Timothy Minnema

The applicant mother brought an uncontested trial seeking custody of the parties' child after relocating from Newfoundland to Ontario.

The respondent father had commenced his own parenting application in Newfoundland.

The court declined to make the substantive orders sought, finding insufficient evidence that the child was habitually resident in Ontario or that the statutory tests for jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act were met.

The court ordered the applicant to personally serve the respondent and file the Newfoundland application materials before adjourning the matter for a further hearing.

Following the successful defence of a contempt motion brought by the respondent, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $8,296.52.

The court found that the respondent acted in bad faith by bringing six meritless contempt charges to perpetuate litigation and attack the applicant personally.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments regarding impecuniosity, noting her income of nearly $100,000.

The applicant was awarded costs of $6,800, with a slight reduction due to his delay in providing benefits information.

The applicant husband brought motions to find the respondent wife in contempt for failing to provide timely disclosure, and for various other relief including the sale or winding up of their jointly owned companies and former matrimonial home, an advance on legal fees, and an extension of the limitation period to seek equalization.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding the wife's delay was not wilful or deliberate.

The court declined to order the sale of the companies or the home given the existence of separation agreements that dealt with those assets, but granted preservation orders restraining the wife from encroaching on corporate funds or the home's equity.

The request for an advance on legal fees was dismissed, and the limitation period extension was adjourned to trial.

The respondent mother brought a motion for contempt against the applicant father, alleging multiple breaches of a final family court order.

The allegations included failing to offer the right of first refusal during a medical emergency, breaching the holiday schedule, allowing unauthorized weekend access, failing to exchange the children at school on snow days, and delaying authorization for benefit information.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding that the father's actions did not constitute willful or deliberate breaches of the order, and emphasizing that contempt is a remedy of last resort not to be used lightly in family law disputes.

The respondent wife brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the applicant husband's claim to set aside their marriage contract, arguing it was brought outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the claim to set aside the contract constituted a "claim" to remedy a loss and was subject to the two-year limitation period.

The husband had actual knowledge of the issues with the contract and the wife's reliance on it by October 17, 2012, making a court proceeding appropriate at that time.

The court also rejected the husband's argument regarding incapacity, finding no reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

Consequently, the husband's claim to set aside the marriage contract was dismissed as statute-barred.

The respondent sought to vary a 2013 spousal support order, requesting a reduction to zero due to alleged unemployment and under-employment.

The applicant opposed, seeking continuation of the existing order based on income imputation.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed and under-employed, imputing income at his previous earning capacity of $130,000 per year.

The applicant's income was maintained at $20,000 per year.

The motion to change was granted only to the extent of reinstating spousal support at $3,000 per month plus medical plan costs, effective July 1, 2017, and ordering a replacement life insurance policy.

The applicant husband brought a motion to set aside a final consent order for custody in favour of the respondent wife and to impose restrictions on her travelling with the children.

The husband argued the consent order should be set aside under Rule 25(19)(c) of the Family Law Rules for not deciding a matter before the court (children's best interests not fully explored) or on contract law principles (lack of consensus ad idem, language barrier, duress, inadequate legal advice).

The court dismissed the husband's motion, finding no legal error for appellate review under Rule 25(19)(c) and that the contract law arguments (language barrier, duress, inadequate legal advice, risks of travel/absconding, FGM risk) were not substantiated by evidence under an objective standard.

While the motion to set aside was dismissed, the final order was varied by consent to include provisions for the wife to notify the husband of international travel with the children.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (OSPCA Act), alleging violations of sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the challenge regarding the division of powers, finding that the OSPCA Act's distress provisions were intra vires the province under "Property and Civil Rights." The court also dismissed challenges to specific warrantless search and seizure provisions under section 8 of the Charter, concluding that the expectation of privacy was low in the regulatory context of animal protection.

However, the court found that sections 11, 12, and 12.1 of the OSPCA Act, which granted police and investigative powers to the OSPCA (a private organization), violated section 7 of the Charter.

This was based on a newly recognized principle of fundamental justice requiring law enforcement bodies to be subject to reasonable standards of transparency and accountability, which the OSPCA lacked.

The declaration of invalidity for these sections was suspended for one year to allow the legislature to address the constitutional defect.

The applicant's unjust enrichment claim was dismissed after a six-day family law trial.

The respondent sought costs, relying on an offer to settle made under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and that her offer to settle, which proposed paying the applicant $10,000 for dismissal of all claims without costs, was more favourable than the judgment.

Considering the reasonableness and proportionality of costs, the court awarded the respondent $38,652.45 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, covering the period from the date of her offer.

The applicant's arguments regarding his financial position and health were not found to be a strong connection to the costs of the failed application.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child support and section 7 expenses against the respondent, who was incarcerated and had no income.

The applicant sought to impute income to the respondent based on his pre-incarceration earnings, arguing his intentional criminal behaviour led to his unemployment.

The court declined to impute income on an interim basis, noting that imputation is discretionary and an incarcerated parent cannot modify their behaviour to earn income.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, leaving the issue for the trial judge to determine on a final basis.

The applicant's Motion to Change child support was settled, leaving only the issue of costs.

The respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $3,390, while the applicant requested no costs.

The court found success was mixed, as the applicant's overall support payment was reduced, but income was imputed at the old rate as sought by the respondent.

The court considered factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the importance and complexity of issues, reasonableness of conduct, and the impact of the self-represented applicant on the respondent's counsel's workload.

The court determined that a modest cost order was fair, requiring the applicant to contribute to the respondent's legal costs for facilitating the settlement and drafting the order, particularly given the applicant's self-representation.

The wife's application for family law relief involved equalization of property, including a fishing boat, tax debts, and an inheritance exclusion, as well as post-separation adjustments for occupation rent.

The court dismissed the wife's claims regarding the fishing boat and inheritance exclusion due to insufficient tracing evidence.

It accepted the husband's proportional tax debt deductions.

Prejudgment interest was awarded to the wife on the equalization payment from the date of separation.

The claim for occupation rent was denied, considering the parties' financial arrangements, the wife's delay in claiming, and her benefit from property value increase.

A divorce order was granted on consent.

The applicant sought a finding of unjust enrichment, a constructive trust, and partition and sale, or a monetary award, relating to real property in the respondent's name.

The parties were in a cohabiting relationship from 2008 to 2014.

The applicant claimed he provided labour to build the house with the expectation of joint ownership, while the respondent asserted a fee-for-services agreement ($10/hour plus living expenses).

The court found a valid contract for services, negating the "absence of juristic reason" element of unjust enrichment.

Furthermore, the court found no enrichment of the respondent, as she paid more for the property than its market value, and no corresponding deprivation of the applicant, whose earnings remained consistent with his historical income.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant husband brought a motion to change seeking to terminate his spousal support obligation following his involuntary termination and subsequent retirement.

The respondent wife sought a modest reduction but argued support should continue, suggesting the husband draw on his RRSP capital.

The court found a material change in circumstances and imputed $20,000 in RRSP income to the wife to match the husband's necessary withdrawals, preventing an inequitable depletion of his assets.

Finding the parties had roughly equal assets and the wife had sufficient income capacity, the court terminated spousal support effective December 31, 2017, and ordered the wife to repay $14,355 in overpaid support.

The applicant Society brought a status review application seeking Crown wardship without access for a 20-month-old child.

The respondent parents opposed, seeking the child's return under a supervision order.

The court found the child in continuing need of protection due to the parents' ongoing domestic conflict and inability to remain separated despite extensive services.

The court ordered Crown wardship, finding the parents' plan for joint custody unrealistic.

However, the court found the parents rebutted the presumption against access, ordering access at the Society's discretion (minimum once per month) as it was meaningful, beneficial, and would not impair future adoption.

The applicant mother sought to relocate the parties' five-year-old child from Kingston to Windsor following the mother's medical release from the military and her engagement to a new partner.

The respondent father opposed the move, proposing the child remain in Kingston where the parties had previously shared custody.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, the court found that both parents were excellent and capable, but concluded it was in the child's best interests to relocate to Windsor with the mother.

The court emphasized the child's close bond with her half-brother in Windsor and the mother's long-term stability compared to the father's uncertain military posting future.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order to terminate child support for his 18-year-old son, arguing the son had withdrawn from full-time educational studies.

The son, diagnosed with ADHD and depression, had struggled in high school but recently enrolled in an alternative learning centre to earn credits.

The court applied the test from the parties' consent order, which mirrored the Divorce Act definition of a child, focusing on whether the son was unable to become self-supporting due to illness, disability, or education.

The court found the son was participating meaningfully in an educational program suited to his needs and dismissed the father's request to terminate support.

The court also adjusted the ongoing support amount based on the father's increased income and reduced his life insurance obligation.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2012 consent Corollary Relief Order regarding section 7 expenses, and the respondent father sought changes to spousal support and access.

The court formalized the parties' practice of five weeks of summer access for the father.

The mother's claim for retroactive section 7 expenses for 2015 and 2016 was dismissed due to her delay in seeking the variation and the father's lack of blameworthy conduct.

Finding a material change in circumstances due to both parties' increased incomes, the court reduced the father's spousal support obligation from $1,000 to $800 per month.

The applicant mother brought motions for interim sole custody, relocation to Toronto with the children, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent father cross-moved for interim joint custody and the interim sale of the matrimonial home.

The court granted interim joint custody, finding that the mother had limited the father's parenting role.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed as there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the move was in the children's best interests.

The court ordered the father to pay ongoing and retroactive child support, as well as ongoing spousal support based on the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The father's motion for the interim sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed as it could prejudice the mother's equalization claim.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking the production of marriage counselling records from the Family Services Assistance Program.

The applicant opposed the motion, asserting case-by-case privilege based on a confidentiality agreement signed by both parties.

Applying the Wigmore test, the court found that the communications originated in confidence, confidentiality was essential to the counselling relationship, and the relationship was one that should be fostered.

On the fourth branch of the test, the court concluded that the injury to the marriage counselling relationship and the applicant's privacy interests outweighed the respondent's interest in obtaining the records.

The motion for production was dismissed.