Andrea VanderHeyden

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to significant trial delay and the introduction of new, more vigilant sureties (the applicant's sister and grandmother).

On the secondary ground, despite the seriousness of the charges (robbery with a firearm, arson, mischief) and rising gun violence, the court was satisfied the applicant discharged his onus, considering his lack of prior violent convictions, physical disability from a self-inflicted gunshot wound, and the strict house arrest plan.

On the tertiary ground, the court weighed the applicant's positive COVID-19 diagnosis amidst an outbreak at the detention centre, along with his youth, lack of convictions, physical disability, and the prospect of pre-trial custody approaching a potential sentence, concluding that public confidence would not be undermined by his release.

Bail was granted with stringent conditions, and the court explicitly removed "keep the peace and be of good behaviour" and "follow rules of the home" conditions, citing R. v. Zora on principles of restraint and judicial oversight of bail terms.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and attempting to distribute child pornography, and obstructing police.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on discreditable conduct evidence and by making personal observations of his hand movements to determine his physical ability to operate a cell phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted to prove identity, and noting the appellant had expressly invited the trial judge to observe his hands during testimony.

The appellant, M.R., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, arguing that his right to an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was infringed.

His Swahili interpreter was only partially accredited and made several significant errors during his testimony, which M.R., who had some English proficiency, corrected.

The trial judge declined a renewed objection to the interpreter, relying on M.R.'s ability to self-correct.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on the appellant to safeguard his own constitutional right to a competent interpreter and by failing to conduct a further inquiry into the interpreter's competence despite clear indications of inaccuracies.

The court emphasized that the right to a competent interpreter is unqualified and a denial of this right is inherently prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, facing serious drug trafficking and firearms charges, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code based on a material change in circumstances.

The court found that the proposal of two new sureties, a stricter release plan including GPS monitoring, and the failure of the detention centre to address the applicant's basic medical needs constituted a material change.

The court held that the strict release plan sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

Furthermore, the institution's failure to provide adequate medical care meant that the applicant's continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The bail review was granted and the applicant was released on a recognizance.

Simeon Harty was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder and discharging a firearm with intent.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, the offender's criminal record, and being on judicial interim release in violation of conditions.

Mitigating factors included his youth, pro-social behavior, community contributions, positive conduct in detention, and rehabilitation prospects.

The jury recommended 10 years parole ineligibility.

The court, comparing the case to R. v. Grant, imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility for murder and a concurrent 10-year sentence (7 years 7 months after pre-sentence custody credit) for discharging a firearm with intent.

Ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact were also made.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the dock during his trial.

The court balanced the interests of a fair trial and courtroom security.

Given the accused's in-custody status, criminal record, and institutional infractions, along with the critical need for the jury to have an unobstructed view of the accused for identification purposes, the application was dismissed.

The Crown applied for an order to permit two police officers to give non-expert opinion evidence identifying the accused from surveillance video in a first-degree murder and attempted murder trial.

The defence resisted the application.

The court found that both officers met the threshold for giving such evidence, having prior acquaintance with the accused and being in a better position than the jury to make the identification due to changes in the accused's appearance and their close interactions.

The court acknowledged potential issues regarding the weight of the evidence and prejudice from prior police contact but ruled the evidence admissible, inviting counsel to minimize the prejudicial risk.

The offender, Lauralee Walker, was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to traffic cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the nature of crack cocaine, and significant mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of prior record, young age, strong family ties, employment history, limited role in the offences, and the context of domestic abuse by her co-accused.

The court also noted the offender's remorse and voluntary disassociation from the co-accused.

Despite the general requirement for custodial sentences in crack cocaine trafficking cases, the court found that the unique circumstances, including over 600 days under restrictive bail conditions, warranted a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, along with ancillary orders including a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA sample order, and victim surcharges.

J.C. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism (Counts 1 & 2) and extortion and sexual assault (Counts 3 & 4).

The court acquitted J.C. on Counts 1 and 2, finding insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant, H.D., was incapable of consenting or that the video was made surreptitiously.

However, the court convicted J.C. on Counts 3 and 4, finding that he extorted sexual favours from H.D. by threatening to post a compromising video online, and that H.D. did not consent to subsequent sexual acts due to duress and power imbalance.

Nicholas Apan pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (51.8 grams).

The Crown sought two years' incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court considered principles of proportionality, parity, denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and rehabilitation, noting the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts since the offence, his mental health issues, and family support.

The court distinguished between conditional sentences (not available for this offence) and probation regarding their denunciatory effect.

The judge imposed an intermittent sentence of 90 days, in addition to 30 days credit for time served, followed by 18 months of probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.