Stephen M. Pender

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown Wardship without access for two young children.

The mother did not present a plan of care but sought access.

The maternal grandmother's partner presented a plan for a kinship placement.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the kinship placement, noting it would essentially return the children to the same environment where they suffered neglect.

The court also found no genuine issue for trial regarding access, as the mother's relationship with the children was not beneficial and meaningful.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the children were made Crown Wards without access for the purposes of adoption.

A child protection trial involving three Indigenous children apprehended by a children’s aid society following earlier permanent guardianship orders involving seven siblings in another province.

The court examined allegations of parental instability, lack of financial and medical supports, transient living conditions, and the significant influence of the father over the mothers.

Expert psychological evidence raised concerns about the father’s paranoia and control over the family dynamic, and whether the mothers could protect the children from associated risks.

Although the mothers demonstrated appropriate parenting during supervised access, the court concluded the ongoing risks of physical and emotional harm remained significant.

Applying the Child and Family Services Act best‑interests framework and considering Indigenous cultural placement factors, the court ordered Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking supervised access for the father and findings of contempt for alleged breaches of interim orders relating to insurance, benefits, and payment of an assessment retainer.

The respondent father cross‑moved to enforce the existing access order and sought make‑up parenting time.

The court held that the parties’ highly conflictual access exchanges and the father’s conduct regarding the infant child’s feeding constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to justify a limited variation of the interim order.

The court ordered that parenting exchanges occur at a supervised exchange centre and required the father to follow the mother’s feeding directions for the infant.

The court dismissed all contempt allegations, finding the orders either not clearly breached or not enforceable by contempt.

Following a three‑day family law trial, the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $5,560.11 relying on success at trial, alleged reasonableness, and a prior offer to settle.

The court held that success at trial had been divided and that both parties had behaved unreasonably in aspects of the litigation, including disclosure issues.

The purported offer to settle was found invalid under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules because it lacked the party’s signature and contained vague, unenforceable terms regarding child support.

The court also found the offer would have been unreasonable in any event due to missing financial disclosure.

In the circumstances, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The mother brought a motion seeking interim sole custody and interim spousal support following the parties’ separation after a long-term relationship and marriage.

The father opposed and sought the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court held that the existing shared parenting arrangement constituted the status quo and that interim changes should only occur where there is clear evidence of danger or a compelling reason.

Finding no evidence that the children were at risk or that their needs were not being met, the court declined to disturb the shared parenting schedule and instead referred the matter to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer under s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The request for interim spousal support was also declined pending further financial disclosure.

The responding parent brought a motion to change a prior consent order granting joint custody with primary residence to him and weekend access to the other parent.

He sought sole custody, while the other parent sought equal time and continuation of joint custody.

The court held that no material change in circumstances had been established with respect to custody under the Children’s Law Reform Act, and therefore declined to vary the joint custody order.

However, the court found a material change regarding access and concluded that the child’s best interests required a simpler and more balanced parenting schedule to reduce parental conflict.

Access was varied to an alternating week‑on/week‑off schedule with detailed parenting provisions and revised child support.