Andrew Benjamin Cappell

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under section 100 of the Criminal Code for possessing 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons, a Villaroman error regarding the inference of guilt, and failure to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

The motion judge found that while the appeal grounds met the low threshold of not being frivolous, the proposed appeal was extremely weak and the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the conviction for this serious firearms trafficking offence outweighed the appellant's interest in reviewing the conviction.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Shafaq Joya, appealed the Ontario Review Board’s decision to continue his conditional discharge and deny his Charter application for an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board’s assessment of risk and refusal to grant an absolute discharge were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no Charter breach, as the Board’s decision was based on public safety, not resource limitations.

The appellant, S.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that her reasons were careful, comprehensive, and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Malcolm Copeland’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The court held that there was no air of reality to the defence of provocation, as the evidence did not support that Copeland lost self-control and acted on the sudden before his passion could cool.

The court found that the evidence was consistent with self-defence, not provocation, and that the trial judge properly applied the law.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault and weapon possession, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order at a forensic hospital.

He argued the Board made material factual errors and that he should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made mischaracterizations of the evidence, these errors did not impact the reasonableness of its risk assessment or disposition.

The court concluded that the Board understood the correct factual context when its reasons were read as a whole, and that the detention order remained the least onerous and restrictive disposition consistent with public safety, given the appellant's ongoing substance abuse and lack of insight into his mental illness.

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences and appealed both his convictions and sentence.

He sought a pre-trial stay of proceedings due to multiple Charter breaches (unjustified strip search, excessive force in prison, and prolonged segregation).

The trial judge found Charter breaches but denied a stay, opting to consider them at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Babos test for a stay, as an alternative remedy was available.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, finding the trial judge's reasons for the 18-month sentence reduction (for Charter breaches, Gladue factors, and Duncan credit) were conclusory and insufficient for appellate review.

Consequently, the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant was convicted of various firearms offences.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for drug trafficking, which led to an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search incident to arrest, and that the evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court emphasized that the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds proceeds from a holistic consideration of all facts, including prior surveillance of a suspected drug trafficker, a drug overdose in the hotel room, and the suspicious conduct of the appellant and his associate, Ms. Gaspari.

The court found the trial judge's reasoning for the arrest was sound, making it unnecessary to address the s. 24(2) Charter argument.

The appellant, Pheonix Haist, appealed her convictions for gun-related offences and refusal to provide a breath sample.

She argued that her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to delays in being informed of the right and in facilitating access to counsel.

She also contended that her convictions for firearm possession were unreasonable, alleging misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the delays in advising and facilitating counsel were justified by the immediacy requirements of breath demands and officer safety concerns.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence regarding firearm possession, affirming that the inference of possession was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mohinder Saini, appealed his conviction for four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, as well as his six-year sentence.

The collision involved 17 vehicles, resulting in four fatalities and nine serious injuries.

At trial, the appellant claimed momentary inattention due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and "microsleep," but the trial judge rejected this, finding his conduct a marked departure from the standard of care.

On appeal, Saini argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, the sentence was unfit, and his s. 14 Charter right to an interpreter was breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and while some interpretation errors occurred during the reading of sentencing reasons, they were not material to the trial's fairness or the appellant's ability to participate, ordering a certified translation of the reasons as a remedy.

The appellant, Daniel Castellano, appealed his convictions for various criminal offences, including mischief, careless storage of a firearm, possession of stolen property, explosives, and a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in concluding his police statement was voluntary, and in dismissing his application to cross-examine the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant (ITO).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's holistic approach to voluntariness and her discretion in denying cross-examination on the ITO, finding no error in principle or application of the relevant tests.

The appellant, Shafaq Joya, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order with privileges, arguing for a conditional discharge as the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and reasonably determined that a detention order was necessary.

The court emphasized that the Board's decision was based on the brutal nature of the index offence and the need for close monitoring, distinguishing it from cases where expediency alone justified a restrictive disposition.

The appellant, Feisal Noor, appealed his conviction on firearms-related charges, arguing that his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention and s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the police had reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and that the handgun was found in plain view during a lawful struggle, thus dismissing the Charter application and affirming the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing that evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant should have been excluded due to breaches of his Charter rights, specifically the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to his formal arrest, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The court determined that the appellant was psychologically detained from the moment police entered his home, and his s. 10(b) rights were violated.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant factors, the court found the Charter breach serious, the impact on the appellant significant, and society's interest in the administration of justice favoured exclusion.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the live issues, including the credibility of the key witness, and that the verdict was reasonable given the direct evidence presented.

The court reiterated the deference owed to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified that a W.(D.) analysis was not required as the case was based on direct, not circumstantial, evidence.

The appellant, Pius Bempong, appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the jury's verdicts of not guilty for sexual assault but guilty for sexual interference, based on the same facts, were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the apparent inconsistency could be reconciled by a legal error in the trial judge's instructions regarding the definition of "force" in sexual assault versus "touching" in sexual interference, as per the framework established in R. v. R.V. The court clarified that the Crown is not required to cross-appeal an acquittal to rebut an inconsistent verdict argument raised by an appellant.

The appellant, Tesean Alvarez, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification reliability, Vetrovec warnings, exculpatory evidence, and cross-racial identification, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification were inadequate, particularly concerning flaws in the police identification process and the distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

While other grounds of appeal were dismissed, the court concluded that the jury was not properly equipped to assess the identification evidence, which was central to the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a peace officer, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and drug possession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in determining the moment of the appellant's detention under the Charter.

The Court held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the police cruiser blocked his vehicle, and that this detention was arbitrary, leading to a breach of his s. 9 Charter rights.

Furthermore, the police failed to immediately advise him of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained as a result of these breaches must be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all counts.