Hilary F.E. Warder

The father brought a motion for shared parenting of the parties' three children, while the mother brought a cross-motion for primary residence and child support.

The court found that the mother had been the primary parent both prior to and following separation.

Applying the best interests of the child factors and the principle that the status quo should generally be maintained on a temporary basis absent compelling reasons, the court dismissed the father's motion and granted the mother's cross-motion.

The father was also ordered to pay temporary child support and costs of $13,500.

The applicant mother brought motions for interim sole custody, relocation to Toronto with the children, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent father cross-moved for interim joint custody and the interim sale of the matrimonial home.

The court granted interim joint custody, finding that the mother had limited the father's parenting role.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed as there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the move was in the children's best interests.

The court ordered the father to pay ongoing and retroactive child support, as well as ongoing spousal support based on the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The father's motion for the interim sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed as it could prejudice the mother's equalization claim.

The court considered a joint submission seeking a consent order directing the parties to engage in secondary arbitration through a parenting coordinator in a family law matter.

The judge raised questions about certification, screening for domestic violence and power imbalances, and the enforceability of a term requiring execution of a future parenting coordination agreement.

The court accepted counsel's explanation that the eventual stand-alone agreement would be a family arbitration agreement governed by the Family Law Act and related regulation, and that any refusal to sign would return the substantive dispute to court.

Although the particular term was not enforceable, the court held the parties understood its limits and signed the consent order.

The parties submitted Minutes of Settlement seeking a Consent Order that included terms for secondary arbitration (parenting coordination) for future disputes.

The court raised several questions regarding whether the proposed terms complied with the mandatory requirements for secondary arbitration under the Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act, 1991, such as the qualifications of the arbitrator and the delegation of choosing the arbitrator.

The court deferred granting the consent order pending further submissions or redrafted Minutes from counsel.