Timothy Minnema

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking recovery of property damages arising from a motor vehicle collision in which the defendant driver lost control and struck them and their property.

The insurer sought to rely on the existing statement of claim or, alternatively, to amend it to add property damage claims after the two‑year limitation period had expired.

The court held that the statement of claim contained no material facts or relief relating to property damage as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proposed amendment would introduce a new cause of action that was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply because no promise not to rely on the limitation period was established and there was no reliance.

The motion for summary judgment and amendment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for smuggling under s. 159 of the Customs Act arising from the attempted importation of a vehicle purchased in the United States.

The appellant argued that he could not be guilty of smuggling or evading duties because legal title to the vehicle was in another person’s name, making it impossible for him to pay duties at the time of entry.

The court held that the appellant had actual possession and physical control of the vehicle and therefore was responsible for declaring it upon importation.

His misleading statements to border officials supported the inference that he intended to avoid paying duties.

The court concluded that the trial judge applied the correct legal test and that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant wife brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement reached at mediation.

The respondent husband brought a cross-motion to set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, alleging failure to disclose, unconscionability, and undue influence by his own counsel.

The added respondents (heirs of the husband's father) sought to dismiss the application against them and requested occupation rent from the applicant.

The court dismissed the husband's motion to set aside the agreement, finding no failure to disclose, no unconscionability, and that issues with his own counsel did not constitute undue influence.

The court also dismissed the claim for occupation rent, finding it lacked a clear legal basis and was not equitable.

The Minutes of Settlement were upheld.

Following a family law motion to change, the successful responding party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules and the discretionary costs power under the Courts of Justice Act.

While the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs, the court adjusted the claim to exclude fees associated with a case conference where costs had not been reserved and to remove duplication arising from a change of counsel.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and proportionality, the court fixed partial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded in a reduced amount reflecting fairness and the circumstances of the litigation.

Following an eight-day family trial concerning custody and parenting time, the successful applicant sought substantial costs after obtaining joint custody and equal shared parenting.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the impact of offers to settle under Rule 18(14).

Although the applicant’s offer to settle was more favourable than the trial result and would ordinarily justify full recovery costs after the offer date, the court considered the financial circumstances of both parties and the impact on the children.

Balancing the purposes of costs awards—partial indemnity, encouraging settlement, and discouraging unreasonable litigation—the court reduced the amount sought.

A costs award of $48,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements was ordered.

The responding party brought a motion to change seeking variation of an access order providing that parenting time occur as agreed between the parties.

The other party sought termination of access, alleging persistent harassment, alcohol abuse, threats, and behaviour undermining the children’s stability and well-being.

Evidence included an Office of the Children’s Lawyer report concluding that the moving party had failed to achieve stability and that defined access would be ill-advised absent substantial progress.

Applying the Children’s Law Reform Act and the material change framework from Gordon v. Goertz, the court found a material change in circumstances and determined that the children’s best interests required termination of access.

The moving party’s motion was dismissed and access was terminated.

The moving party brought a motion for contempt alleging the respondent repeatedly interfered with his court‑ordered parenting time following a trial decision incorporating recommendations from a parenting assessment.

The court reviewed the legal test for civil contempt under Rule 31 of the Family Court Rules and the requirement that the alleged contemnor knowingly and deliberately breach a clear court order proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because the trial judgment had not yet been formally settled and both parties mistakenly believed it was not yet operative, the court found the respondent did not knowingly breach the order.

Although the respondent’s conduct in several incidents interfered with the moving party’s access, the knowledge element required for contempt was not proven.

The contempt motion was dismissed, but the respondent was ordered to pay costs due to unreasonable conduct regarding access.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Animal Care Review Board that had found a compliance order invalid for three dogs and required the appellant to reimburse veterinary costs.

The Superior Court held that under s. 18(4) of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act the appeal is a new hearing conducted de novo, not a review of the Board’s decision.

The court declined to determine whether the Board had jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter because the constitutional issue was not properly raised and the respondent did not participate.

After hearing unopposed evidence from animal welfare officers and a veterinarian, the court found there were reasonable grounds to believe the dogs were in distress and that the compliance order was justified.

The Board’s order requiring reimbursement of veterinary expenses was rescinded.

The applicant brought a motion to change a divorce order incorporating a separation agreement, seeking termination of spousal support upon his retirement and a division of the respondent’s pension based on alleged non-disclosure.

The court held that the pension had been disclosed during negotiations and that the applicant knowingly waived any claim to it; therefore the domestic contract could not be set aside under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The applicant also failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

His planned retirement at age 55 was voluntary, foreseeable at the time of the agreement, and unsupported by medical evidence showing inability to work.

The court found termination of support would significantly reduce the respondent’s income and therefore dismissed the motion.

Following a successful motion dismissing a statement of claim as an abuse of process, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $177,000.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be limited to $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis and contended that certain work related to alternate arguments on the motion should not be compensated.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to unfounded allegations of serious misconduct against the defendants and the finding that the proceeding constituted an abuse of process.

While accepting the accuracy of the defendants’ bill of costs and the complexity and importance of the litigation, the court found the amount claimed excessive.

Costs were therefore fixed at a fair and reasonable level significantly below the amount requested.

The father brought a motion to change a 2007 joint custody order, seeking primary residence of the two children.

The mother opposed and sought sole custody.

The court found that the escalating parental conflict constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, the court concluded that changing primary residence or granting sole custody would not address the core problem of parental conflict.

The court dismissed both parties' claims to change custody and primary residence, maintaining joint custody with primary residence to the mother.

The court ordered both parents to attend counseling to assist them in co-parenting and made minor modifications to the access schedule.

The applicant children's aid society sought Crown wardship of a five-year-old child who had been apprehended due to severe developmental delays and the parents' refusal to seek or accept medical assistance.

The parents opposed the application, seeking the child's return without conditions, and demonstrated a pattern of hostility and non-compliance with child protection workers and medical professionals.

The court found the child in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act, concluding that the parents failed to provide necessary treatment to alleviate the child's emotional harm and developmental delays.

Crown wardship was ordered with no access granted to the parents, as they failed to prove that access would be meaningful, beneficial, and not impair future adoption opportunities.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order, seeking custody, a restraining order, restrictions on the respondent father's online postings, child support based on imputed income, and termination or supervision of access with a psychiatric assessment requirement.

The father had a history of domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and online harassment of the mother, and had failed to pay child support despite having the ability to do so.

The court granted custody to the mother, ordered supervised access to continue, required the father to undergo a psychiatric assessment before access could be reviewed, fixed child support arrears, and imputed an income of $31,000 to the father for ongoing child support.

Following the breakdown of a long marriage, the applicant sought equalization of property, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, child support, damages for spousal assault, and a restraining order.

The respondent sought equalization, sale of property, spousal support, and contested the valuation date and other financial issues.

The court determined the valuation date to be September 1, 2007 under s. 4 of the Family Law Act and found the parties continued financial cooperation after separation did not amount to reconciliation.

The court ordered the sale of jointly owned real property and the family business with proceeds divided subject to adjustments including unpaid corporate dividends, a septic repair contribution, equalization payment, and retroactive child-related expenses.

The respondent’s claim for spousal support was dismissed and damages for historical spousal assault were awarded in the modest amount of $1,000.

Requests for exclusive possession and a restraining order were denied.

Following a family law motion in which the moving party was entirely successful, the court determined the quantum of costs payable by the applicant and respondent.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the mandatory full recovery provision for bad faith under sub‑rule 24(8).

The court found that both opposing parties had acted in bad faith by making false statements, abusing the court process, and advancing unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.

After reviewing the complexity of the issues, reasonableness of conduct, offers to settle, counsel’s hourly rate, and time spent, the court concluded the claimed full indemnity costs were fair and reasonable.

Costs of $23,887.57 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded and ordered payable immediately.

The moving party, the maternal aunt of two children residing in Kuwait, brought a motion to be added as a party and to set aside two previous Ontario custody orders granted to the children's father and paternal aunt.

The moving party alleged the orders were obtained through fraud, as the children had never habitually resided in Canada.

The court found overwhelming evidence, including Kuwaiti entry/exit records and medical documents, proving the father fabricated his claims of the children's residence in Ontario.

The court applied the test for civil fraud, added the maternal aunt as a party, and set aside the previous custody orders.

In a child protection proceeding, the father brought a motion for summary judgment seeking custody of two children while the child protection agency sought to withdraw its protection application and terminate interim orders.

The court considered whether there were genuine issues requiring trial regarding a protection finding and custody arrangements under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial on the protection finding and concluded that the younger child should remain in the father's custody based on stability and best interests, granting summary judgment on that issue.

However, a genuine issue remained regarding custody of the older child, who had been independently deciding her residence, and that issue was not suitable for summary judgment.

The protection application was permitted to be withdrawn and interim protection orders were terminated.

The plaintiff sought recovery of funds secured by a mortgage arising from an investment agreement relating to a car export venture.

The defendant argued the parties were partners and that the plaintiff should only recover his principal investment and share any losses.

The court examined the investment agreement, addendum, mortgage documents, and promissory note, finding the documentation consistently characterized the plaintiff as an investor rather than a partner.

The court concluded the defendant acknowledged a debt secured by the mortgage and that there was no evidence the plaintiff shared the risk of loss.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the balance of the mortgage together with interest.

On an interim custody motion following separation, the father sought shared parenting while the mother sought to maintain the existing arrangement that limited the father’s parenting time.

The court considered the principle that interim orders should generally preserve the true status quo unless the child’s best interests require otherwise.

The judge found the relevant status quo was the parenting arrangement prior to the father being required to leave the matrimonial home, where both parents had significant involvement in caregiving.

Given the conflicting affidavit evidence and both parents’ demonstrated commitment to the child, the court ordered an interim shared parenting regime with alternating weeks.

The court also ordered that the child’s daycare not be changed pending further order and that daycare costs be shared equally.

On a motion for temporary child support under the Divorce Act and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court considered whether income should be imputed to an unemployed parent and at what level.

The payor parent had been unemployed for several years following the loss of a high-paying job but asserted ongoing efforts to secure comparable employment.

The court held that a parent with child support obligations must earn what they are capable of earning and may be imputed income on an interim basis where prolonged unemployment persists.

Relying on prior earning history and limited evidence of current earning capacity, the court imputed income of $40,000 annually and ordered temporary guideline child support and proportional section 7 expenses.

Issues of retroactive support, retroactive special expenses, and life insurance were deferred to trial.