William McIntyre

The respondent's trial was discontinued due to exceptional publicity from statements made in the National Assembly regarding the defence and a witness's credibility.

Before a new trial date was set, the respondent successfully moved for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a stay of proceedings was premature as the possibility of selecting an impartial jury could only be determined at the jury selection stage.

Criminal appeal addressing whether cross-examination of an accused on prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act infringes the right to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the provision is constitutionally valid because prior convictions are admissible on credibility, do not reverse the burden of proof, and can be controlled by limiting instructions, while also recognizing a judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in unusual cases where fairness would be undermined.

On the facts, the majority found no unfairness in admitting the accused's prior non-capital murder conviction given the centrality of credibility and the defence attack on the criminal records of Crown witnesses.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the prior murder conviction should have been excluded and a new trial ordered.

The Minister of Health and Community Services appealed a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that set aside a guardianship order and substituted a custody order for two children in protective care.

The Court of Appeal had held that the Minister must prove parental moral turpitude and name specific adoptive parents to obtain a guardianship order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the guardianship order, holding that the sole criterion under the Family Services Act is the best interests of the child.

The Court found that requiring proof of moral turpitude or the naming of specific adoptive parents contradicts the language and spirit of the Act.

The appellants appealed their convictions for income tax evasion, arguing that evidence obtained prior to the enactment of the Charter under a provision of the Income Tax Act later found to be unconstitutional should be excluded.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the Charter does not apply retrospectively to searches and seizures conducted before it came into force.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Applying the principles from Collins, Sieben, and Hamill, the Court found no error in the lower court's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed from the bench.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal from the appellant's acquittal on charges under the Combines Investigation Act and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutional search.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge and ordered a new trial.

The stay had been entered based on allegations that the Crown's conduct at trial infringed the appellants' rights to fundamental justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer who detected an odour of alcohol and demanded a breath sample for a roadside screening device.

The appellant refused and was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand.

He argued his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a roadside breath demand constitutes a detention under s. 10 of the Charter, triggering the right to counsel.

However, the Court concluded that the limitation on the right to counsel implied by the requirement to provide a sample 'forthwith' is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter, given the importance of deterring impaired driving.

The appellant was stopped at random by a police officer during a spot check.

The officer demanded a breath sample after detecting alcohol, which the appellant refused.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the random stop and the demand for his licence and insurance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing need to combat impaired driving.

The Court also found that the demand for documents did not violate section 8 as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such documents.

The appellant's first two trials on a charge of criminal negligence causing death ended with hung juries.

The trial judge stayed a third trial on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential element of abuse of process, a third trial in these circumstances does not violate the community's sense of fair play and decency.

The appellant appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the validity of a wiretap authorization.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the authorization adequately described the manner of interception in accordance with the Criminal Code, as established in the Wiretap Reference and Lyons v. The Queen.

The appellant was laid off due to a strike by another local of his union at his place of employment.

He applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was denied on the basis that he was 'financing' the strike under s. 44(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, because a portion of his mandatory union dues was diverted to the International Union's strike fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'financing' requires active and voluntary involvement by the claimant.

The mandatory payment of union dues did not constitute financing the labour dispute, and the appellant was therefore entitled to benefits.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 234.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the provision was inoperative because it had not been proclaimed in force in all provinces, allegedly violating equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the non-universal application was justified by a valid federal objective related to provincial law enforcement priorities and resources.

The Court also held that s. 7 of the Charter could not be used to bypass the delayed implementation of equality rights under s. 15.

The appellant brought an action for defamation against the respondent newspaper after it published an article identifying him as a representative of the Jewish Mafia.

A jury awarded the appellant $135,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which the trial judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the award to $13,500, finding the jury's amount unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the jury's assessment was not so grossly inflated as to be unreasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal and applied to adduce fresh evidence consisting of traffic offence notices.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to admit the evidence but subsequently dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso and concluding the evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that once fresh evidence is admitted on the basis that it might reasonably affect the verdict, the court cannot later conclude it had no such effect without usurping the jury's function.

The curative proviso cannot be applied where no error at trial is shown and the issue is solely the admission of fresh evidence.

The respondent dumped woodwaste in provincial marine waters during logging operations and was charged under section 4(1) of the Ocean Dumping Control Act, which prohibits dumping at sea without a permit.

The lower courts held the provision ultra vires Parliament.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the control of marine pollution by dumping is a single, indivisible matter of national concern that falls within the federal peace, order and good government power.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that varied the trial judge's disposition regarding the valuation of shares, related compensation, and interest.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's disposition of these issues.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the trial judgment restored.

The appellant sought an advance payment of special damages for rehabilitation purposes from the respondents.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal against the Canadian National Railway Company, granting the advance payment of $200,000 based on the dissenting reasons of Rice J.A. in the Court of Appeal.

The appeal against VIA Rail Canada Inc. was dismissed without costs.

The appellant's claim for interest on the advanced moneys was dismissed, and costs were awarded on a party and party basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and use of a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred in discounting his testimony.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the disposition of the appeal by the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, a limited partner in an oil and gas exploration fund, brought an action against the general partner after the general partner sold the partnership's non-producing lands to its parent company.

The appellant alleged that the sale breached s. 55(b) of the Partnership Act by making it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the partnership, and that the general partner breached its fiduciary duty.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the partnership continued to exist and receive revenue, so its ordinary business was not rendered impossible.

The Court also held that the general partner did not breach its fiduciary duty, as the partnership agreement permitted conflicts of interest and the sale was made in good faith for fair value.