Tracy Kozlowski

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking in relation to sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because the trial judge acquitted on one count while convicting on others, and that the judge scrutinized his evidence more strictly than the complainant's.

The court held that the verdicts were not irreconcilable on any realistic view of the evidence and that there was an evidentiary basis for the choking conviction apart from the acquitted incident.

The court also found no unfairness in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying charges against the respondents due to unreasonable delay under s 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge made several errors in attributing delay and assessing prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's analysis consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Godin.

The Court emphasized deference to the trial judge's knowledge of local court practices and her strong factual findings regarding the prejudice suffered by the respondents over the 25-month delay.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying her an absolute discharge.

The appellant argued there was no evidence she would stop taking her medication if discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's missed psychiatric appointments, lack of insight, and past omissions to take medication.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing an unarmed victim.

He appealed his convictions on several grounds, including allegations of juror coercion and outside influence, the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on self-defence under section 37 of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge's review of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the juror's allegations of coercion were protected by juror secrecy, the alleged outside influence was not capable of influencing the jury, and there was no air of reality to a self-defence claim under section 37.

The appellant appealed convictions entered by a jury.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown's concession, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and ordered a new trial without addressing the other grounds.

The youth appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and erred in admitting a hearsay statement.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons were too brief to reveal the basis for resolving conflicting evidence.

Furthermore, the hearsay statement lacked reliability, as the declarant had a motive to fabricate and the evidence required cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, subject to the Crown's discretion given the appellant had almost completed his probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge failed to mention or apply the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility and the burden of proof, and failed to address defence evidence bearing on culpability.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical sexual and physical offences committed against his two former wives and two daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to resolve his first daughter's earlier recantation of her allegations and by relying on her evidence to support other complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and was not required to resolve every discrete factual issue.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year and three-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit for an offender in a position of trust who sexually abused children over a substantial period.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, gross indecency, and sexual exploitation of a young relative, as well as his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or reliance on corroborative evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the trial judge correctly identified the minimum three-year range for sexual offences against a child by an adult in a position of trust, and appropriately weighed mitigating factors.