Andrea M. Habas

The applicant sought a declaration that it possessed a prescriptive easement permitting use of a private laneway over the respondent’s property to access parking at the rear of its premises.

The claim relied on alleged continuous and uninterrupted use by the applicant’s predecessors in title for over 20 years before the lands were converted to the Land Titles system.

The court reviewed the principles governing prescriptive easements and the doctrine of lost modern grant, emphasizing the requirement that use be “as of right” rather than permissive.

The evidence established long-standing use of the laneway but did not demonstrate that the use occurred without permission or that the servient owner acquiesced to an asserted right.

The court concluded the use was more consistent with a neighbourly licence than a legally enforceable easement.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal where success was divided, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Divisional Court ordered no costs for the appeal due to the divided success, noting the significant finding of oppressive conduct by the appellants.

The court also set aside the application judge's costs award of $25,000 due to the altered outcome, but upheld the award of $14,790 plus HST for accounting fees, as the appellants' conduct necessitated retaining accountants.

The appellants appealed an order finding they acted oppressively toward the respondent, a 10% minority shareholder in a landlord corporation, by leasing property to their own company at below-market rent.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of oppression regarding the failure to pay fair market rent after the initial lease term expired in 2010.

However, the court set aside the application judge's finding that the respondent reasonably expected triple rent for overholding, and reversed remedial orders directed at a non-party tenant corporation and for the period prior to 2010, finding that cash payments made to the respondent's principal had alleviated any unfair prejudice during that time.

The corporate plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to permit its president, who was not a lawyer, to represent the corporation in a construction lien action and also sought to set aside a noting in default on a counterclaim.

The court held that a corporation must normally be represented by counsel and that leave for non-lawyer representation requires evidence both of financial inability to retain counsel and of the proposed representative’s ability to conduct the litigation.

The court found the evidence of financial inability inadequate and concluded the proposed representative’s conduct demonstrated he was incapable of responsibly managing complex civil litigation.

The court further held that under s. 54 of the Construction Lien Act a defendant seeking to set aside default must provide evidence of a meritorious defence.

Because no such evidence was provided, the motion to set aside the default was dismissed with prejudice.

The applicant, a 10% minority shareholder in a landlord corporation, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholders.

The court determined preliminary issues, finding that the majority shareholders acted oppressively by leasing the corporation's property to their own related business at less than fair market value and failing to enforce the lease terms.

The court also found accounting irregularities, including the landlord corporation paying expenses that should have been paid by the tenant, and ordered remedies including the repayment of improper expenses and a buyout of the applicant's shares without a minority discount.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application against the personal respondent, the President of the corporate respondent.

The Tribunal found that the application contained no allegations of discriminatory conduct against the President and that he was named solely because of his position.

Applying the Persaud factors, the Tribunal concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success against him and dismissed the application as against the President.

The plaintiff sought interim and interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendant from continuing an alleged trespass and requiring removal of construction equipment, fencing, refuse bins, and a large stockpile of topsoil from its property.

The dispute arose from a development arrangement where the defendant was permitted under a letter agreement to operate a sales or construction trailer on a commercial block pending reconveyance.

The defendant argued the provision created a lease granting broader rights of occupation, or alternatively that any misuse constituted only a breach of contract.

The court held the agreement granted only a limited licence to place and operate a trailer and did not confer exclusive possession or a leasehold interest.

The defendant’s additional uses constituted deliberate and continuing trespass warranting injunctive relief, and the RJR‑MacDonald test was satisfied in any event.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the record raised legitimate issues for trial regarding coercion and legitimacy, specifically concerning the appellant's state of mind when signing a guarantee, the nature of the demand, and the options available to him.

Because the facts relevant to these issues were in dispute, a trial was warranted.

The appeal was allowed with costs awarded to the appellant.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision refusing to extend the time to review an Employment Standards Officer's order to pay.

The applicant's solicitor had inadvertently missed the 30-day deadline, initiating the request six months late.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's discretionary decision reasonable given the statutory purpose of prompt resolution and the presumed prejudice of a six-month delay.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring that an offer to lease between the parties was no longer valid.

The offer contained conditions with specific completion dates and stipulated that time was of the essence.

The conditions were not met or extended by the specified dates.

Seven months later, the appellant attempted to unilaterally extend the time to complete the conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that it was commercially unreasonable to interpret the offer as giving the appellant an unlimited right to extend time requirements, and held the appellant was not entitled to unilaterally extend the time.

The appellant real estate agency appealed the dismissal of its claim for commissions against the respondents.

The trial judge found the listing agreement invalid because the agent failed to leave a copy with the vendor, as required by section 35 of the Business Brokers Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

However, the Court noted the trial judge erred in concluding that failure to post the listing on MLS within two days invalidated the agreement, and that agents are required to verify a vendor's authority or sole ownership before signing a listing agreement.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motions for an interim injunction and a certificate of pending litigation regarding a terminated commercial lease.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to seek leave but dismissed the application on the merits.

The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the test for injunctive relief, noting evidence supported the findings that the premises were not unique and damages would suffice.

The court also held that the failure to provide explicit reasons for dismissing the CPL did not warrant granting leave.

The appellant entered into a mortgage agreement that included a profit-sharing scheme.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the scheme constituted a criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that s. 347 is intra vires the Parliament of Canada and does not unconstitutionally infringe on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.