Civil Litigation - Defendant

The applicant wife brought a motion for leave to bring an urgent motion to enforce a prior court order regarding support, expenses, disclosure, and the sale of the matrimonial home, alleging the respondent husband had depleted business funds.

The respondent argued against the urgency of the request.

The court found that the unexplained depletion of business account funds by the husband created a dire financial circumstance, satisfying the urgency test under the Chief Justice's Notice regarding COVID-19 court operations.

Leave was granted, and specific directions were provided for the urgent motion, with costs awarded to the applicant.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike a negligence claim without leave to amend.

The respondent, a lawyer acting as a notary, had notarized an affidavit containing allegations against the appellant.

The affidavit was subsequently published in a newspaper article.

The appellant's original defamation claim was statute-barred, so he amended to allege negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that no duty of care existed between the appellant and respondent.

The court held that a lawyer does not owe a duty to third parties to verify the accuracy of affidavit contents, and there was insufficient proximity between the parties to ground a duty of care.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment concerning liability for damages arising from an accident.

The appellants sought to challenge the trial judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that liability should be apportioned two-thirds to Safranyos and one-third to Hamilton.

The court made a Sanderson order requiring Safranyos to pay one-third of McHugh's costs of trial and appeal, but declined to impose such an order against Hamilton, as Hamilton made no arguments relating to McHugh's liability at trial or on appeal.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal from an order of Swinton J. dismissing her application for judicial review of a decision by Kurke J. refusing leave to appeal an interlocutory order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

The applicant, who was self-represented, challenged the appointment on the grounds that it violated her human rights.

The court dismissed the motion for extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and significant prejudice to the respondent from the delay.

The court held that judicial review does not lie against a Superior Court judge's refusal of leave to appeal, and therefore no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, a corporation, sought permission to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The motion judge granted leave for the sole shareholder to represent the corporation.

The respondent moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the appellant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs.

The motion judge found reasonable grounds for security for costs and ordered the appellant to post security in the amount of $6,906.95 before the motion for leave to appeal was sent to a panel for disposition, but declined to require security for the appeal itself pending leave being granted.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a costs decision of the Superior Court awarding $121,892 to the respondent municipality.

The applicant also sought a stay of enforcement of the costs award pending disposition of the leave application.

The respondent sought dismissal of the motion or, alternatively, sought permission to conduct a judgment debtor examination and take steps to preserve the status quo, citing concerns about a potential fraudulent conveyance of the applicant's matrimonial home interest to his wife prior to the action.

The motions judge granted the stay of enforcement pending determination of the leave application.

The appellants sought a stay of a writ of seizure and sale pending an appeal of a vexatious litigants order, along with requests for six months to arrange financing and to lift a Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The appellants were self-represented and had previously had their pleadings struck for non-compliance with court orders.

The court identified three procedural problems: the appellants lacked leave from a Superior Court judge to bring the motion, no appeal had been brought from the underlying costs order, and the appellants had not sought leave to appeal a default judgment of which they were unaware.

The court granted a limited stay of execution of the writ of seizure and sale until thirty days after the appeal of the vexatious litigants order was heard, and encouraged the appellants to retain legal counsel or seek pro bono assistance.

Datawind Inc. appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice registering a costs order from the United Kingdom High Court of Justice under the Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

Datawind argued that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over it as a third party to the original proceeding, that the costs order was not for a definite sum, and that it was denied natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the foreign court had jurisdiction, that the interim payment on account of costs constituted a registrable judgment for a definite sum, and that no denial of natural justice occurred.

The defendant York Medical Group moved for security for costs against the plaintiff Proxema Ltd. under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring leave under s. 67(2) of the Construction Lien Act.

The court granted leave, finding the motion necessary due to Proxema's precarious financial position and its role as a nominal plaintiff pursuing litigation for the benefit of solvent subtrades.

The court determined that Proxema was a "shell corporation" with insufficient assets to cover a costs award.

Balancing the interests of preventing risk-free litigation by insolvent plaintiffs and avoiding prohibitive orders, and considering the existence of a counterclaim, the court ordered Proxema to pay $50,000 into court as security for costs, drawing an analogy to the $50,000 limit in s. 44(1)(d) of the Construction Lien Act for vacating a lien.

The plaintiff successfully defended two summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, The City of Mississauga and Peel Condominium Corporation #89.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued against the costs, citing a last-minute change in the plaintiff's discovery evidence and excessive hours billed by plaintiff's counsel.

The court found the plaintiff fully successful and entitled to costs, dismissing the defendants' arguments regarding the plaintiff's testimony.

While acknowledging the complexity, the court found the total hours billed by two counsel to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 all-inclusive against each defendant, applying Rule 57.01(1) and principles of fairness and reasonableness in costs awards.

The moving party sought leave to amend a statement of claim in a defamation action after documentary discovery revealed additional allegedly defamatory emails authored by the responding party.

The responding party opposed the amendment on the basis that the communications were unrelated, privileged, and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Libel and Slander Act.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the presumption in favour of permitting amendments absent non-compensable prejudice.

It found the amendments merely provided further particulars of an existing defamation claim rather than advancing a new cause of action, and that any prejudice could be addressed through procedural steps.

The motion to amend was granted and the responding party’s cross‑motion to compel answers to undertakings was dismissed.

The plaintiff broadcaster sought partial summary judgment to enforce payment of two dishonoured post‑dated cheques issued by the defendant in connection with a sports broadcasting agreement.

The defendant argued that equitable set‑off should apply because the cheques were issued for services to be rendered and the dispute did not involve international commerce.

The court held that under the Bills of Exchange Act equitable set‑off is not available as a defence to an action on a dishonoured cheque, and that the rule applies regardless of whether the transaction involves international trade or services yet to be performed.

Partial summary judgment was granted for the value of the dishonoured cheques.

However, because the defendant’s counterclaim raised triable issues, execution of the judgment was stayed on condition that the defendant pay the judgment amount with interest into court.

The plaintiffs moved for leave under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their statement of claim to allege that the insurer failed to properly assess and adjust their business interruption loss following a fire.

The insurer opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action outside the one‑year contractual limitation period and brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the proposed amendment introduced a new factual basis for liability—post‑loss adjustment of the claim—distinct from the existing allegation that the defendants failed to place adequate insurance coverage prior to the loss.

As the limitation period had expired, the amendment was barred.

With no viable claim remaining against the insurer, summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim and the broker’s crossclaim was granted.

A commercial dispute between competing importers of Caribbean food products involved allegations of defamation, statutory unfair competition under s. 7 of the Trade-marks Act, depreciation of goodwill under s. 22, and unlawful interference with economic relations.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made false statements to a supplier accusing the plaintiffs of importing and selling infringing competing products, which were subsequently relayed to the supplier in a written report.

The court held that the oral statements were statute‑barred as slander but that the written republication constituted actionable libel.

Although qualified privilege initially applied, the court found the defendant acted with malice and intentional dishonesty, defeating the defence.

The plaintiffs failed to prove economic loss or that the statements caused termination of their distributorship, but general damages were presumed for libel and awarded to one plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment alleging civil fraud arising from altered trust ledger statements relating to land transfer tax amounts in three condominium transactions.

The moving party alleged the defendant misrepresented tax amounts, resulting in a $40,000 discrepancy and sought damages, tracing, and disgorgement.

The court found that the defendant had made a false representation and knew it was false, but determined that the plaintiff failed to establish the required element of loss because the $40,000 had been repaid pursuant to a certified cheque delivered in connection with criminal proceedings.

As a result, the claim for repayment of the $40,000 could not succeed on summary judgment.

Remaining claims, including disgorgement and related relief, were left to be determined at trial.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative order dismissing the action for failure to set the matter down for trial within the required time.

Applying the factors outlined in Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that the delay resulted from inadvertence, that the plaintiff acted promptly after learning of the dismissal, and that the action had not been abandoned.

Although the defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and that presumptive prejudice arose from the expiry of the limitation period, the court held the limitation issue could not be determined definitively at this stage and that no substantial prejudice would arise from allowing the action to proceed.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.

At a Commercial List case conference, the court addressed procedural issues relating to documentary production, privilege waiver, and the scheduling of discoveries.

The plaintiffs had expressed a desire to bring a motion to strike certain counterclaims, while certain defendants contemplated a motion for a further and better affidavit of documents.

The court declined to schedule those motions, directing instead that the matters be addressed through examinations for discovery and cooperative document production.

Counsel were directed to resolve production issues, exchange documents, and establish a protocol for property inspections to facilitate an expert valuation report.

The moving party sought certification of a national class proceeding alleging that organic asphalt roofing shingles manufactured by the defendants were defective and prone to premature failure.

Claims were advanced in negligence and under various provincial consumer protection statutes, asserting that the shingles failed prematurely and exposed homeowners to risks such as water penetration, mould, and structural damage.

The defendants opposed certification on the grounds that the claim disclosed only pure economic loss, that no common defect existed across the products, and that individual remedies were preferable.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action, that expert evidence provided some basis in fact for a common defect, and that the proposed class and common issues met the statutory requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

A class proceeding was found to be the preferable procedure given the small individual claims and the efficiency of resolving common issues collectively.

Following a civil action concerning a dispute over the proceeds from the sale of a jointly owned house, the plaintiff obtained judgment for a portion of the claimed amount.

The plaintiff then sought costs of the action on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted that although there were settlement discussions, none of the offers complied with Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore did not justify elevated costs.

While the court accepted the reasonableness of the hourly rate and time spent, it considered the claimed amount somewhat high given the value and nature of the dispute.

The court exercised its discretion and awarded reduced partial indemnity costs.

Following certification of a proposed class proceeding concerning a medical product, the court determined the appropriate costs award for the certification motion and a related motion to strike an affidavit.

The court considered the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Although the plaintiffs were successful in obtaining certification, the evidentiary record and legal issues were relatively modest and the defendants made timely concessions that narrowed the scope of the dispute.

The court concluded that a conservative costs award was appropriate and reduced the plaintiffs’ claimed fees to a reasonable partial indemnity level.

The defendants were awarded costs for their successful motion to strike, which were offset against the certification costs.