Conner Harris

The plaintiffs sued the defendant municipality for negligence and nuisance, alleging that a replacement culvert installed by the municipality caused flooding that damaged their buildings.

The buildings were constructed on the municipality's shore road allowance pursuant to building permits issued decades earlier.

The court found that the new culvert was not the cause of the flooding, as the property had a history of flooding prior to its installation.

Furthermore, the court held that the municipality did not owe a private law duty of care to prevent flooding on its own land, and its decision not to undertake further hydrological studies was a protected policy decision.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants, the titled owners of a residential property, brought an application to evict the respondent mother and brother from the home.

The respondent brother, acting as power of attorney for the mother, brought a cross-application asserting trust claims against the property on behalf of their deceased father's estate.

The court allowed the eviction application and dismissed the estate application, finding that the mother lacked standing to advance trust claims on behalf of the intestate estate and that the claims were statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence to support a resulting or constructive trust, as the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by evidence that the property transfer was for consideration.

The applicants, the titled owners of a residential property, brought an application to evict the respondent mother and brother from the home.

The respondent brother, acting as power of attorney for the mother, brought a cross-application asserting trust claims against the property on behalf of their deceased father's estate.

The court allowed the eviction application and dismissed the estate application, finding that the mother lacked standing to advance trust claims on behalf of the intestate estate and that the claims were statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence to support a resulting or constructive trust, as the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by evidence that the property transfer was for consideration.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $10,000 to the responding party.

The defendants, RepVisor Portfolio Systems Inc. et al., brought a motion seeking $100,000 (later reduced to $81,000) in security for costs from the plaintiff, Ian McLean, in his capacity as Trustee of the JSL Trust.

The moving parties argued that the plaintiff was a nominal plaintiff and lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to cover a potential costs award.

The plaintiff countered that he was not a nominal plaintiff, possessed sufficient assets, and that section 249(3) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) provided immunity from posting security for costs for oppression remedies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff, as a trustee with fiduciary duties, was not a nominal plaintiff, and the moving parties failed to demonstrate insufficient assets.

Furthermore, the court noted that the action, in substance, was an oppression remedy, which weighs against ordering security for costs under the OBCA.

The plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in costs.

The appellant, Don Mills Residents Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed its application seeking a declaration and injunction to compel the City of Toronto and C/F Realty Holding Ltd. to construct a community centre as per minutes of settlement.

The application judge found the minutes were not a binding contract and specific performance was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the minutes of settlement, in the context of land-use planning, were not a binding contract but rather a planning instrument under the Planning Act, revisable in the public interest.

The court also found no legal obligation on the City to build the centre, as that obligation rested with C/F Realty Holding Ltd.

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

Two groups of landowners appealed the Surveyor General's confirmation of a survey that extended road allowances to the water's edge of Georgian Bay, separating their properties from the beach.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by ignoring a previous Divisional Court decision, misapplying common law principles of accretion, and rejecting estoppel arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding the Surveyor General made reasonable findings of fact supported by evidence, including that no accretion had occurred and that the original 1820s survey intended the road allowances to reach the water.

The court held the standard of review was correctness for law and palpable and overriding error for fact, and found no such errors.

A residents' association sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel construction of a community centre at a specified site under minutes of settlement arising from planning appeals.

The court held the minutes were part of a planning framework under the Planning Act, not a final and everlasting commercial contract, and that essential terms remained dependent on further agreements including a section 37 agreement and related instruments.

The court further held the minutes did not obligate the municipality to construct, maintain, or operate the facility, and that the discretionary letters-of-credit provision did not create such an obligation.

Specific performance was refused, and the application was dismissed.

The City of Windsor appealed a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) decision awarding the respondents approximately $2.8 million in compensation for expropriated lands and injurious affection.

The City argued the LPAT breached natural justice by copying the respondents' submissions and erred in its treatment of Provincial Policy Statements (PPS) regarding environmentally sensitive lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the extent of copying did not rebut the presumption of independent decision-making.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the LPAT's factual findings regarding the impact of the PPS on the lands' development potential, the valuation of the properties, or the award of interest.

In the context of a pending summary judgment motion regarding an alleged negligent misrepresentation of intent to acquire property for a GO Train station, both parties brought motions to compel answers to questions refused during cross-examinations on affidavits.

The Master applied the principles from Ontario v. Rothmans Inc. to determine the proper scope of cross-examination.

Notably, the Master found that the defendant waived solicitor-client privilege by relying on its counsel's advice to support its defence of good faith and to allege ulterior motives by the plaintiffs.

Both parties were ordered to answer specific questions and re-attend for further cross-examination.

The applicant, a commercial tenant, sought judicial review of the respondent City's actions during the expropriation of restrictive covenants in its lease.

The applicant alleged a denial of procedural fairness regarding the timing of disclosure and the City's refusal to consent to an adjournment of the Hearing of Necessity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the City met its statutory obligations and owed no broader common law duty of procedural fairness at that stage.

The Court also declined to rule on the validity of the expropriation, finding the application premature as the applicant had withdrawn from the statutory hearing process and no final expropriation decision had been made.

The appellants appealed an order directing the sale of a jointly owned property rather than its partition.

Following the commencement of the appeal, the appellants sold their interest in the property to the respondent for $3,900,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the issues raised were not elusive of review and did not warrant the expenditure of judicial resources.

The parties reached an agreement regarding the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs to the respondent in the agreed amount of $20,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant property owner appealed a decision granting the respondent municipality a prescriptive easement for a watermain installed on the property in 1979-1980.

The appellant argued the municipality's use was not open, that the burden of proof regarding permission was reversed, and that public authorities with expropriation powers cannot acquire prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge reasonably inferred the owners had actual or imputed knowledge of the watermain, the lack of evidence of permission rendered any burden of proof issue moot, and there is no legal bar preventing municipalities from acquiring prescriptive easements.

The appellants appealed an order of the Surveyor General confirming a survey plan that fixed the position of a concession road allowance and shore road allowance across their property.

The appellants argued the Surveyor General erred by disregarding an original monument and relying on a standard iron bar as the best evidence of the inner limit of the shore road allowance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the application of the hierarchy of survey evidence and no palpable and overriding error in the Surveyor General's factual findings regarding the monuments.

The appellant lawyer appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him professionally negligent in his representation of the respondent in a condominium application.

The appellant argued the Deputy Judge erred in statutory interpretation, failed to draw adverse inferences from uncalled witnesses, and failed to consider mitigation and apportionment of liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The court also awarded costs to the successful respondent, who was represented by pro bono counsel, on the condition that the respondent provide a written direction that the costs be paid directly to the law firm.

The plaintiff sued his neighbours in nuisance and negligence, alleging that their home reconstruction altered drainage patterns and caused water to infiltrate his basement.

The defendants counterclaimed for trespass, nuisance, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, alleging the plaintiff's own landscaping caused the water issues and that the plaintiff's wife maliciously sought a peace bond against them.

The court dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim.

The court found the defendants' construction was reasonable, approved by the city, and did not breach the standard of care.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to prove causation, as expert evidence indicated the plaintiff's own landscaping likely caused the water accumulation.

The counterclaims were dismissed as trivial or lacking evidence of malice.

The applicant property owner sought a mandatory injunction requiring the respondent municipality to remove a watermain that had been installed on its property in 1979 or 1980.

The municipality brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that it had acquired a prescriptive easement over the land.

The court found that the municipality had established continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use of the land for the watermain for over 20 years prior to the property's conversion to the Land Titles system, without permission from or objection by the property owners.

The court granted the municipality a prescriptive easement and dismissed the property owner's application for removal.

The appellant's property was damaged by flooding following significant rainfalls in May 2013.

The floodwaters originated from adjacent land expropriated by the respondent municipality in 2009 for a construction project.

The appellant had commenced an injurious affection claim before the Ontario Municipal Board in 2011.

Following the flooding, the appellant commenced an action in Superior Court in June 2015.

The respondent moved for summary judgment on the basis that the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was discoverable when the flooding occurred in May 2013.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether an action in Superior Court would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy, and by misapprehending the evidence regarding the appellant's belief that the OMB had exclusive jurisdiction over injurious affection claims.