Anne E. London-Weinstein

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit after-the-fact conduct evidence to establish the accused's state of mind regarding the defences of provocation and defence of another person.

The court ruled that while such evidence is generally admissible if relevant to state of mind, the specific conduct of the accused (jogging with a cup, smoking, changing hairstyle, leaving the scene) was too equivocal to support an inference about his state of mind at the time of the shooting.

Consequently, the evidence was deemed inadmissible for determining culpability or state of mind for murder, but remained admissible for the purpose of identifying the shooter.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to have the defence of provocation put to the jury.

The court first addressed the constitutionality of the July 2015 amendment to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, concurring with R. v. Mujber that the requirement of an indictable offence punishable by five or more years imprisonment violated s. 7 of the Charter and was of no force and effect.

The court then assessed whether there was an air of reality to the provocation defence, considering the four elements: wrongful act or insult, sufficiency to deprive an ordinary person of self-control, the accused acting in response, and acting suddenly before passion cooled.

Despite the accused denying being the shooter, the court found that, taking the defence evidence at its highest, a jury could reasonably infer the elements of provocation, including a wrongful act (brandishing a weapon at a friend) and a sudden reaction, influenced by the accused's recent shooting injury and age.

The defence of provocation was therefore left with the jury.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and scope of use for intercepted communications in a second-degree murder trial.

The accused, Donald Musselman, and a third-party witness, I.A., both testified that I.A. was the shooter.

The Crown sought to introduce intercepts to rebut this defence, arguing they undermined I.A.'s claim and suggested Musselman directed I.A. to falsely assume responsibility.

The court conducted a probative-prejudicial balancing analysis for numerous intercepts, admitting some for impeachment purposes only, while excluding others due to their highly prejudicial nature, including references to extrinsic criminal conduct and a criminal lifestyle.

The judge declined to admit the intercepts for the truth of their contents as admissions, exercising judicial discretion to ensure overall trial fairness and prevent propensity-based reasoning, given the volume of discreditable conduct evidence.

This ruling addresses whether the defence of "defence of another person" had an air of reality in a second-degree murder trial, meaning it should be put to the jury.

The accused, Donald Musselman, was charged with the murder of Markland Campbell.

The Crown argued against the air of reality, citing the accused's denial of being the shooter and potential inconsistency with a provocation defence.

The court found that despite the accused's denial, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to support the three elements of self-defence (reasonable belief of threat, defensive purpose, reasonable response) to meet the evidential burden for an air of reality.

The judge emphasized resolving doubts in favour of leaving the defence to the jury and that inconsistent defences can both have an air of reality.

Donald Musselman was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to introduce wiretap intercepts as part of its case-in-chief to prove identification and rebut an alternate suspect defence.

The court ruled that the intercepts, while probative, carried significant risks of moral and reasoning prejudice if introduced early, especially given their content (extrinsic criminal behaviour, gang discussions, etc.) and the uncertainty of defence witnesses testifying.

The court initially denied their introduction as part of the Crown's case but allowed their use for cross-examination if the defence called I.A. or Musselman to testify that I.A. was the shooter, as this would crystallize their probative value.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude certain prior convictions (unauthorized possession of a firearm and assault) from being used for credibility purposes during his testimony.

The court granted the application, finding that these convictions had limited probative value on credibility and posed a significant risk of propensity reasoning by the jury, outweighing their probative value.

The court noted that other convictions (failure to comply and possession for trafficking) and evidence of involvement in the drug subculture would still be admissible, preventing a distorted picture of the accused.

Following a family law trial where the applicant mother was largely successful on issues of primary parenting, residence, and decision-making, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent father had some success on minor issues, and both parties had behaved unreasonably at times.

The court found the applicant was the largely successful party and awarded her costs of $13,895 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant, a former provincial legislator charged with offences related to the Freedom Convoy protest, applied for a change of venue from Ottawa, arguing pervasive bias prevented a fair trial.

The Crown argued the court was bound by a prior coordinate decision denying a change of venue for another convoy participant.

The court found it was not bound by the prior decision due to significant differences in evidence, notably a targeted social media campaign against the applicant.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that existing procedural safeguards, including robust jury screening, were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit evidence of discreditable conduct against the respondent, who is charged with second-degree murder.

The court admitted evidence of specific threats involving a knife made by the respondent to the deceased shortly before the killing, and a prior incident where the respondent brandished a knife and stabbed a motel room wall in the deceased's presence.

However, the court declined to admit evidence of the respondent's prior convictions for weapon possession, robbery (involving knife brandishing), and assault with a weapon, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, particularly on the central issue of who possessed the murder weapon.

His Majesty the King brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to challenge a trial judge's declaration of a mistrial in a domestic violence case.

The respondent argued against the remedies and raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court found that the trial judge's intemperate and disparaging remarks towards counsel and the respondent created an appearance of unfairness and a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby rebutting the presumption of judicial impartiality.

Consequently, the court declined to remit the matter back to the original trial judge for further consideration.

This trial decision addresses parenting and child support for a four-year-old child born from a brief, high-conflict relationship.

The Mother sought primary decision-making and residence, while the Father sought equal shared parenting and a parallel parenting regime.

The court dismissed the Father's allegations of sexual assault against the Mother due to insufficient evidence.

The court determined that the child's primary residence would remain with the Mother, citing the child's stable environment and the impracticality of the Father's proposed school arrangements.

Decision-making was split, with the Mother having final say on health and education, and the Father on extracurricular activities, both requiring consultation.

The Father's parenting time was gradually increased, and child support was ordered based on the Father's income and imputed income for the Mother.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, re-elected trial by judge alone.

The sole issue was whether the accused was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) by virtue of a mental illness under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from psychosis due to schizophrenia, which rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions, despite knowing the physical nature and quality of the acts.

The court accepted the defence's burden and found the accused NCR.

The applicant sought a bail review to vary a condition that completely banned his use of social media.

He had been arrested during the 'Rolling Thunder' protest and charged with causing a disturbance and mischief.

The court found that an absolute ban on social media use was overly broad and an error in law, as it unjustifiably infringed on the applicant's Charter right to freedom of expression and political dissent.

The bail condition was varied to only prohibit using social media to counsel or encourage others to break the law.

The applicant sought interim child support and imputation of income to the respondent, who claimed inability to work due to physical limitations.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed but did not accept his doctor's opinion as expert evidence for complete inability to work.

Income was imputed at minimum wage for 30 hours/week, resulting in a lower child support amount than sought by the applicant.

Issues of retroactive support and life insurance were deferred to trial.

Costs were divided due to mixed success.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action with prejudice due to the plaintiff's repeated failures to participate in litigation.

The plaintiff failed to attend examinations for discovery, did not file an affidavit of documents, and failed to comply with a court order requiring them to appoint new counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct demonstrated an intention to abandon the action and granted the dismissal under Rules 3.04(4)(b)&(c) and 34.15(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, with costs to be determined.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for two counts of causing a disturbance and one count of assault arising from two separate incidents at a Tim Horton's and a Walmart where he refused to wear a mask.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to analyze the essential elements of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's oral reasons were adequate when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and that the findings of guilt were supported by the evidence.

In a voir dire during a first-degree murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's utterances upon arrest and his formal police statement, alleging breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found that a five-minute delay in providing the right to counsel upon arrest was justified by specific officer and public safety concerns.

The court also held that the accused's spontaneous utterances and his subsequent formal statement to police were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the accused being a youthful Indigenous offender and the interviewing officer making ambiguous comments about the accused's integrity and future prospects.

This ruling addresses an application by the Crown to remove defence counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest.

Defence counsel represented the accused in a murder trial while also representing the mother of the Crown's key witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

The court found a significant appearance of divided loyalties, particularly concerning the cross-examination of the key witness whose credibility was central to the defence theory.

Despite the accused's desire to retain counsel and counsel's assertion of no actual conflict, the court prioritized public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the removal of counsel.

The Applicant Mother and Respondent Father, who have a child with special needs, were before the court on a motion for parenting time and a cross-motion for child support.

The court addressed only the parenting time aspect, finding a material change in circumstances due to the Father's lack of contact with the child for eight months.

The court ordered a gradual restoration of the Father's parenting time, starting with specific daytime visits, and maintained the Mother's sole decision-making authority with a requirement to consult the Father.

The Mother's requests for a parenting course for the Father, OCL involvement, and unilateral passport/travel authority were denied.

The Father's request for joint decision-making and immediate equal parenting time was also denied.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude evidence of his criminal record (including sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm) and to redact references to these convictions from an expert's forensic psychiatry report.

The court denied the application, finding that while the convictions were prejudicial, they formed a vital basis for the expert's opinion, particularly regarding potential antisocial conduct disorder or sexual paraphilia.

The court emphasized that the jury must have access to the full foundation of expert evidence to assess its weight, even considering Gladue principles for Indigenous accused.