Timothy Minnema

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order to terminate child support for his 18-year-old son, arguing the son had withdrawn from full-time educational studies.

The son, diagnosed with ADHD and depression, had struggled in high school but recently enrolled in an alternative learning centre to earn credits.

The court applied the test from the parties' consent order, which mirrored the Divorce Act definition of a child, focusing on whether the son was unable to become self-supporting due to illness, disability, or education.

The court found the son was participating meaningfully in an educational program suited to his needs and dismissed the father's request to terminate support.

The court also adjusted the ongoing support amount based on the father's increased income and reduced his life insurance obligation.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2012 consent Corollary Relief Order regarding section 7 expenses, and the respondent father sought changes to spousal support and access.

The court formalized the parties' practice of five weeks of summer access for the father.

The mother's claim for retroactive section 7 expenses for 2015 and 2016 was dismissed due to her delay in seeking the variation and the father's lack of blameworthy conduct.

Finding a material change in circumstances due to both parties' increased incomes, the court reduced the father's spousal support obligation from $1,000 to $800 per month.

The applicant mother brought motions for interim sole custody, relocation to Toronto with the children, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent father cross-moved for interim joint custody and the interim sale of the matrimonial home.

The court granted interim joint custody, finding that the mother had limited the father's parenting role.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed as there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the move was in the children's best interests.

The court ordered the father to pay ongoing and retroactive child support, as well as ongoing spousal support based on the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The father's motion for the interim sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed as it could prejudice the mother's equalization claim.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking the production of marriage counselling records from the Family Services Assistance Program.

The applicant opposed the motion, asserting case-by-case privilege based on a confidentiality agreement signed by both parties.

Applying the Wigmore test, the court found that the communications originated in confidence, confidentiality was essential to the counselling relationship, and the relationship was one that should be fostered.

On the fourth branch of the test, the court concluded that the injury to the marriage counselling relationship and the applicant's privacy interests outweighed the respondent's interest in obtaining the records.

The motion for production was dismissed.

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment on its status review application, seeking Crown wardship for four children.

The parents opposed, seeking the return of the children or a period of Society wardship.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding disposition, as the parents lacked insight and had not made sustained progress to meet the children's complex needs, and granted Crown wardship.

However, the court found the parents rebutted the statutory presumption against access, ordering sibling access and access between the parents and the children, with further submissions required for the youngest two children.

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship without access for the child A.N.L-R. The respondent mother opposed, while the respondent father did not participate.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's documented mental health issues, unstable relationships involving domestic violence, and inability to provide adequate care.

Despite the mother's arguments for more time to address concerns and claims of insufficient support, the court determined there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Crown wardship was ordered, as less disruptive alternatives were deemed inadequate and the mother's plan lacked viability and sustained progress.

The court also found that the statutory presumption against access was not rebutted by either parent.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment on all family law relief sought in her application, including child support, equalization, and access.

The parties settled equalization and ongoing child support during the hearing.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the father's access, dismissing the mother's request for an order of no access and requesting the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The court also determined the amounts owing by the father for retroactive child support, retroactive section 7 expenses, and joint line of credit payments, declining to impute income to the father for alleged under-employment due to drug use, but imputing income for the period he was incarcerated.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change seeking expanded and overnight access to her child, who has been in the custody of the paternal grandmother since birth.

The grandmother opposed the expansion and sought to reduce access due to safety concerns, the mother's inconsistent exercise of access, and the child's heightened anxiety.

The court found a material change in circumstances and determined that expanded access was not in the child's best interests, citing the mother's refusal to vet new partners and failure to prioritize the child's needs.

The court reduced the mother's access to every other Saturday and dismissed the grandmother's request to restrict the mother from bringing future motions.

The Family and Children's Services of Frontenac, Lennox and Addington brought a status review application seeking Crown wardship without access for the child X.J.F.S. The mother, K.S., opposed this, seeking a supervision order to have the child returned to her care, a position supported by the father, J.B. The court found the child to be in continuing need of protection.

After considering the child's best interests, including the mother's inability to protect the child from unhealthy relationships and the paramount need for permanence and stability, the court ordered Crown wardship.

The court also granted the mother access, finding that her relationship with the child was meaningful and beneficial, and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities, but specified that access would be at the Society's discretion with a minimum frequency of once per month.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The parties were unmarried and the respondent disputed that they were spouses, alleging a non-exclusive relationship.

The court applied the Moldowich criteria and found the applicant established a prima facie case of cohabitation since 2007.

The court also found a prima facie case for non-compensatory entitlement based on the applicant's needs and disability.

Interim spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, retroactive to the start of the year.

The applicant commenced an application against the Government of Canada and various officials, seeking $510 billion USD based on nonsensical documents he claimed were historic financial bonds.

The Department of Justice requested the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim completely devoid of merit and dismissed the proceeding as frivolous and vexatious.

During a family law trial, the respondent sought to qualify his long-time accountant as an expert to provide opinion evidence on his income for spousal support purposes.

The applicant opposed the request on the basis that the evidence was not necessary and the accountant lacked independence.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks and concluded that the proposed expert evidence was not necessary.

Furthermore, the court found the accountant lacked specific expertise in support income determination and lacked the requisite independence and impartiality, having served as the respondent's accountant for nearly four decades.

The request to admit the expert opinion evidence was denied.

The applicant Society brought a motion for summary judgment on its status review application, seeking Crown wardship without access for two young children.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing she needed more time to stabilize her mental health and substance abuse issues.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the mother's recent relapses demonstrated an inability to provide a permanent and stable home.

The court granted the motion, making the children Crown wards with no access, prioritizing their need for a permanent and stable placement.

This trial decision addresses complex family law issues following a long marriage, including child support, special expenses, and property equalization.

The court determined the appropriate income for child support calculations by imputing a portion of the applicant's employment expenses and excluding a non-recurring RRSP withdrawal.

It also clarified the duration of child support for an adult child pursuing education.

For property equalization, the court ordered the sale of the matrimonial home and a lump-sum payment from the applicant's Canadian Forces pension to the respondent, grossed-up for the respondent's future tax liability.

Claims for past special expenses were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge the legality of his detention, specifically his transfer from a minimum security institution to a maximum security prison.

The court found no relief available for his former placement issues, as habeas corpus addresses occurring deprivations of liberty, not denials of additional privileges or past concerns.

However, regarding his current placement, the court determined that the transfer to maximum security was procedurally unfair because Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) failed to provide the applicant with the Security Reclassification Scale Functional Specification (scoring matrix), as required by Commissioner's Directive 710-6 and Section 27(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations.

This failure deprived the applicant of the ability to meaningfully challenge the reclassification, even though the SRS score was overridden.

The court granted the writ, setting aside the Warden's decision and approving the applicant's transfer back to minimum security.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a consent order, seeking to vary child support upwards for their child.

The respondent father sought to pay lower than table child support based on undue hardship, citing his new family obligations and financial struggles.

The court dismissed the father's undue hardship claim, finding he did not meet the high threshold of "exceptional, excessive and disproportionate" hardship.

The court varied the child support order, increasing the father's monthly payment based on his current estimated income, effective January 1, 2016, rather than the earlier date requested by the mother, due to a history of the mother waiving previous increases.

The applicant brought a motion for production of documents from non-parties Rosen Energy Group Inc. ("REG Inc.") and the Bank of Montreal ("BMO") to investigate the respondent's alleged beneficial ownership interest in REG Inc. The respondent and BMO took no position, while REG Inc. opposed the production.

The court found the requested documents relevant to property claims and spousal support, and necessary because the respondent no longer controlled them.

It was deemed unfair to the applicant to proceed without access to information that could reveal undisclosed assets.

Despite REG Inc.'s concerns about prejudice, a confidentiality agreement was considered sufficient.

The motion for production was granted.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to strike portions of a self-represented plaintiff's pleading, including claims for misfeasance in public office, false imprisonment, arbitrary detention, cruel and unusual punishment, breach of fundamental justice, and aggravated and punitive damages.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Claims for misfeasance in public office, aggravated damages, and punitive damages were permitted to proceed, as sufficient material facts were pleaded.

However, claims for false imprisonment, arbitrary detention, cruel and unusual punishment, and breach of fundamental justice were struck without leave to amend due to a lack of reasonable prospect of success or insufficient factual basis.

The third parties moved for an order requiring the defendant to post security for costs of the action.

The court considered Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that the third parties met the initial onus.

The central issue was whether the defendant had a good chance of success on his third-party claim, which would make a security for costs order unjust.

The court found that the defendant had a good chance of success in establishing that one of the third parties was the controlling mind of the defendant's company, and that the third parties' actions may have contributed to the defendant's financial distress.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed.

A non-profit corporation operating a residence for families of children receiving medical treatment sought exemption from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)11 of the Assessment Act.

The respondents disputed that the organization provided the “care of children” required by the statutory exemption.

The court held that although the organization did not directly provide childcare, its primary function constituted a “house of refuge” by offering shelter and support to families experiencing hardship while their children received medical treatment.

Interpreting the statutory language in its ordinary meaning and legislative context, the court concluded the facility provided refuge from distress and therefore qualified for the exemption.

The application for tax exemption was granted.