Dr. Christopher Cooper

The applicant sought accident benefits following a motor vehicle collision, disputing the insurer's determination that his injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued for removal from the MIG based on a concussion, chronic pain, and psychological impairments.

The Tribunal found insufficient medical evidence to support a concussion or chronic pain diagnosis, and preferred the respondent's psychological assessments which found symptom exaggeration over the applicant's assessments.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant's injuries were predominantly minor.

The applicant's claims for treatment plans outside the MIG limit, a non-earner benefit, and an award for unreasonable delay were all dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, claiming her injuries warranted removal from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) due to chronic pain and a pre-existing psychological condition.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found insufficient medical evidence to establish chronic pain with a functional limitation.

Furthermore, the Tribunal relied on a section 44 psychological assessment to conclude that the applicant's pre-existing psychological condition did not prevent her from achieving maximal recovery within the MIG limits.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was held to the MIG.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) and a special award under Regulation 664 following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent insurer denied the benefits, arguing the applicant's impairments were based on subjective complaints and her evidence was unreliable.

The Tribunal found the applicant credible and determined she suffered a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her pre-accident employment as a gas bar attendant, entitling her to pre-104 week IRBs.

However, the Tribunal dismissed her claim for post-104 week IRBs, finding she failed to prove a complete inability to engage in suitable employment, as she had successfully worked part-time jobs post-accident and failed to prove her subsequent surgeries were accident-related.

The claim for a Regulation 664 award was also dismissed, as the insurer's delay in obtaining addendum reports was not unreasonable given the applicant's delay in providing requested documents.

The plaintiff, injured in a motor vehicle accident, suffered chronic pain and pain-related depression, which was treated by her family doctor and a neuropsychologist.

The defendant moved for an independent psychiatric examination of the plaintiff by a specific psychiatrist, Dr. Monte Bail.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found insufficient evidence to warrant a psychiatric examination, noting the plaintiff had never been treated by a psychiatrist and her psychological condition had improved.

Granting the order would significantly delay the upcoming trial.

The court also made strong obiter comments that Dr. Bail would not have been permitted to conduct the examination due to previous judicial findings of lack of credibility and failure to adhere to expert duties under Rule 4.1.01.

A child protection application by Highland Shores Children's Aid Society seeking Crown wardship of two young children.

The Society alleged the children suffered physical harm and were at risk of emotional harm due to assault by the father, general neglect, parental substance abuse, and the mother's failure to emotionally support the child following disclosure of abuse.

The court found the father assaulted the older child by choking and striking her, and that both children were in need of protection.

The court rejected the parents' alternative plans for care and made both children wards of the Crown for purposes of adoption, with no parental access but with access between the siblings.

Child protection trial concerning a one‑year‑old child apprehended at birth.

The child protection agency sought Crown wardship, alleging the child was in need of protection under s. 37(2) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of harm in the mother’s care.

Evidence included prior child protection proceedings, psychological and parenting capacity assessments, concerns regarding the mother’s cognitive limitations, inconsistent access, and instability in her proposed caregiving plan involving a new partner.

The court found the child to be in need of protection and concluded that less disruptive alternatives, including supervision orders, would not adequately protect the child.

Crown wardship was ordered and the mother failed to meet the statutory test for post‑wardship access.