Alexandra Hoy

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, robbery, break and enter, and related offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on identification evidence and admitting hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that any alleged errors were inconsequential given the overwhelming DNA evidence placing the appellant at the scene of the home invasion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor student.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly and illogically rejected the alibi evidence provided by his wife, which would have exonerated him.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a solid evidentiary basis for the trial judge's adverse credibility findings regarding the wife, noting her history of deceit and bizarre behaviour.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not subject the evidence to an unreasonably high standard of scrutiny and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years' imprisonment for robbery and related offences, arguing it violated the parity and jump principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the appellant's circumstances and criminal record differed significantly from his co-accused, and the jump principle did not apply due to the dramatic increase in the seriousness of his crimes.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash a restitution order, as the Crown conceded the stolen funds had been fully recovered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and committing a sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and reliability, and in appreciating the elements of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which attract great deference, and concluding that the finding of no permission to enter supported the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking crack cocaine.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge was unable to identify the appellant from surveillance photographs but relied on the opinions of police officers who identified the appellant in court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the officers' opinions, as they had no special knowledge or advantage over the judge in comparing the photographs to the appellant.

The in-dock identification was inherently frail, and the verdict could not be supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and weapons offences and his sentence of ten years and nine months.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to cross-examine the police officer who prepared the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, alleging the officer deliberately omitted information to mislead the issuing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the allegation of mala fides.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered the appellant's cooperation in expediting the proceeding.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The applicant argued the trial judge and appeal judge misapprehended video surveillance evidence regarding his claim of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the proposed grounds lacked significance to the general administration of criminal justice and the merits were not strong, as the trial judge's findings were based on the evidence as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give instructions on post-offence conduct, a Vetrovec warning, the defence of accident, the elements of manslaughter, causation, and the victim's reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that the defence counsel at trial had not requested the omitted instructions or objected to the charge.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages against the respondent municipality.

The appellant and a friend had driven down a dead-end rural road, got stuck on a hydro right-of-way, and abandoned their vehicle in extreme cold, resulting in severe frostbite injuries.

The appellants argued the municipality breached its standard of care by failing to post 'No Exit' and checkerboard signs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the road conditions were not potentially dangerous to reasonable drivers and that the appellants would have ignored the signs regardless.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants' farm property was expropriated by the respondent, and the parties settled compensation at $1.3 million, with costs to be assessed under s. 32 of the Expropriations Act.

An assessment officer awarded costs, but a Superior Court Justice reduced the amounts on appeal, finding them unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court Justice erred by conducting a rehearing and substituting her own view of what was reasonable instead of applying the proper deferential standard of review.

The assessment officer's awards were reinstated.

The moving party sought to review an order of Doherty J.A. that denied an extension of time to appeal an order refusing to set aside a default judgment for the sale of mortgaged property.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the previous decision, noting the moving party had not moved promptly after learning of the default judgment and the property had already been sold.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.

The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for sexual interference, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of the complainant's recantation and subsequent resiling from that recantation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Palmer test and declined to admit the fresh evidence, finding it would not have affected the trial result given the strong corroborating physical and DNA evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay the respondents' litigation based on an arbitration clause in their shareholder agreements.

The respondents argued the parties never reached an agreement on the contents of a schedule, meaning no arbitration agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and stayed the litigation, noting that the respondents had not sought a declaration that the agreements were void ab initio, the agreements contained severability clauses making the arbitration clauses separate contracts, and under the Arbitration Act, an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction.

The litigation was stayed except with respect to three companies that were not parties to any shareholder agreement.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application for a declaration that the respondent insurance company had a duty to defend a third party claim.

The claim involved property damage allegedly caused by pollution from dry cleaner tenants at the appellants' shopping plaza.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the claims asserted were either outside the scope of coverage or fell within the policy's pollution and owned-property exclusions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that a statement made during a traffic stop should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 8 violation.

The Court of Appeal applied the Grant framework and upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence.

The court found that the police conduct was not egregious, the state of the law was uncertain at the time, and the reliable evidence was essential to the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that it should have been brought in the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash or adjourn the respondent's motion, alleging improper service, and also moved to review an order of a single judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion regarding service, finding she was properly served and prepared.

The Court granted the respondent's motion to quash the appeal, noting that section 171.16(1) of the Cooperative Corporations Act directs appeals to the Divisional Court.

The appellant's motion to review the single judge's order was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed an order varying child support, alleging she did not receive proper notice of the variation motion and therefore did not attend.

The respondent sought an adjournment because the appellant failed to pay two costs orders, which the court declined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if there was a technical defect in service, the appellant had direct knowledge of the motion.

The appellant appealed his provincial offences convictions, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance, failing to wear a seatbelt, and operating without a validated permit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that the appellant had automobile insurance at the time of the offence.

The conviction for operating without insurance was set aside and an acquittal substituted.

The appeal regarding the remaining charges was dismissed as the appellant provided no substantive defence or explanation for missing his first court appearance.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing an adjournment in an oppression remedy proceeding under the Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision not to adjourn was an order ancillary to the OBCA proceeding and therefore appealable to the Divisional Court under s. 255 of the OBCA.