Administrative Law

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The appellant challenged a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication treatment.

The appellant and amicus curiae argued that the appellant was denied statutory rights advice and that the evidence did not support the incapacity finding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant received proper rights advice as required by statute, that no additional rights advice obligation arose when the appellant later expressed intent to apply to the Board, and that the Board's finding of incapacity was supported by evidence and involved no palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal concerning an international commercial arbitration award.

The application judge had set aside the award due to a reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, who had accepted a second, unrelated arbitration engagement from the appellants' counsel without disclosure to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred by applying a subjective test for disclosure and bias, rather than the objective test mandated by the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The Court found no breach of the arbitrator's legal duty to disclose and no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the second arbitration involved no common parties or overlapping issues, and the arbitrator was not aware of the parties' subjective disclosure expectations.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to address other grounds for attacking the award.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision that struck out a default judgment and statement of claim as an abuse of process, found overpayment on a mortgage due to fraud, and awarded damages.

The trial judge's decision relied in part on prior Financial Services Tribunal findings of fraudulent conduct by the appellant mortgage broker.

The appellants challenged the striking out of the judgment/claim, the trial judge's credibility findings, and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings, noting that the appellants' counsel had consented to the judge hearing the case despite prior dealings, and found no evidence of bias.

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) affirming a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing medications.

The appellant, who was self-represented, did not appear at the appeal hearing, but amicus curiae provided submissions.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding mootness but ultimately found the appeal was not moot due to the appellant's ongoing interactions with the mental health system and the potential relevance of a prior capable wish.

The court reviewed the CCB's application of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and its consideration of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The court found no reviewable errors by the CCB, concluding that the CCB's finding on the appellant's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment was sufficient, and that the appellant's religious beliefs were a manifestation of his mental condition, not a genuine religious objection.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion for contempt against Mr. Sutharsan for breaching a 2021 injunction that prohibited him from providing unauthorized legal services.

Mr. Sutharsan consented to the contempt order, and the matter proceeded to a penalty hearing.

The LSO sought 30 days incarceration.

The court, applying the five-factor test for civil contempt sanctions, found Mr. Sutharsan remorseful and his breaches not egregious enough to warrant incarceration.

The court imposed a penalty of 100 hours of community service and ordered Mr. Sutharsan to pay $6,000 in costs to the LSO, payable at $300 per month.

The appellant, Trillium Power Wind Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its claims for misfeasance in public office and spoliation against the Ontario government.

The claims arose from the abrupt cancellation of offshore wind power projects and the subsequent destruction of government documents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the misfeasance claim, finding no evidence that the moratorium announcement was timed to injure the appellant or that the appellant suffered damages.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the spoliation claim, finding that the deliberate destruction of relevant government documents, even under a general policy, constituted spoliation and an abuse of process.

Despite this, no damages were awarded for spoliation as the appellant could not prove it suffered any, but the appellant was granted costs of the appeal and Ontario was deprived of its costs below.

The appellant, Julie Daly, appealed the dismissal of her claim for damages under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other relief against the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown.

Her claim alleged improper treatment and bias by LTB members during several applications concerning her lease.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the LTB was not a suable entity and the Crown was not vicariously liable for the LTB's actions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is immune from vicarious liability for judicial acts of quasi-judicial board members acting in good faith under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown for alleged breaches of her Charter rights and various torts, seeking damages.

The defendants brought motions under Rule 21 to dismiss or strike the claim.

The court granted the motions, finding that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is not vicariously liable for the actions of independent LTB tribunal members.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The appeal concerns the openness of a police services board hearing regarding an extension of time for service of a disciplinary notice.

Following an investigation by the Ontario Independent Police Review Director into allegations of police misconduct in the investigation of the death of an Indigenous man, a retired judge appointed as a substitute decision-maker ordered that the extension hearing be held in camera.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and First Nation complainants sought judicial review, arguing that the hearing should be open pursuant to section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Divisional Court upheld the in camera order, finding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test did not apply to administrative proceedings and that the statutory test under the Police Services Act was sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply to administrative proceedings, the Charter right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press recognized in Langenfeld applies to police services board meetings, and the presumption of openness under the Police Services Act must be considered in light of this Charter protection.

The defendant, a member of the Royal Canadian Legion, organized and promoted two vacation packages without being registered as a travel agent under the Travel Industry Act.

The Bahamas cruise package resulted in $25,089.91 in losses to 104 victims, and the Hawaii vacation package resulted in $45,500.00 in losses with no value delivered.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of acting as a travel agent without registration.

At sentencing, the court found aggravated moral wrongdoing, including misappropriation of funds, continued promotion of trips while unable to deliver, and deliberate deception of victims.

The court imposed intermittent jail sentences totaling 75 days on the primary count and 45 days concurrent on the secondary count, rejecting arguments for a non-custodial sentence despite the defendant's lack of prior record and extensive volunteer history.

The appellant appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board that declined to provide a term allowing for community living at the hospital's discretion.

The Board instead included a generous daily pass provision at the hospital's discretion.

The Court of Appeal found the order reflected the evidence of the treating psychiatrist and hospital team, and that the daily pass provision adequately addressed concerns regarding the appellant's potential deterioration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Canadian National Railway Company (CNR) moved to stay an application brought by the Regional Municipality of Halton and its constituent municipalities (Halton) concerning the applicability of provincial and municipal laws to CNR's proposed intermodal rail hub in Milton.

Halton's application sought declarations on constitutional division of powers issues, arguing that provincial and local laws of general application should apply to the federal undertaking.

CNR contended the application was premature and interfered with an ongoing federal environmental assessment process.

The court granted CNR's motion to stay Halton's application, finding that while the constitutional issues were not hypothetical, the federal environmental review panel was mandated to consider local concerns and impacts, and allowing the application to proceed would be an unwarranted intrusion into the federal process and an inefficient use of judicial resources.

The stay is temporary, pending the completion of the federal environmental assessment and the Minister's decision.

The applicant, a police officer, sought an anonymity order and a publication ban for an upcoming mandatory inquest into a death following his use of force, citing alleged threats to his safety on social media.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the paramountcy of the "open court" principle and the mandatory nature of section 32 of the Coroner's Act, which stipulates that inquests shall be open to the public with only two specific exceptions not applicable to this case.

The court found no evidence of specific threats constituting a real and substantial risk to justify overriding the statutory requirement for a public inquest.

The appellant was charged with operating a taxicab without a valid licence contrary to the City of Oshawa Taxicab Licensing By-law.

The appellant was detected through an undercover operation where a municipal officer used the Uber app to request a ride.

The appellant accepted the ride request and arrived at the pickup location but was detained before any passenger entered the vehicle.

At trial, the appellant argued that no completed trip occurred and therefore no "operation" of an illegal taxicab had been proven.

The trial justice convicted based on findings that the appellant accepted the Uber ride request, arrived at the pickup location, and paid a cancellation fee, constituting evidence of hiring himself out for conveyance.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "conveyance" and "for hire" under the by-law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against the police services board and an officer for missing and damaged property that had been seized.

The appellants argued their action was an enforcement of a court order under section 16(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, which has no limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants' true cause of action was for monetary damages based on allegations of neglect or refusal to return goods and damage to property, not enforcement of the original order of disposition.

Since the action was commenced more than two years after the appellants knew the property had been forfeited to the Crown, it was barred by the two-year limitation period under section 4 of the Limitations Act.

The Municipality of West Nipissing sought an injunction to restrain the respondents from operating an automobile repair shop, alleging contravention of a zoning by-law.

The respondents claimed legal non-conforming use.

The court found that the respondents failed to establish that an auto repair shop was operating at the property when the prohibiting by-law was enacted, as prior repairs were incidental to a towing business.

Furthermore, they failed to prove continuous operation of an auto repair shop after the towing business moved.

Consequently, the current use was not a legal non-conforming use, and the injunction was granted.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and the defendant police officers brought a motion seeking a declaration that Lina and Paul Lochner lacked standing to challenge a court-approved settlement concerning George Lochner, a party under disability.

The court found that Lina and Paul had received courtesy notice of the settlement approval motion but were not legally entitled to notice, nor were they "affected persons" under Rule 37.14(1) as their proprietary or economic rights were not impacted.

The court granted the PGT's motion, declaring Lina and Paul had no standing, and awarded costs against them due to their unmeritorious arguments and disruptive courtroom behaviour.

The court also initiated a process under Rule 2.1.02 to summarily dismiss Lina and Paul's own motion to set aside the settlement judgment as an abuse of process.

A landscaping company was convicted of operating a pit without a licence under the Aggregate Resources Act after removing rocks and boulders from farmland to facilitate the construction of a fence.

The company appealed, arguing that the excavation was for the purpose of building a structure (a fence) and therefore fell within the statutory exemption.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding that the primary purpose of the excavation was to facilitate the building of a fence, which constitutes a structure within the meaning of the Act's exemption.

A mother sought costs against a Children's Aid Society following the withdrawal of a child protection application.

The Society had commenced proceedings seeking supervision of the child, who had Crohn's disease, after the mother sought alternative naturopathic treatment and refused to cooperate with the Society's investigation.

The court dismissed the costs motion, finding that while the mother was a strong advocate for her child, the Society acted reasonably in investigating concerns raised by medical professionals and in seeking a minimally intrusive court order to compel cooperation.

The Society reassessed its position once information was provided and withdrew the application at the third court appearance.

A 17-year-old youth charged with two counts of assault appeared in youth court with a paralegal, Leopoldo Llorente, rather than with counsel.

The youth and his father had attempted to access legal aid but were unable to reach the Legal Aid Ontario toll-free line.

The paralegal sought to be recognized as a suitable adult under section 25(7) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to assist the youth.

The court held that paralegals are not eligible to be considered suitable adults under section 25(7) and directed that the youth be represented by counsel under section 25(4) of the Act.