Anne E. London-Weinstein

This costs endorsement addresses a motion regarding parenting time and the appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court found that success on the motion was divided: parenting time was reinstated, but the OCL was not appointed.

The court also addressed outstanding child support and ordered immediate payment to the Applicant.

Given the divided success and the circumstances, no costs were awarded.

The court sentenced Chawn Lemieux for second-degree murder following a public shooting in Ottawa.

The decision reviews the statutory and case law considerations for setting the period of parole ineligibility, including the nature and circumstances of the offence, the character of the offender, jury recommendations, and victim impact statements.

After reviewing comparable case law, the court imposed a life sentence with 16 years of parole ineligibility, emphasizing the aggravating factors of public danger, prior record, and use of a firearm, while also considering Lemieux’s youth, difficult upbringing, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The respondent, Michael Franchina, was sentenced to an absolute discharge and a weapons prohibition order under section 109 of the Criminal Code following a trial for assault with a weapon.

However, because the Crown had proceeded by summary conviction, a section 109 weapons prohibition order was not legally available upon the imposition of an absolute discharge.

The Crown conceded the sentencing error and brought the matter forward for review.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to delete the weapons prohibition order.

The Bank of Nova Scotia sought leave to issue a notice of garnishment to enforce a 2014 judgment against Ronald William Arnold, after more than six years had passed.

The court reviewed the requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure for seeking such leave, including the need to show no waiver or acquiescence by the plaintiff and the absence of detrimental reliance by the defendant.

The court found that the Bank had made continuous efforts to enforce the judgment and contact the defendant, who acknowledged but refused to pay the debt.

The court granted leave to issue the notice of garnishment.

The appellant, Prosper Chenjelani, appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg in 100 ml of blood, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on alleged errors by the trial judge, including the rejection of evidence of racial profiling, the sufficiency of reasons, and the application of the law regarding racial profiling.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge’s findings and the applicable legal standards, ultimately dismissing the appeal and upholding the conviction.

The court considered whether to exercise its discretion to grant pre-charge Charter relief in the form of a declaration that the seizure of items by police during a criminal investigation was in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The Applicants, Eastway Tank Pump and Meter Ltd. and Neil Greene, had not been charged with a criminal offence but were under investigation following a fatal explosion.

The court reviewed the factual background, the parties' positions, and relevant case law on the availability of certiorari and declaratory relief prior to the laying of charges.

Ultimately, the court declined to exercise its discretion to grant the relief at this stage, finding the Charter issues best left to the trial judge, but left open the possibility of renewal if charges are not laid within a reasonable time and further evidence of reputational harm is provided.

The applicants, owners of 156 First Avenue in Ottawa, sought a declaration of prescriptive easement over a laneway (the “Disputed Lands”) running between their property and the respondents’ property at 152 First Avenue.

The applicants claimed the right to use the laneway to access the rear of their property and for parking, and sought an order for the removal of a fence erected by the respondents.

The court reviewed extensive affidavit evidence from the parties, former tenants, and neighbours regarding the historical use of the laneway.

The court found that while there was some evidence of past use for parking, the applicants failed to establish 20 years of open, uninterrupted, and acquiesced use necessary for a prescriptive easement, nor that such use was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder and facing a joint judge-and-jury trial with a co-accused, sought a Rowbotham order after legal aid funding had been denied.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish the second precondition because proceeds from the sale of her home had not been pursued to fund the defence.

The application for state-funded counsel was therefore denied.

However, given the complexity of the anticipated trial, the accused's language and mobility limitations, the presence of a co-accused, and expected voluntariness and Charter motions, the court appointed amicus with an expanded adversarial mandate in the interests of justice.

This endorsement addresses a motion regarding parenting time between Kristen McElroy (mother) and Ryan Andrew Spence (father) for their six-year-old child, Bryson McElroy.

The court reviews the parties’ parenting history, the mother’s unilateral changes to the father’s access, and allegations of substance abuse.

The court finds no evidence to justify supervised parenting time for the father and restores his regular access, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the need for cooperative co-parenting.

The court also orders the father to pay outstanding child support directly to the mother and provides directions for resolving costs.

The court considered whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Hassan Ozeir for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found that police lacked such grounds, as their observations of Ozeir were consistent with benign behaviour and did not match the pattern of drug trafficking described by tipsters or observed in relation to his brother, Yousef Ozeir.

The court concluded that the arrest and subsequent search violated sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the Charter breach and misleading police testimony.

The court allowed the appeal of Erwin Blanco’s conviction for sexual assault, finding that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient regarding the complainant’s state of mind and the issue of consent.

The trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting evidence about whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity, particularly her statements that she thought the activity “felt nice” and that she was “very tired.” The court also found that the trial judge did not properly address whether any consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust or authority under section 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

As a result, a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a lower court decision upholding a firearms officer's refusal to issue him a firearms licence.

The refusal was based on the appellant's history of mental health issues, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia and past psychotic episodes, as well as police reports of family conflict.

The appellant introduced fresh evidence of his current stability, employment, and discipline.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the lower court did not err in concluding the firearms officer's decision was reasonable given the legitimate concerns regarding public safety and the appellant's denial of his mental health history.

The Applicant, Althea Reyes, sought certiorari in aid of prohibition to challenge a trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure and the introduction of her prior criminal record.

The Crown moved for summary dismissal of Reyes' application.

The court found that the alleged errors by the trial judge were not jurisdictional in nature, but rather discretionary matters within the trial judge's purview (e.g., length of adjournment for disclosure review, recall of witnesses, abuse of process, or mistrial applications).

The court emphasized that extraordinary remedies like certiorari are reserved for jurisdictional errors, not mere alleged errors reviewable on appeal.

Consequently, the court summarily dismissed Reyes' application, finding it manifestly frivolous as it was "obviously doomed to fail."

The Applicant sought $150,000 in interim costs but was unsuccessful.

The Respondent then sought costs for that unsuccessful motion.

The court exercised its discretion to defer the determination of costs for the motion to the trial judge.

The decision was based on the lack of a final determination of substantive issues, the narrow scope of the interim costs motion, and a concern that an immediate costs order might impair the Applicant's ability to finance and prepare for trial, particularly regarding expert evidence on the Respondent's financial affairs.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing the trial judge erred by sentencing him as if he committed a "use" offence rather than a "possession" offence, and by overstating the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found no error in principle, stating the trial judge properly considered all circumstances, including the potential for harm, and that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

This motion for directions concerned the estate of Paula Vout, deceased, with the Applicant seeking a determination of funds improperly diverted by the Respondent and whether certain transfers were gifts.

The Respondent, the deceased's daughter and named Estate Trustee, had failed to probate the will, account for assets, or comply with previous court orders.

The court found that joint assets remaining at death ($157,000) were owed to the Estate.

Further, $205,000 in "Real Estate Advances" claimed by the Respondent as gifts were determined to be subject to a resulting trust in favour of the Estate, as the Respondent failed to provide corroborating evidence to rebut the presumption of gift.

The court allowed a deduction of $70,000 for legitimate healthcare and property maintenance expenses incurred by the deceased.

The total amount found owing to the Estate was $453,000.

The court clarified that the Estate Trustee, not the Applicant, was responsible for collecting these funds.

Costs were reserved for further submissions.

The Applicant sought an interim disbursement costs order of $150,000 to fund financial experts and counsel for an upcoming trial, arguing the Respondent had significant income.

The Respondent claimed financial destitution due to the commercial real estate market downturn.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion, finding she failed to provide sufficient evidence of her inability to fund the litigation from other sources (e.g., family loans) and lacked a detailed breakdown of future costs, as opposed to past expenses.

The court emphasized that interim cost awards are discretionary, limited to exceptional cases, and require clear demonstration of necessity and reasonableness for future litigation expenses.

This judgment concerns a murder trial where the accused, Brandon Lamoureux, was charged with the fatal stabbing of Gilbert Rumleskie.

The central issue was the identification of the stabber, with conflicting and unreliable witness testimonies from Jordan Plumb and Ashley Dombroskie, and circumstantial evidence including grainy surveillance video and DNA analysis.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility of all witnesses, noting significant inconsistencies and admitted lies from the Crown's key witnesses.

Despite evidence of animus and prior threats by the accused towards the victim, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused or Jordan Plumb, whose knife was the murder weapon and bore his DNA, inflicted the fatal wound.

The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must be rationally inconsistent with any other conclusion than guilt, and that reasonable inferences consistent with innocence can arise from a lack of evidence.

Ultimately, the court found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence brought a motion for disclosure of emails exchanged between Crown counsel, asserting their relevance to a potential abuse of process application.

The accused had been convicted of second-degree murder.

The emails concerned prior disclosure of third-party suspect material to an alternate suspect (I.A.) who testified for the defence, which contradicted the Crown's cross-examination suggesting I.A. had no legitimate basis for his knowledge.

The court found the emails were subject to litigation privilege, which had not expired due to I.A.'s pending appeal.

After reviewing the emails, the court found no evidence of Crown misconduct, bad faith, or improper motives that would warrant disclosure under the "misconduct" exception to privilege.

The motion for disclosure was dismissed, but the emails were sealed for appellate review given the court's mistaken belief about its post-verdict jurisdiction for an abuse of process application in a jury trial, and concerns regarding unusual juror conduct.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce various pieces of evidence, including the accused's prior firearm possession, drug trafficking, and involvement in other incidents.

Initially, the court excluded most of this evidence, finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly due to the risk of propensity-based reasoning.

However, the evidentiary landscape shifted when a defence witness indicated they would testify as the shooter.

This change rendered some previously excluded evidence, such as the accused's drug possession for trafficking and being shot, admissible as it became highly probative to rebut the defence's theory and establish the accused's motive to carry a firearm.

The court emphasized the dynamic nature of relevance and the balancing act between probative value and prejudicial effect, ultimately exercising its discretion to exclude certain evidence to ensure trial fairness and manageability.