Lauwers J.A.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of impaired driving causing death and one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm after a high-speed crash.

He was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in his parity analysis by concluding without explanation that the appellant's conduct was more egregious than offenders in similar cases.

The Court substituted a sentence of seven years, noting the appellant's youth and severe injuries as mitigating factors.

The appellant insurer appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion regarding uninsured automobile coverage.

The respondent argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction because the order was interlocutory, not final.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that unless a motion judge explicitly invokes Rule 20.04(4) to make a binding determination of law, an order dismissing summary judgment is presumed interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent over $2.2 million for unpaid commercial leases of forestry equipment.

The appellants argued the respondent was not the proper assignee, disputed the amount owing, and claimed equipment malfunctions excused payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the respondent was the assignee, the debt calculation was correct, and broad exclusion clauses in the leases precluded the equipment malfunction defence.

The court also quashed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding a stay of execution for lack of jurisdiction.

The parents appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their appeal of a Crown wardship decision for delay.

The parents argued the motion judge failed to consider the merits of their appeal and breached their right to a fair hearing by denying an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge should have explicitly addressed the merits, a review of the record showed the parents' appeal raised only factual disputes with no palpable and overriding error.

Given the lack of merit and the child's need for stability, the appeal was dismissed.

In a CCAA restructuring proceeding, stakeholders sought disclosure of a settlement agreement between U.S. Steel, its Canadian subsidiary, and the Attorney General of Canada regarding undertakings under the Investment Canada Act.

The CCAA judge held that the agreement was entirely privileged under s. 36 of the ICA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 36(5) protects the Crown from being compelled to disclose the agreement, this protection does not extend to the private corporations.

The appeal was allowed, and the issue of whether common law settlement privilege barred disclosure was remitted to the CCAA judge.

The franchisor appealed a motion judge's decision finding it breached the duty of fair dealing under s. 3 of the Arthur Wishart Act by failing to disclose that it did not receive significant volume rebates.

The motion judge had read language into a certified common issue without notice to the parties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by effectively amending the common issue and by concluding that the alleged non-disclosure constituted a breach of the duty of fair dealing in the performance of the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the dismissal of its motion to add a new common issue was dismissed.

The appellants, a Canadian citizen and several foreign corporations, appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay an action brought against them in Ontario for misappropriation of proprietary information.

They argued the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction or should decline it on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the contracts were made in Ontario, establishing a real and substantial connection.

The Court also affirmed that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving China was a more appropriate forum, noting that China does not recognize breach of fiduciary duty, a key cause of action pleaded.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing compliance with condominium rules under s. 134(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The appellant tenant argued she was subjected to oppressive conduct by the condominium corporations.

The motion judge granted the compliance order, noting that no cross-application for an oppression remedy had been brought and that alleged oppressive conduct did not excuse breaching the rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to grant the compliance order.

The appellant was convicted of speeding and stunt driving after being clocked at 154 km/h by a police officer using a BEE III radar device from the shoulder of a highway.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the officer did not operate the radar device in accordance with the manufacturer's manual, which he claimed required the patrol vehicle to be in the same or adjacent lane as the target vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the appeal judge's interpretation that the manual allows the radar to monitor traffic moving in either direction across multiple lanes from a stationary roadside position.

The Court also declined to admit fresh evidence from the radar manufacturer, finding it unnecessary.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondents for losses arising from unauthorized investment trading, arguing the action was barred by the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test for discoverability.

The respondents cross-appealed to recover capital gains taxes incurred due to the unauthorized trading.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the claim for taxes was not a new cause of action but a claim for additional damages arising from the existing cause of action, and thus not statute-barred.

The respondent, a silent investor in a private company, brought an oppression action against the managing directors for awarding themselves excessive compensation and failing to provide financial disclosure.

The trial judge found the directors liable for oppression and awarded damages and substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of oppression and the scale of costs, but found the trial judge erred by not calculating the excess compensation on a net basis over the entire 22-year period, which would have credited the directors for under-compensation in the company's early years.

The Court reduced the damages award from $250,000 to $187,453.51 and remitted the quantum of costs to the trial judge for reconsideration in light of a Rule 49 offer to settle.