Andrew K. Lokan

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision finding that provisions of the Expenditure Restraint Act limiting compensation increases for federal employees infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the parties had already engaged in a meaningful process of collective bargaining before the Act was enacted.

The Court concluded that s. 2(d) guarantees a process, not a result, and the Act did not render the pursuit of collective goals effectively impossible.

A municipal government brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a Charter application challenging federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry and mandating destruction of registry records.

The underlying application alleged the repeal violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter by increasing risks of domestic violence against women.

The court considered the principles governing intervention under Rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including whether the proposed intervenor had a real and identifiable interest, a distinct perspective, or relevant expertise.

The court found the municipality had demonstrated a substantial interest in firearm‑related public safety and domestic violence issues and could provide assistance on the public interest component of the injunction analysis without expanding the evidentiary record.

Leave to intervene was granted subject to limitations on evidence, length of submissions, and costs.

The Union filed policy grievances alleging the Employer violated the collective agreement by unilaterally deciding to no longer agree to requests for compensating time off (CTO) in lieu of overtime pay for correctional officers.

The Union argued this undermined local bargaining, breached local agreements, and had a discriminatory effect on employees with family responsibilities.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievances, finding that the collective agreement required mutual agreement for CTO, and the Employer was entitled to withhold its consent for legitimate business reasons, namely reducing overtime costs.

The Board found no prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status, as employees had not requested formal accommodation.

The grievances were allowed only to the extent that the Employer breached notice provisions in any local agreements.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding they breached the Securities Act by trading and distributing securities to offshore investors without registration or a prospectus.

The appellants argued the Commission lacked constitutional jurisdiction because the distributions occurred outside Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding a sufficient connection between the appellants' activities and Ontario to justify regulatory action, as the appellants were Ontario residents, used an Ontario transfer agent, and deposited funds in Ontario bank accounts.

The court also upheld the Commission's costs award as reasonable.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's order for a re-trial, which was based on a finding that the jury's answers regarding damages were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury's answers were not inconsistent and that there was evidence to support their findings on past and future wage loss and general damages.

The jury's verdict was reinstated, and the issue of costs was remitted to the trial judge.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection that the Grievance Settlement Board lacked jurisdiction to hear grievances concerning its unilateral decision to cease agreeing to compensating time off (CTO) for overtime worked.

The Employer argued that the collective agreement made CTO subject to mutual agreement, and its refusal to agree was an unreviewable exercise of management rights.

The Union argued the decision violated local agreements, past practice, and other collective agreement provisions.

The Board dismissed the Employer's preliminary objections, finding it had jurisdiction to determine whether the Employer's exercise of management rights adversely affected substantive rights under the collective agreement, and that the Union had provided sufficient particulars of its case.

The appellant, Hydro One Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Financial Services Tribunal order for a partial wind-up of its pension plan under s. 69(1)(d) of the Pension Benefits Act.

Following a corporate merger, the employment of 73 Management Compensation Plan (MCP) employees was terminated.

The Tribunal used a 'subset analysis' to determine that a 'significant number' of plan members had been terminated, comparing the number of terminated MCP employees to the total number of active MCP plan members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 69(1)(d) permits a subset analysis in appropriate circumstances and that the Tribunal's application of this analysis was reasonable given that the merger intentionally targeted senior employees nearing retirement.

The appellant appealed a jury decision dismissing his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence, alleging the respondent's trial counsel improperly cross-examined him on an inaccurate diagram of the intersection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test for discoverability and there was no support for the allegations of improper conduct.

Furthermore, there was ample evidence to support the jury's findings on liability and causation.

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

She argued that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of 'material' contribution regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge was not deficient when read as a whole.

The court noted that the jury was entitled to accept the defence theory, supported by the appellant's own medical expert, that her condition could have been caused by factors other than the accident.

The appellant sought to examine a non-party expert witness residing in British Columbia prior to an application hearing, but the motion judge dismissed the request for an interprovincial summons.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order finally disposing of an issue between a party and a non-party is a final order.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the expert's evidence was not necessary for the due adjudication of the proceeding under the Interprovincial Summonses Act.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for business interruption losses following a fire at their towing and collision repair facility.

They argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and misapprehended the evidence regarding the impact of the fire and subsequent arson rumours on their business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons standing alone made appellate review difficult, the basis for her rejection of the appellants' evidence and expert report was patent on the record.

The appellant filed for bankruptcy shortly before the scheduled peremptory appeal hearing.

The appellant's counsel was unable to obtain instructions from the trustee in bankruptcy regarding whether to proceed with the appeal.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal deemed the appeal abandoned, ordered the release of funds held in court to the respondent, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed two decisions of the Ontario Energy Board granting leave to construct a natural gas pipeline to the proposed Greenfield Energy Centre.

The appellants argued the Board erred by limiting its public interest consideration to the pipeline itself, rather than considering the environmental and socio-economic effects of the generating station and the resulting closure of a coal-fired plant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly limited its jurisdiction to the specific project before it and correctly deferred to the Ministry of the Environment on the assessment of the plant.

The Union filed a grievance alleging the Employer violated the collective agreement by failing to reimburse insulin pumps and supplies.

At the hearing, the parties agreed to adjourn the matter.

The Vice-Chair ordered the Employer to produce specific information regarding Manulife's past coverage, cost of claims, and direction letters related to insulin pumps and supplies.

The plaintiffs appealed a jury's assessment of damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the award was perverse and that the trial judge's threshold determination under the Insurance Act bound the jury on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was entitled to reject the plaintiff's position on causation based on the evidence.

The Court also held that a trial judge's threshold determination does not constitute a binding finding of fact on causation for the jury.

The employer brought a motion requesting that the Vice-Chair recuse herself from hearing a policy grievance due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The employer argued that the Vice-Chair's prior experience mediating and arbitrating disputes between the parties, and specifically her familiarity with the phrase 'removed from the table' in the context of joint committee meetings, created an apprehension of bias.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the motion, finding that in the context of labour arbitration, an adjudicator's prior knowledge and experience with the parties and their collective agreement does not, without more, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellants, representing members of a salaried pension plan, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that upheld the Superintendent's consent to merge their plan with an hourly-paid plan.

The appellants argued the merger would dilute their plan's surplus and that the surplus constituted 'other benefits' protected under s. 81(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

On the merits, the Court found that an actuarial surplus in an ongoing defined benefit plan is not an 'other benefit' under s. 81(5), and dismissed the appeal.

Following a successful appeal by Canadian Waste Services Inc. and the Minister of the Environment, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The Court exercised its discretion to order no costs for either the application in the Divisional Court or the appeal.

The Court reasoned that the case involved a novel and difficult issue of statutory interpretation regarding the 1996 amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act, raised issues of public importance, and featured a significant disparity in the financial resources of the parties.

The Ontario Waste Management Association brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal involving environmental issues.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, subject to conditions regarding factum length, oral argument time, costs, and filing deadlines.

The moving party, Green Lane Landfill, sought leave to intervene as an added party in an environmental appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the motion, subject to conditions regarding factum length, oral argument time, costs, and filing deadlines.