Angela Chaisson

The defendants sought costs of $41,082.45 on a full indemnity basis after successfully dismissing the plaintiffs' defamation action as a SLAPP suit.

The plaintiffs agreed the amount was reasonable but argued it should be reduced by approximately $14,000, which the defendants allegedly raised through a GoFundMe campaign, citing the principle of indemnity.

The court rejected this argument, holding that costs inquiries are restricted to examining the lawyer's bill, not the successful party's means of payment.

The court awarded the defendants $41,000 in costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The applicant, the Integrity Commissioner, was found substantially successful in the underlying application, despite not succeeding on all allegations.

The court considered the applicant's claim for partial or substantial indemnity costs and the respondent's arguments regarding excessive time and junior counsel fees.

The court awarded the applicant $25,000.00 for fees plus $2,125.42 for disbursements, including HST, finding the respondent's conduct intentional and persistent, which warranted more than a nominal costs order.

The plaintiffs brought two defamation actions against the defendants arising from tweets and emails that characterized the plaintiffs' own tweets as homophobic and transphobic.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the expressions related to matters of public interest and that, while the defamation claim had some merit, the defendants had a valid defence of fair comment given the highly politicized and hyperbolic nature of Twitter.

The actions were dismissed as strategic litigation against public participation.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, appealed a decision declaring her seat vacant for breaching the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The application judge found she intentionally used her position to influence council regarding a fire department service charge levied against her son, and failed to leave a closed meeting where the matter was discussed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the application judge's findings on liability or the imposition of the penalty.

The moving party, a municipal councillor, sought a stay pending her appeal of a judgment that found she violated the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act and declared her council seat vacant.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the court found no irreparable harm because it ordered the municipality not to fill the vacancy pending the appeal.

The balance of convenience favoured the public interest in municipal integrity, and the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The Integrity Commissioner applied for a determination that a municipal councillor contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The councillor had declared a conflict of interest regarding a fire department service charge levied against her son, but remained in the council meeting and actively questioned the fire department representative about practices and procedures.

The court found the councillor intentionally used her position to attempt to obtain a financial advantage for her son, contravening the Act.

The court declared the councillor's seat vacant but declined to disqualify her from seeking re-election in the future.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of non-consensual prior sexual activity with the complainant, his aunt, to explain the nature of their relationship, his behaviour during the alleged incident, and his mental state at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the other sexual activity (OSA) evidence met the requirements of section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant claimed the complainant had sexually assaulted him over a two to three-year period when he was a youth.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence sufficiently particularized, relevant to issues at trial, and having significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The applicant sought specific school records of the complainant relating to an inquiry by school administrators about an allegation that the complainant had been raped by her cousin.

The court conducted a stage one analysis under section 278 of the Criminal Code to determine whether the records met the threshold of "likely relevance." The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate case-specific information showing the records were likely relevant to an issue at trial.

The evidence was inconsistent and insufficient to establish that the records would contain information of value to the defence.

The application was dismissed at the first stage.

The accused applied for the production of third-party records from a school board and a children's aid society relating to two complainants.

Having previously found the records likely relevant, the court proceeded to the second stage of the O'Connor application to determine whether production should be ordered.

Applying the principles from McNeil, the court balanced the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainants' privacy interests.

The court ordered the production of the records, subject to redactions for plainly irrelevant and highly sensitive personal information.

The accused, charged with historical domestic violence offences, brought an application under the common law O'Connor framework for the production of third-party records relating to two complainants.

The records were held by a school board and a children's aid society.

The court found that the accused met the first-stage threshold of demonstrating that the records were likely to be relevant to the complainants' credibility, given the unfolding of the allegations and the potential influence of a school social worker.

The court ordered the records produced for judicial inspection.

The defendants, correctional officers, sought summary judgment to dismiss an action by the plaintiffs for intrusion upon seclusion and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional/economic harm.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants unlawfully accessed and disseminated confidential information about one plaintiff's criminal convictions, leading to family law disputes and public shaming.

The court dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue for trial, as the information accessed was publicly available, the defendants' actions were not "highly offensive," and no economic harm or sufficient mental suffering was proven.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant regarding the deemed undertaking rule, the court considered the issue of costs.

The court had previously indicated a preliminary view that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty and public importance of the issue.

The appellant sought $12,000 in costs, while the respondent argued for no costs on the appeal but sought to retain the motion judge's costs award.

The Divisional Court confirmed its preliminary conclusion, ordering no costs for the original motion, the motion for leave to appeal, or the appeal itself, emphasizing the public benefit of clarifying a novel point of practice.

The appellant faced criminal charges for sexual assault and was also sued civilly by the complainant.

In the civil action, the appellant obtained discovery evidence, which his civil counsel shared with his criminal counsel to impeach the complainant at the criminal trial.

The motion judge ruled that the appellant needed court leave under rule 30.1(8) to use the evidence for impeachment and that sharing it with criminal counsel breached the deemed undertaking.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that rule 30.1(6) permits the use of discovery evidence for impeachment without prior court authorization, and that sharing the evidence with legal advisors does not breach the undertaking.

The defendant in a civil sexual assault action sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for a declaration that the deemed undertaking rule did not apply to the disclosure of discovery evidence to his criminal counsel for impeachment purposes.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order requiring pre-approval to use the impeachment exception, and noting the issue is of sufficient importance to the profession and administration of justice.

The defendant in a civil action for sexual assault brought a motion seeking a declaration that he had not breached the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1.01) or, alternatively, an order to exempt certain documents from it.

The defendant's civil counsel had provided the plaintiff's compelled documentary productions, including sensitive medical and counselling records, to his criminal defence counsel for use in parallel criminal proceedings to impeach the plaintiff's credibility, without prior notice or court directions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the impeachment exception in Rule 30.1.01(6) is not automatic and requires parties to seek directions from the civil court, ordinarily on notice to the producing party, before using discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding.

The court found that the defendant had breached the deemed undertaking.

The appellant appealed a libel judgment arising from nine online blog posts published during and after a human rights tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings that multiple statements were defamatory, that the appellant acted with malice, and that malice defeated any otherwise available fair comment defence.

Although the court held that describing the respondent as an anti-Semite was opinion rather than fact, that error did not affect the outcome because the malice finding remained dispositive.

The court also upheld the damages award of $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, together with appeal costs to the respondent.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of the deceased, Dwayne Thompson, taken at the coroner's office, through Sgt. Raymond Linton, who was not present at the autopsy.

The accused objected, arguing the Crown reneged on an agreement not to introduce autopsy photographs through Sgt. Linton and that the photograph was prejudicial.

The court ruled the photograph admissible, clarifying it was not an "autopsy photograph" in the agreed-upon sense, and that its probative value, particularly in authenticating paper bags placed on the deceased's hands at the scene, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also issued directives for future disclosure of electronic evidence to prevent similar misunderstandings.

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.