Amit A. Ghosh

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper denial of an adjournment application, failure to afford meaningful opportunity to review disclosure, conviction by section 54 rather than section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, and insufficient evidence of identification.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the adjournment was properly denied, the brief hold-down for disclosure review was reasonable, section 54 was the appropriate procedure, and identification evidence was sufficient.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery contrary to s. 344 of the Criminal Code.

He accosted an 81-year-old woman at an automated banking machine on Yonge Street in Richmond Hill, used force to rob her of approximately $500, and damaged her eyeglasses valued at approximately $500.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 months imprisonment, less credit for 108 days of presentence custody (credited at 1.5 days per day for a total of 162 days), leaving 18 days to be served.

The defendant was also placed on probation for 36 months with conditions including substance abuse counselling, a no-contact order with the victim, a 100-metre distance restriction, restitution of $1,000, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

He applied to stay the charges alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from laying of charges to anticipated trial completion was 18 months and 27 days.

The court applied the new Jordan framework for determining unreasonable delay, finding that after deducting 39 days of defence delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found the defence had not established meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings, as counsel had repeatedly pursued a non-existent witness statement after the Crown and court were ready to set trial dates.

The application was dismissed and trial dates were upheld.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault causing bodily harm under s. 272(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved the brutal sexual assault of an eighteen-year-old virgin victim in the early morning hours of January 1, 2016, in Newmarket.

The offender, intoxicated by cocaine and alcohol, followed the victim from a bus, dragged her onto a snow bank, and subjected her to multiple forms of sexual violence including forced oral sex and vaginal intercourse.

The victim suffered physical injuries and profound psychological trauma.

The court imposed a sentence of eight years in the penitentiary, less enhanced credit for presentence custody, resulting in 5 years and 10.5 months remaining to be served.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registry Act order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement of the complainant, Ashley Briscoe, for its truth under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility established in R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The complainant had recanted her allegations during cross-examination after initially adopting her police statement during examination-in-chief.

The court found that both the necessity and reliability criteria were satisfied.

Necessity was established by the complainant's recantation, and reliability was supported by the videotaped nature of the statement, the availability of the declarant for cross-examination, an adequate K.G.B. caution, and corroborative evidence of the alleged injuries.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the accused was seated in the driver's position and that his ability to drive was impaired with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found that the Crown failed to prove de facto care or control, as the requisite realistic risk of danger was not present.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.