Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

The self-represented plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant supermarket, brought a motion for leave to further amend his statement of claim to add six individual employees as defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action against the individuals, as the pleadings did not establish any independent tortious conduct outside the scope of their employment.

Furthermore, the court held that the allegations were insufficiently particularized and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also exercised its discretion under Rule 5.04(2) to refuse the amendments, noting that adding the individuals would unduly complicate and delay the proceedings.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim and for the issuance of summonses to witness in an action against his bank regarding a credit card dispute.

The court dismissed the motion to amend, finding that the proposed amendments pleaded fundamentally different facts and a new cause of action after the expiry of the presumptive limitation period, which constitutes non-compensable prejudice.

The court also dismissed the request for summonses as no trial had been scheduled.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the defendant.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiff should have amended a stayed counterclaim in a prior construction lien action instead of commencing a new proceeding.

The plaintiff cross-moved for leave under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to continue the action on behalf of the bankrupt corporation's creditors.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding no abuse of process as the counterclaim was stayed due to bankruptcy and there was no multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also held that the plaintiff did not require s. 38 authorization because the claims sought to pierce the corporate veil against the bankrupt's alter egos, which were personal claims not belonging to the bankrupt's estate.

Following the dismissal of an estate application regarding beneficiary designations, the court determined the costs payable to the successful respondent.

The respondent sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the Estate argued for a reduced amount.

The court found no reprehensible conduct to justify elevated costs and noted that public policy considerations in estate litigation generally limit recovery to reasonable costs.

The court also disregarded the respondent's offer to settle, finding it lacked meaningful compromise.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $26,963.13 for fees and $2,081.76 for disbursements, payable by the Estate.

The appellants failed to complete the sale of their home in 2016.

The respondent was awarded $715,000 in damages in lieu of specific performance at trial.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant requested an adjournment, which the court denied due to the lengthy history of the litigation and lack of evidence supporting the request.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and fact-finding.

The court also rejected the argument that the appellant wife was not a proper party, noting she signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as a consenting spouse under the Family Law Act.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment attacking a police towing procurement process, challenging municipal towing licensing requirements, and alleging unlawful interference with economic interests.

The court held that the applicable procurement thresholds under the municipal purchasing by-law turned on the municipality’s annual expenditure, not the supplier’s anticipated revenue, so no RFT or RFP was required and no procurement breach occurred.

The court further found no breach of procurement-related duties of fairness or good faith, no basis to invalidate the towing contract awarded to the successful bidder, and no merit to the claim that an out-of-municipality towing operator was exempt from Windsor’s licensing regime when towing within the city.

The tort claim also failed because the impugned police conduct did not constitute actionable unlawful means against third parties and there was no proof of intention or damages.

The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was dismissed, the defendants’ cross-motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion on consent for leave to commence a secondary market misrepresentation action under the Securities Act against KPMG and for certification as a class proceeding for settlement purposes.

The court found the statutory criteria satisfied and granted the order, approving the class definition, representative plaintiff, common issue, and the form and dissemination of the notices to class members regarding the settlement hearing and opt-out process.

The appellant commenced an action in Ontario for breach of a share purchase agreement.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action in favour of an ongoing International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement to which it was not a named party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding an arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding an 'arguable case' that the respondent was an affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause, thereby engaging the competence-competence principle.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review case management directions that struck his 267-page appeal factum and required him to obtain trial transcripts for a Small Claims Court appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the case management judge's directions reasonable and necessary given the moving party's flagrant breach of the Rules respecting transcripts and factums.

The court extended the deadline for the moving party to order transcripts but warned that failure to comply could result in the dismissal of his appeal.

Following a trial decision in a wrongful dismissal action, a dispute arose regarding the calculation of the plaintiff's Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) damages.

The plaintiff included a dividend payment of $1,736.10 related to a Restricted Share Unit in his calculations, which the defendant opposed on the basis that dividends were not specifically addressed in the trial reasons.

The court held that the dividend flowed naturally from the decision to award the plaintiff value for his LTIP and permitted its inclusion in the final order.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the motion judge's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment and to strike pleadings was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the motion judge's decision regarding the 2020 limitation issue was a final determination under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The defendants sought costs of a variance motion on a substantial indemnity scale against the plaintiff's former counsel, Monkhouse Law Professional Corporation.

The court found that while Monkhouse's conduct in the underlying action warranted a varied costs order, its conduct during the variance motion itself was professional and not reprehensible.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive, representing a mid-point between the parties' submissions.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim in a medical malpractice action to substitute three specific physicians for 'Jane Doe' defendants, arguing misnomer, or alternatively, special circumstances.

The court found that misnomer did not apply as the 'litigation finger' was not pointing clearly at the proposed defendants, but rather the pleadings were vague and could apply to almost any medical staff member.

However, the court granted leave to add the proposed defendants under the doctrine of special circumstances, leaving the final determination of the limitation defence to the trial judge due to conflicting evidence on the plaintiffs' diligence.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal a decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicant mortgagee brought a motion to set aside any tenancy agreement and obtain an order for possession of the mortgaged property after the respondent owners defaulted.

The respondents failed to appear or provide evidence of a valid tenancy agreement, breaching a previous adjournment order.

The court granted the motion, finding no legal protection for the occupants without a tenancy agreement, and alternatively, that any such agreement was entered into to discourage mortgagee possession.

The occupants were ordered to vacate, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the respondent owners.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion under Rule 51.06 for judgment on alleged admissions regarding a limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not finally dispose of the rights of any parties or any issue, as the limitation defence could still be argued at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, and jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a second status hearing motion to extend the time to set their wrongful dismissal action down for trial.

The defendants opposed, arguing the action should be dismissed for delay after the plaintiffs missed the court-ordered set down date.

The court found the plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, noting that an intervening appeal by the defendants had significantly shortened the time available to complete mediation.

The court held that the plaintiffs' counsel reasonably relied on the defendants' apparent cooperation and that the defendants would suffer no actual prejudice if the action proceeded.

The motion to extend the set down date was granted.

The applicants sought an injunction to stop their neighbour from operating an unapproved outdoor shooting range on his property.

The respondent argued his property was not a 'shooting range' under the Firearms Act because the events were informal and involved non-restricted firearms.

The court found the respondent's organized shooting events were 'regular and structured', meeting the definition of a shooting range, and thus required approval under the Firearms Act.

The court also found the activities violated the municipal zoning by-law and constituted a private nuisance.

An injunction was granted prohibiting the shooting activities unless and until the respondent obtains Firearms Act approval and appropriate zoning.

Following a passing of accounts application where the respondent beneficiary raised over 150 unsuccessful objections, the applicant estate trustee sought costs against the respondent personally on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the respondent's objections were not reasonably necessary for the proper administration of the estate, the applicant's offer to settle lacked any real compromise.

The court ordered the respondent to personally pay $12,500 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, representing the legal fees incurred in response to his objections, with the remaining $39,710.88 payable from the estate.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding that her application for statutory accident benefits was time-barred.

The appellant argued the insurer's notice of refusal did not comply with s. 54 of the SABS because it failed to detail all levels of appeal and misleadingly stated a hard two-year limitation period without explaining discoverability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 54 only requires notice of the right to dispute the refusal at the Tribunal, not subsequent appeal rights.

The Court also found the notice was not misleading, as detailing discoverability principles could detract from the clarity of the warning and confuse claimants.