Timothy Minnema

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a default divorce order obtained after an uncontested trial when he failed to participate in the proceedings.

The court considered the traditional three-part test for setting aside a default judgment—promptness, explanation for the default, and an arguable defence—but emphasized that the factors are not rigid preconditions and the ultimate inquiry is whether the interests of justice favour setting aside the order.

The respondent’s failure to participate was explained by severe disabilities and ongoing medical complications, and he raised arguable issues regarding property equalization, support, and the treatment of funds from a personal injury settlement.

The court also considered the applicant’s limited enforcement steps and subsequent settlement discussions when assessing delay and prejudice.

The default divorce order was set aside except for the prior costs award, and certain interim orders remained in effect pending further proceedings.

In a shared custody arrangement, the parents could not agree on which elementary school their young child should attend.

The court was asked to determine this specific incident of custody under the Children's Law Reform Act based on the child's best interests.

The court assessed factors including stability, proximity to the parents' homes, family supports, daycare connections, transportation considerations, school programming, and the availability of French Immersion.

Although both schools could meet the child’s needs, the court found stronger evidence regarding the programming and opportunities at the school proposed by the father, including the availability of early French Immersion.

The balance of the evidence favoured that option.

Following a four‑day family law trial concerning custody, access, and child support, the successful party sought costs including partial indemnity costs and full indemnity costs based on an offer to settle.

The court applied s.131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable and generally follow the event.

Although the successful party prevailed on the main issues of custody and access, the offer to settle did not meet the requirements to trigger full recovery costs.

After adjusting the bill of costs to remove improperly included conference and motion fees and correcting billing errors, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also permitted the costs award to be set off against existing child support arrears.

In a parenting dispute between unmarried parents of a young child, the court considered whether the father’s access should remain supervised at a supervised access centre and addressed child support.

Allegations concerning the father’s sexual behaviour and a psychological assessment suggesting prudence regarding unsupervised caregiving tasks were examined.

The court found no evidence that the father posed a risk to the child and concluded that continued highly restricted access was not in the child’s best interests.

Applying the Children’s Law Reform Act and the principle of maximum contact, the court ordered a graduated expansion of supervised access outside the supervised access centre with conditions preventing the father from bathing or changing the child.

The court also ordered prospective child support based on the father’s modest income and declined retroactive support.

The applicant mother and respondent father separated after a four-year relationship and had one child together.

The mother sought sole custody and a continuation of the father's limited access, citing his recent criminal convictions for harassment and uttering threats.

The father sought joint custody and an alternating week shared parenting schedule.

The court found that both parents were capable and loving, and that the father's criminal conduct, while serious, did not preclude joint custody.

The court ordered joint custody and an alternating week schedule, and calculated retroactive and ongoing child support based on a set-off approach.

The parties separated in 2013 and have one child together.

The mother sought sole custody and limited access, citing the father's criminal convictions for harassment and threatening.

The father sought joint custody and an alternate week shared parenting schedule.

The court found that both parents were capable and loved the child, and that the father's criminal behavior, while serious, did not preclude joint custody.

The court noted the mother's attempts to limit the father's access and her inappropriate discussions with the child.

The court ordered joint custody and an equal shared parenting schedule, along with retroactive and ongoing child support based on the Child Support Guidelines.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for an interim supervision order placing two children in the care of the respondent mother, subject to conditions.

The mother opposed a condition requiring her to consent to psychological and educational assessments for her child, who exhibited severe language delays, and opposed releasing school records.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of emotional harm due to delayed development from the mother's failure to act.

The court granted the interim supervision order and found the assessment condition reasonable and appropriate, though it removed the requirement that the mother follow all recommendations before knowing what they are.

The court considered a joint submission seeking a consent order directing the parties to engage in secondary arbitration through a parenting coordinator in a family law matter.

The judge raised questions about certification, screening for domestic violence and power imbalances, and the enforceability of a term requiring execution of a future parenting coordination agreement.

The court accepted counsel's explanation that the eventual stand-alone agreement would be a family arbitration agreement governed by the Family Law Act and related regulation, and that any refusal to sign would return the substantive dispute to court.

Although the particular term was not enforceable, the court held the parties understood its limits and signed the consent order.

In a child protection status review, the Society sought summary judgment for Crown wardship with access in its discretion, while the mother sought a further Society wardship order.

Applying the Hryniak summary judgment framework and the best-interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no issue requiring a trial on continuing need of protection, but there was a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether Crown wardship versus Society wardship was in the child's best interests.

The court emphasized the statutory permanency timeline in s. 70, but found it was still too early to foreclose rehabilitation given the parent's longstanding relationship with the child, cultural connection, and some evidence of commitment to treatment.

The request for summary judgment was therefore dismissed except for the protection finding, the application was adjourned, the existing order continued, and no costs were awarded.

The parties submitted Minutes of Settlement seeking a Consent Order that included terms for secondary arbitration (parenting coordination) for future disputes.

The court raised several questions regarding whether the proposed terms complied with the mandatory requirements for secondary arbitration under the Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act, 1991, such as the qualifications of the arbitrator and the delegation of choosing the arbitrator.

The court deferred granting the consent order pending further submissions or redrafted Minutes from counsel.

Following a six-day family law trial with divided success on property and spousal support issues, both parties sought costs.

The court found that while success was generally divided and no settlement offers triggered cost consequences, the husband took unreasonable positions on several issues, including a claim for unequal division of net family property and possession of a dog.

To sanction this inappropriate behaviour, the court ordered the husband to pay the wife $20,000 in costs.

The plaintiff hired the defendants to perform renovations on his cottage, paying $21,000 for a flooring contract and $37,000 for time and materials.

After discovering he was being overcharged and that the defendants had removed a load-bearing wall without a permit, the plaintiff terminated the relationship and sued for breach of contract, negligence, assault, and punitive damages.

In an undefended trial, the court awarded the plaintiff $21,000 for the flooring contract due to a fundamental breach.

The claims for return of the renovation monies, assault, punitive damages, and a declaration under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act were dismissed.

The defendant, the Ontario Power Authority, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for misfeasance in public office on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant unlawfully and retroactively reduced the price it would pay under the microFIT program, causing the plaintiff to lose customers and suffer financial harm.

The court applied the test for a motion to strike and the elements of misfeasance in public office, concluding that it was not plain and obvious that the claim must fail.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

This was a costs endorsement following a nine-day family law trial involving custody, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The court held that the respondent at trial was substantially successful and that none of the parties' offers to settle met the formal and substantive requirements for full recovery costs consequences under Rule 18.

The court further found bad faith by the other party, including the knowing presentation of incomplete and misleading evidentiary materials, which significantly prolonged the trial and justified a sanction.

After excluding certain conference, mediation, and other non-recoverable items, the court fixed costs at $122,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

In an interjurisdictional support proceeding conducted in writing, the applicant sought a declaration of parentage and child support.

The court found parentage established on a balance of probabilities based on evidence of an exclusive intimate relationship during the conception period, but made the declaration only on an interim basis to permit the respondent to obtain DNA testing at his own expense within sixty days.

Retroactive child support was denied because the respondent's evidence showed insufficient income while he was a student in 2013 and 2014.

The issue of ongoing support was adjourned for further evidence concerning the respondent's actual course load and whether income should be imputed retroactive to January 1, 2015.

Following a five-day family trial involving custody, residence, parenting time, equalization, and support-related issues, the successful party sought substantial costs and alternatively relied on an offer to settle for enhanced recovery.

The court held that the offer to settle provisions for full recovery were not triggered because neither side did as well or better than all terms of any offer.

Applying the costs discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules, the court weighed success, settlement conduct, reasonableness, and the responding party's severe financial hardship.

The court awarded reduced costs of $4,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The court refused to set off the costs award against ongoing child support.

In an estate litigation matter resolved by consent dismissals of a third party claim and a counterclaim with costs, the court determined the quantum, scale, apportionment, and timing of the resulting costs award.

The moving parties sought substantial indemnity costs after being sued personally for conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and interference with economic relations in claims totaling $12 million.

The court held that, although there had been no adjudication on the merits and no basis to find the claims were knowingly unsupported or maliciously advanced, the nature of the intentional misconduct allegations justified elevated costs.

The claimed amounts were reduced as excessive, and total costs were fixed at $70,000 inclusive, apportioned between the responding parties, with no deferral of payment.

The respondent mother sought leave to appeal an interim spousal support order fixing support at $1,500 per month.

She argued the motion judge improperly treated the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ceiling of $350,000 as a hard cap despite the payor’s higher income.

The court held that applying the SSAG ceiling in an interim support context was within the motion judge’s discretion and did not demonstrate a conflict in legal principles with other decisions.

The applicant also failed to show a good reason to doubt the correctness of the order or that the proposed appeal raised issues of public importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The parties separated after a short marriage and had one child.

The mother moved to Trenton and initially denied the father access, while the father remained in Kingston.

The father sought joint custody and for the child's primary residence to be in Kingston, while the mother sought sole custody and to remain in Trenton.

The court ordered joint custody, finding that the mother's actions created the communication difficulties and that the father was a capable parent.

The court ordered the child's residence to be in Kingston with an alternating weekly schedule, and dismissed the mother's claims for an equalization payment and occupation rent.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a final family law order obtained by default after failing to file an Answer to an application.

The court considered whether the respondent acted promptly, whether he had a viable defence, whether the outcome might have differed, and whether he acted in good faith.

The evidence raised serious concerns about whether the application had been properly served, including deficiencies in the affidavit of service and conflicting evidence regarding who received the documents.

The court accepted that the respondent first learned of the order when his pension was garnished and found he acted promptly thereafter.

In the interests of justice, the default final order addressing property, custody, and support was set aside.