Andrew Charles Crichton Parley

The plaintiffs, the estate and family members of Sandra Zarubiak, brought a medical negligence action against Dr. John Luce, Nurse Kathy Cull, and the Niagara Health System.

They alleged that Sandra's discharge from the hospital, despite her deconditioned state and fall risk, led to a subsequent fall, lacerations, and a fatal infection.

The court found that neither Dr. Luce nor Nurse Cull breached the standard of care, concluding that Dr. Luce's decision was a matter of professional judgment, and Nurse Cull's actions were meticulous.

Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as the source of the fatal infection could not be definitively linked to the fall or pre-existing wounds, with both theories being equally plausible.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants sought declarations that the respondent, the mayor of Caledon, contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on land development matters in which he allegedly had a pecuniary interest.

The court found no evidence that the respondent had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the matters voted upon, noting that his property was located several kilometers away from the developments and any potential development of his land was decades in the future.

Both applications were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce answers to questions refused on cross-examination and a motion to adduce fresh evidence, following an adjournment of an underlying motion to vary a Mareva order.

The non-parties sought costs for the adjournment and the motions.

The court found the non-parties were mostly successful overall and awarded them costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at $9,610 for one non-party and $4,310 for the other after assessing the reasonableness of the claimed fees.

The plaintiff, Trade Capital Finance Corp., brought a motion to compel Carlo De Maria to answer questions from his cross-examination on an affidavit supporting a motion by non-parties 2454904 Ontario Inc. and Red Quest Holdings Inc. to vary a Mareva Injunction.

The plaintiff also sought to admit fresh evidence related to banking activities of The Cash House Inc. and DoUknow Inc. The court granted the motion to admit fresh evidence to the extent it supported compelling an answer to one specific question (Q121) regarding DoUknow Inc.'s operating capital, finding it relevant to the true value of The Cash House Inc. shares and the proposed transaction.

All other questions and undertakings from the May 17, 2016 cross-examination were dismissed, as were undertakings from a November 25, 2015 cross-examination, which were deemed moot.

The plaintiff sought an adjournment of a motion brought by non-parties to vary an interim Mareva injunction.

The adjournment was requested to allow the plaintiff to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from an affiant whose affidavit supported the motion to vary.

The court granted the adjournment, applying established principles for judicial discretion in granting adjournments, emphasizing the overall objective of a just determination on the merits and the need for the plaintiff to adequately prepare its opposition.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that Ontario’s permit-suspension enforcement mechanism is constitutionally inoperative to the extent it enforces a bankruptcy-provable toll debt discharged under s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, because it creates an operational conflict and frustrates Parliament’s financial rehabilitation purpose.

The applicants, a group of mortgage investors, applied to appoint a receiver over the property of the respondent, a not-for-profit corporation operating a church and school, due to an outstanding loan balance of approximately $11.5 million.

The respondent had previously commenced an action against the applicants alleging conspiracy and seeking restitution.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not just and convenient to appoint a receiver because the respondent raised triable issues, the property value greatly exceeded the debt, and a receivership would effectively end the ongoing litigation and negatively impact the church and school.

The defendant landlord moved for a mandatory interlocutory injunction to compel the plaintiff tenant to allow access to the leased premises for environmental testing related to redevelopment.

The landlord relied on a lease provision requiring the tenant not to hinder redevelopment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the lease provision did not grant the landlord a right of access, the landlord's case on the merits was weak, and there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside the registrar's dismissal for delay of his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was from a Master's decision dismissing his motion to set aside the dismissal of his action for delay.

The court applied the factors from Paulsson v. University of Illinois and found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden.

The delay in obtaining transcripts was not a valid excuse, and the justice of the case favoured the defendants given the history of delay and the weak merits of the appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a statement of claim to plead that certain corporate defendants were sham entities incorporated to perpetrate a fraud and to seek relief piercing the corporate veil against individuals controlling the corporations.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendment introduced a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held the proposed amendment did not introduce a new cause of action but instead sought an additional remedy arising from facts already pleaded, namely alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and misuse of corporate entities.

Alternatively, the court found that even if a new cause of action were pleaded, the limitation period had not expired because discoverability arose only after examinations for discovery revealed that the corporations conducted no legitimate insurance business.

Leave to amend was granted.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy appealed a decision allowing 407 ETR to enforce pre-bankruptcy toll debts against a discharged bankrupt by directing the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to renew the bankrupt's vehicle permit under s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act.

The Court of Appeal found no operational conflict between the provincial legislation and s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as dual compliance was possible.

However, the Court held that s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act frustrated the federal legislative purpose of providing a discharged bankrupt with a financial 'fresh start'.

Consequently, the doctrine of federal paramountcy applied, rendering s. 22(4) inoperative to the extent that it thwarted the fresh start purpose of the BIA.

The appellant sought costs of $107,070 plus disbursements after successfully appealing a decision under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The respondent argued for no costs on the basis that he was a public interest litigant.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs to either party, noting that success on the appeal was divided, the proceeding raised novel legal issues of public importance regarding municipal codes of conduct, and it was reasonable for the respondent to have pursued the application initially.

The appellant, Mayor Robert Ford, appealed a decision declaring his seat vacant for violating the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA).

The application judge found the appellant breached the MCIA by speaking and voting on a council motion to rescind a previous council decision that required him to reimburse $3,150 in donations to his private football foundation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the original reimbursement order was ultra vires the City of Toronto Act, 2006, which only permits reprimands or suspensions of remuneration for Code of Conduct violations.

Because the financial sanction was a nullity, the appellant did not have a pecuniary interest when he voted to rescind it, and therefore did not contravene the MCIA.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of his action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the contextual approach and the Reid factors, considering the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence explaining prolonged delay in advancing the action, including outstanding undertakings and discovery obligations, and relied primarily on unsupported assertions of health issues.

Given the age of the action, the expiry of the limitation period, and the presumption of prejudice to the defendants, the court found the evidentiary record inadequate to justify reinstatement.

The trustee administering the HCV Fund established under a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act plan for the Canadian Red Cross Society sought directions regarding approximately $483,983 in settlement funds represented by uncashed cheques issued to class members who could not be located.

The court considered three potential approaches: redistributing the funds to known partially paid claimants, transferring the funds to governmental and institutional bodies to attempt to locate missing beneficiaries, or adopting a hybrid approach.

Emphasizing proportionality and the objective of maximizing compensation to class members, the court held that redistributing the funds to known partially paid claimants provided the greatest certainty of placing the funds with eligible victims.

The court therefore approved redistribution of the unclaimed funds among partially paid claimants and authorized the trustee to donate any residual amounts to a charity if further distribution would be impractical.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy sought to appeal a Superior Court decision that found no operational conflict between the Highway 407 Act's vehicle permit denial provisions and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act's discharge provisions.

The Superintendent had not been a party to the lower court proceedings. 407 ETR moved to quash the appeal for lack of standing.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superintendent does not have an automatic right to appeal as a non-party, the court has jurisdiction under s. 193(e) of the BIA to grant leave to appeal in exceptional circumstances.

Finding that the Superintendent was deprived of notice below and raised issues of systemic importance, the Court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

Tobacco producers commenced a proposed class action alleging that federal and provincial governments failed to enforce tobacco taxation and excise legislation, allowing contraband tobacco markets to flourish and causing economic losses to lawful producers.

The plaintiffs advanced claims in misfeasance in public office and negligence, asserting that public officials deliberately failed to enforce statutory regimes to placate certain communities.

The defendants moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the amended statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the pleading failed to allege the essential elements of misfeasance in public office, including deliberate unlawful conduct and bad faith by specific officials.

It further concluded that the statutory schemes governing tobacco regulation did not create a private law duty of care owed to tobacco producers and that recognizing such a duty would improperly subject government policy decisions to tort liability.

The amended statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for an interlocutory injunction against the vendor of its IT business and several former employees who joined a newly established direct competitor.

The vendor had signed a non-competition and non-solicitation agreement upon the sale of the business.

The court found that the strong prima facie case standard applied to the restrictive covenant in the context of a sale of a business.

The court held that the non-competition clause was reasonable, except for a 10 km geographic extension which was severed using the blue-pencil doctrine.

The court granted the injunction against the vendor and the other defendants, finding they were impressed with fiduciary duties, and ordered the preservation and forensic review of electronic devices due to a strong prima facie case of misappropriation of confidential information.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and the motion judge's detailed reasons, finding no error.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.