Warren K. Winkler

The appellant corporation appealed a partial summary judgment order.

The president and CEO of the appellant corporation had pledged shares as security for a loan advanced by the respondent, representing that all was in order despite a notice of restriction on the transfer of the shares.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 19 of the Business Corporations Act, the corporation could not rely on its own non-compliance with its articles and by-laws to defeat the claim, as there was no evidence the respondent knew or ought to have known of the non-compliance.

The appellants appealed a decision quashing their committal to stand trial for manslaughter and instead committing them to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences from the evidence in favour of the defence.

The reviewing judge correctly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to determine the appropriate remedy.

The Crown appealed an order quashing the validation of service ex juris on the respondent foreign corporations for summonses relating to fraud charges.

The Crown argued that mailing the summonses from Canada constituted service in Canada and that the Provincial Offences Act and Criminal Code authorized such service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that in penal proceedings, a summons cannot be served outside Canada without express statutory authorization, which neither the Criminal Code nor the Provincial Offences Act provides.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order finding that their debt to the respondents survived bankruptcy due to fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant physician breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent patients by falsely assuring them their investment was safe.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but the costs awarded by the motion judge were reduced to exclude costs from related proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding spousal and child support, arguing the trial judge failed to award compensatory support, failed to discount the respondent's business expenses, and improperly imputed an income of $40,000 to her based on expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the compensatory aspects of support under Moge, properly assessed the respondent's income, and made no error in qualifying the expert or imputing income to the appellant given her failure to make reasonable efforts to obtain employment.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a discretionary remedy regarding the carriage of a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant's conduct, specifically her decision to assume the role of a participating creditor, warranted the refusal of the requested order.

The Court noted the respondent's undertaking to pursue the claim forcefully and cooperatively.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant had a history of violent behaviour and there were concerns for witness safety, justifying detention on the secondary ground.

Furthermore, the tertiary ground was met as the combined effect of the strength of the Crown's case and the circumstances of the offence made detention necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs and an intervenor sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against James W. Curran and his former solicitor, J. Perry Borden, following the dismissal of a motion to set aside a consent order.

The motion to set aside was based on unfounded allegations of fraud and deceit against another solicitor, David A. Seed.

The Divisional Court found that Mr. Curran and Mr. Borden acted as joint venturers in pursuing a meritless claim and making groundless fraud allegations.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs against both Mr. Curran and Mr. Borden jointly and severally, and to Mr. Seed against Mr. Curran.

The father appealed a decision setting aside a consent order that allowed him to deduct CPP disability benefits paid to his children from his child support obligations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge erred by failing to recognize that the issue was res judicata and by ignoring the statutory exception under s. 33(14) and (15) of the Family Law Act, which permits such deductions when parties consent.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the respondent foster parents.

The affidavit disclosed a mid-trial offer to settle.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, holding that an evidentiary ruling cannot be the subject of an isolated appeal when the ultimate decision on the stay motion was not appealed.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish conflicting decisions regarding the confidentiality of offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for libel.

The defendants pleaded alternative defamatory meanings and sought to justify them.

The motions judge struck out the defendants' particulars on the basis that they were oppressive to the plaintiffs, relying on the Polly Peck approach adopted in Pizza Pizza.

The defendants appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the court cannot strike a pleading or particulars in a libel action that are relevant, necessary, and of reasonable probative value solely on the ground of oppression.

The court must balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant wife appealed an interim order restraining her from sending scurrilous letters to third parties about her husband, and a sealing order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that such letters can constitute harassment under section 46 of the Family Law Act.

The court held that while the order infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, it was justified under section 1 as a proportionate measure given its narrow scope and limited duration.

The sealing order was also upheld.