Andrew K. Lokan

Following the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application on the grounds of delay, the respondents sought costs.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, reducing the claimed amounts due to excessive hours, duplication of effort by multiple lawyers, and unexplained disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $18,000 plus disbursements for the respondent union and $14,000 plus disbursements for the respondent locals.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision but delayed perfecting the application for 13 months.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the application for delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, noting the applicants offered no explanation for the delay, evaded explicit OLRB orders, and caused ongoing prejudice and uncertainty in a time-sensitive labour relations dispute.

The applicant, CBS Canada Co., and the Superintendent of Financial Services, along with the CAW-Canada, reached a settlement regarding the partial wind-up of the Westinghouse Canada Inc. Pension Plans following several plant closures.

The Financial Services Tribunal approved the Minutes of Settlement, which detailed the calculation of early retirement benefits for affected plan members and the withdrawal of the Superintendent's Notices of Proposal to refuse the partial wind-up reports.

The Tribunal remained seized of the matter for implementation purposes.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested costs for a motion for a stay, despite no costs being requested in relation to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs of the motion for a stay to the Attorney General, fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The Association of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario (AMAPCEO) filed a policy grievance asserting that the Employer, Management Board Secretariat, failed to include certain employees under the recognition clause of their collective agreement, claiming AMAPCEO is a 'tag end' unit.

The Employer opposed the grievance and argued that the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) should be granted third party status because the determination of the grievance could affect OPSEU's bargaining rights.

OPSEU sought status, while AMAPCEO opposed it.

The Grievance Settlement Board granted OPSEU third party status, finding that the fundamental question of whether AMAPCEO is a tag end unit directly implicates the scope of OPSEU's bargaining units, and natural justice requires OPSEU's participation.

OPSEU's intervention was made conditional on its agreement to be bound by the result of the proceedings.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) brought a motion for a stay of an order restraining its members from picketing at courthouses during a lawful strike, pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

OPSEU argued that peaceful informational picketing is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and that a total ban was unnecessary.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for granting a stay.

While tentatively accepting jurisdiction as a single judge to hear the motion, the court dismissed the motion on the balance of convenience branch.

The court held that the public interest in ensuring unimpeded access to the courts, as established in BCGEU, outweighed the harm flowing from the infringement of the picketers' constitutional rights.

The applicant union alleged that a sale of part of a business occurred when Ontario Hydro sold the Glen Cross Conference and Training Centre to Goldman Hotels Inc. The purchaser argued that it merely bought idle assets and started a new business.

The Board found that there was substantial continuity of enterprise, evidenced by a two-year leaseback to Ontario Hydro and continued room bookings from former clients.

The Board also found substantial continuity in the bargaining unit work performed by the front-line staff.

The Board concluded that a sale of part of a business occurred under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act and declared that the collective agreement applied to the purchaser's operation.

The appellants challenged 1994 changes to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) that restricted eligibility based on immigration status, imposed a three-month waiting period, and required individual rather than family-based eligibility assessments.

The appellants argued these changes violated their equality rights under section 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the distinction between permanent and non-permanent residents is not an enumerated or analogous ground under section 15.

The Court further found that the three-month waiting period and the shift to individual eligibility did not constitute discrimination.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Superintendent of Financial Services proposed an order requiring Dustbane Enterprises Limited to fund a deficit arising from the partial wind-up of its pension plan.

Dustbane argued that the plan was a multi-employer pension plan and that its distributors were separate employers liable for their respective shares of the deficit.

The Financial Services Tribunal held that the plan did not meet the statutory requirements for a multi-employer pension plan, as there were no written participation agreements and the plan was not administered as such.

The Tribunal directed the Superintendent to carry out the proposed order, making Dustbane solely liable for the deficit.

The appellant municipality sought to enforce Ontario's building code and development charge regime against a massive redevelopment project at a federally owned international airport operated under long-term leases.

The court held that the entire redevelopment, including terminals, runways, utilities, and air navigation facilities, fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics and also formed part of a federal undertaking, such that provincial laws directly regulating building design, permits, and development charges were constitutionally inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity.

The court further held that provincial land and property development legislation could not apply to the federal Crown's continuing property interest in leased airport lands.

Ancillary claims based on the ground lease, common law compensation, and refusal of fire services were rejected, with the municipality directed to pursue the statutory grant-in-lieu regime instead.

The applicant union applied under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, alleging a sale of part of Ontario Hydro's business to the Bracebridge Hydro-Electric Commission.

The parties agreed that a sale and intermingling of employees had occurred following a municipal takeover under the Power Corporation Act.

The Board determined that the existing bargaining structure of separate 'inside' (office) and 'outside' units should be maintained.

The Board ordered a representation vote for the office employees, as the applicant formerly represented a sufficient percentage (one of three) of the intermingled employees.

However, the Board declined to order a vote for the outside employees, as the applicant formerly represented only 10% of that unit, and terminated the applicant's bargaining rights with respect to the outside unit.

The applicant brought a preliminary motion for an order directing the Superintendent of Financial Services to respond to interrogatories regarding the delay in processing a partial wind-up application for a pension plan.

The Superintendent refused to answer, arguing the reasons for delay were irrelevant.

The Financial Services Tribunal applied the Monsanto test and ordered the Superintendent to answer the interrogatories, finding that the issue of delay was arguably relevant as it had been included in the agreed Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum.

The Power Workers' Union applied under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging a sale of part of Ontario Hydro's business to Lincoln Hydro Electric Commission following a statutorily mandated transfer of retail distribution assets.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that a sale of part of a business had indeed occurred, as Lincoln Hydro acquired a coherent and functioning part of Ontario Hydro's operation.

However, because only one former Ontario Hydro employee accepted a job with Lincoln Hydro and was intermingled with its largely non-union workforce, the Board exercised its discretion under section 69(6) to terminate the union's bargaining rights effective the date of the transfer.

The appellant employer and respondent union were engaged in a bitter, 18-month strike marked by violence.

The employer refused to negotiate a grievance arbitration process for employees dismissed for picket-line violence, making it a precondition to further bargaining.

The Canada Labour Relations Board found this constituted a failure to bargain in good faith and ordered the employer to table its previous tentative agreement, with four unresolved issues subject to binding mediation.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that the determination of bad faith bargaining was within the Board's specialized jurisdiction and not patently unreasonable.

The Court also held that the Board's broad remedial order under s. 99(2) of the Canada Labour Code was rationally connected to the breach and necessary to counteract the consequences of the employer's intransigence, thus not exceeding its jurisdiction.

The appellant employee was suspended for abusing sick leave benefits after the employer hired private investigators who gained entry to his home under false pretenses.

The employee filed grievances under the collective agreement and also commenced a court action for torts and Charter breaches.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory arbitration clause in the Labour Relations Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on labour arbitrators for all disputes arising from the collective agreement.

The Court concluded that both the tort and Charter claims arose from the administration of the collective agreement, and that the arbitrator was a court of competent jurisdiction empowered to grant Charter remedies, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the courts.

The union applied for certification of a group of unrepresented employees at the Salvation Army's Mental Health Services in Metropolitan Toronto, and sought to combine this new unit with an existing unit it already represented.

The employer argued for four separate bargaining units based on location and function.

Applying the Hospital for Sick Children test, the Board found the union's proposed comprehensive unit appropriate, noting it avoided the labour relations problems associated with fragmentation.

Following certification, the Board ordered the combination of the new and existing bargaining units on the agreement of the parties.

The appellants, who were minors at the time of their respective motor vehicle accidents, commenced actions for damages more than two years after the accidents but within two years of reaching the age of majority.

The central issue was whether the two-year limitation period in section 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act excluded the operation of section 47 of the Limitations Act, which postpones the running of limitation periods for persons under legal disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are not inconsistent and that section 47 applies to postpone the limitation period for minors.

The appeals of the minor plaintiffs were allowed.

However, the adult plaintiff's claim, which was commenced after the limitation period expired, was held to be incurably out of time and was dismissed.