the calculation of the mortgage debt based on an expert report.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, conceding that all grounds of appeal depended on the trial judge's finding that there was no fourth lease dated October 31, 2007, with Nemesis Entertainment as a tenant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's rejection of the lease's existence was well anchored in the evidence and contained no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a permanent injunction restraining them from contravening the Town of Georgina's Site Alteration By-law by importing fill onto their property.

The appellants argued that the Aggregate Resources Act permitted them to import fill to rehabilitate a former aggregate pit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific conditions of the appellants' licence and site plans required rehabilitation using only onsite materials.

The Court also found no conflict between the injunction and the Act, as the By-law explicitly exempted authorized rehabilitation activities.

The appellant tenant commenced an application for a declaration of a valid lease after the respondent landlord terminated the tenancy and took possession of the premises.

Three years later, the appellant moved to direct a trial of the issues and amend its pleadings to claim damages for wrongful termination and loss of inventory.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the proposed amendments raised new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed damages claim was an alternative remedy arising from the same factual nexus originally pleaded in the application and supporting affidavit, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligence action against a surveying company regarding a boundary dispute.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant knew of the encroachment and had sufficient information to sue more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the action was out of time and rejecting the appellant's procedural arguments regarding the timing of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant purchaser sought the return of its deposit after aborting a commercial real estate transaction due to environmental issues and a Ministry of the Environment Certificate of Prohibition registered on title.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the purchaser had waived the environmental condition and failed to adduce evidence that it had not received the environmental order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the waiver of the environmental condition effectively waived the title objection, and that the purchaser bore the evidentiary burden on summary judgment to prove it had not received the order.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing compliance with condominium rules under s. 134(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The appellant tenant argued she was subjected to oppressive conduct by the condominium corporations.

The motion judge granted the compliance order, noting that no cross-application for an oppression remedy had been brought and that alleged oppressive conduct did not excuse breaching the rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to grant the compliance order.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

The appellant sought to set aside four property transfers made by the respondent to his wife and her company under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The trial judge found the 1987 and 1988 transfers were not fraudulent, but set aside the 1992 and 1993 transfers of the matrimonial home and a Florida property.

Both parties appealed the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, his refusal to pierce the corporate veil, or his rejection of the laches defence.

Motions to admit fresh evidence were also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent bank based on her default under a mortgage on a condominium property.

The appellant had stopped making principal, interest, and common element fee payments.

The appellant raised defences including that her name had been expropriated and that she was a tenant rather than an owner.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order incorporating terms of settlement regarding zoning restrictions on a proposed plan of subdivision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the language of the consent order clear and unambiguous in excluding the contested lots from the restrictions.

The Court further held that even if there were ambiguity, the parole evidence rule would not assist the appellants, and there was no basis to find unilateral or mutual mistake.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for damages arising from two sewer backups, alleging breach of lease, negligence, and misrepresentation.

The motion judge struck most claims, finding they were barred by the lease's covenant to insure.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the covenant to insure barred the negligence and breach of contract claims, it was not plain and obvious that it or the 'entire agreement' clause barred the negligent misrepresentation claim.

The Court also allowed the tenant's claim that the landlord was estopped from relying on the covenant to insure for the second backup to proceed.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant landlord appealed a motion judge's decision deducting an amount from its claimed relief for a defaulting tenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord provided unchallenged evidence of hiring a commercial real estate agent to re-let the premises, thereby taking reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.

The judgment was varied to award the full amount claimed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondent vendors for alleged misrepresentation regarding an easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no misrepresentation, noting the appellant was fully aware of the easement's use prior to closing and failed to adduce any evidence of damages caused by the vendors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

On a motion in a family property dispute, the moving plaintiff sought leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation over farm property allegedly transferred through a quitclaim deed for inadequate consideration and in breach of fiduciary obligations.

The court found there were numerous triable issues concerning the plaintiffs' claimed interest in the land, the surrounding transfers, mortgages, and the role of family members and their solicitor.

Although there had been delay and material non-disclosure in earlier proceedings, the court held that a CPL was still appropriate in light of the unresolved issues and the threatened sale.

To balance the pending arm's-length sale, the court ordered that the CPL could be vacated if $1,500,000 was paid into court on closing.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's declaration that an option agreement was valid.

The appellants argued the agreement failed to comply with s. 50(21) of the Planning Act because it did not expressly refer to s. 50, but only to the Act in general.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that making the agreement conditional upon compliance with the Act as a whole was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement, as it is impossible to comply with the Act without complying with s. 50.