Sorensen v. LeBlancq, 2015 ONSC 2118
CITATION: Sorensen v. LeBlancq, 2015 ONSC 2118
COURT FILE NO.: 12-0406
DATE: 20150401
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
STEPHEN SORENSEN
Plaintiff
– and –
JOHN LEBLANCQ, MICHAEL LEBLANCQ, JOHN LEBLANCQ AND MICHAEL LEBLANCQ carrying on business as LEBLANCQ DESIGN GROUP, and NORMAND J. LEBLANCQ (2001) INC.
Defendants
David M. Adams, for the Plaintiff
In Default
HEARD: March 11, 2015
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Minnema J.
[1] The Statements of Defence and Counterclaim were struck by an order of this court dated October 8, 2013. This was an undefended trial on an Amended Statement of Claim (“ASC”). A subsequent order of this court dated October 29, 2014, set out the trial process.
Issues
[2] The plaintiff at the start of the trial indicated that he was not seeking judgment against the defendant Michael LeBlancq, and on consent that claim is discontinued on a without costs basis. The plaintiff still seeks damages as set out in the claim against the other defendants as summarized below. A central issue in this trial was whether the plaintiff should receive an order that the remaining defendants are not protected in bankruptcy from the default judgment.
Background Facts
[3] The plaintiff is a man of some sophistication in the business world. He was originally from Kingston, moved away after university to have a very successful career, and when he retired in 2009 he moved back to Kingston. A man of considerable means, he pursued and eventually purchased what was essentially his family’s cottage from his youth on Howe Island, which is just east of Kingston.
[4] He wanted to make improvements to the cottage. He had looked at floor coverings on his own and then consulted with a trusted friend Susan Henry, who is a real estate agent. She recommended John LeBlancq. The plaintiff and the defendant John LeBlancq initially communicated by email. They hit it off, exchanging jokes, quips and pleasantries, as well as communicating regarding mutual outside interests. Wherever possible John LeBlancq extolled his own abilities and experience as a tradesman and dropped names of well-known people he claimed to have known and/or worked for. He touted the well-established reputation of his father as a skilled builder, implying ‘like father like son’ in that regard. These emails appear to have started on April 17, 2011, and continued after the parties first met on May 31, 2011. Further exchanges indicated that these parties were getting to like each other and were having social contact.
[5] There were negotiations for the installation of the new floor at the cottage. A contract was entered into reflected by a June 24, 2011 estimate from the defendant Normand J. LeBlancq (2001) Inc., which was accepted when the plaintiff provided a $12,000 deposit on June 27, 2011. The contract was in two stages. First there was the floor itself. It was described as “Eastern White Pine, knotty grade #2 and better”. That, and the other materials such as nails, glue, finish, brushes and paper, was $8,500. The labour for the defendant company to work the pine in its shop to make it look essentially older and weathered, was “$18,000 approximate.” These numbers were plus taxes. The second part of the contract was the site prep (removal of the old floor and baseboard) and the installation of the pine floor and new baseboard. The estimated labour and materials was “up to” $18,000, billed hourly at $48 per hour per carpenter. The total price then was approximately $44,500 plus HST.
[6] Although not specified in the written contract, John LeBlancq represented to the plaintiff that the wood for the floor would come from a moderate climate along the eastern seaboard of the United States because it was better quality, and that he would purchase it from a U.S. manufacturer he had used before. The wood was actually purchased at a local lumber yard, although the evidence does not establish where it came from.
[7] The plaintiff’s evidence was that the negotiations leading up to the written contract, and even afterward, were between himself and John LeBlancq personally and the LeBlancq Design Group which was comprised of John LeBlancq and his brother Michael LeBlancq. The contract was with John and Michael LeBlancq and not with the limited company, despite its letterhead being on the estimate.
[8] It appears from the invoices from Normand J. LeBlancq (2001) Inc. that that work started sometime in mid-July 2011. The defendant submitted time and material bills on almost a weekly basis that the plaintiff paid. Along with the $48 per hour for carpenters as noted in the contract, the defendant John LeBlancq billed himself out at $75 per hour as a designer and his brother Michael, the discontinued defendant, at $65 per hour as a supervisor. There was no objection about these rates at the time, and this arrangement appears to have been by agreement.
[9] Almost immediately after the defendants started removal work for the floor, further discussions began for full-scale renovations at the cottage involving the laundry area, living room, closets, and new window/door casings. The parties agreed that this work would be done on a ‘time and material’ basis at the labour rates noted above, and a $4,000 deposit for that work was received. There was no written contract. The plaintiff maintained that there was an implied term that the defendants would obtain the necessary building permits at the outset, although no discussion about a building permit is found in the early email exchanges. Work started immediately per an invoice dated July 22, 2012 (sic), with a redesign involving removed walls, plumbing, appliances, kitchen, carpets, trim, and furnishings. By July 28, 2011, there was a new email exchange initiated by the plaintiff regarding living room configurations and the bedrooms. Weekly bills continued to be rendered and paid without objection.
[10] On July 29, 2011, there was an email from John LeBlancq to the plaintiff with an invoice for “[m]y time on-site and in-office with design/structural review (steel beam, paint, electrical, &c)”. A proposal for a change to the front entrance was also enclosed, plus what appears to be acceptance of an invitation from the plaintiff for John LeBlancq and his wife to come to some event on Saturday. On August 3, 2011, John LeBlancq sent the plaintiff an email invitation to a paid event. The friendly emails and exchanges, including apparent socializing invitations, continued until August 14, 2011.
[11] The plaintiff’s evidence was that at some point around this time he found out that John LeBlancq was billing him for travel time to the job site, and they had a heated discussion. He also said that John LeBlancq was driving him crazy with pictures or proposals regarding other properties, some of which were reflected in the emails in evidence. However, he said it was the travel that set him off. He decided that he did not want to talk to John LeBlancq anymore. On August 14, 2011, the plaintiff sent an email to John LeBlancq itemizing a number of design decisions he had made, and listing the things he felt needed to be done. He ended by saying that Susan Henry, the friend who initially introduced him to John LeBlancq,
“… is going to help me finish this project and I will pay her for her time. She will be acting on my instruction and reporting to me and working directly with you. I will be involved but have other projects that need my attention more than the cottage. I hope you two have fun working together …… chesrs (sic) …….S”
[12] The relationship between Ms. Henry and John LeBlancq seemed to go as the plaintiff directed, although soon after John LeBlancq was again in direct email communication with the plaintiff. John LeBlancq was not thrilled at losing control over the work to Ms. Henry, and in particular decisions about sub-trades.
[13] In his oral evidence the plaintiff said that, given his significant business experience, due diligence was “part of my DNA”. However, he acknowledged that for some reason he was “asleep at the wheel” for the cottage project, which he said was uncharacteristic. He indicated that he was “a bit naive” regarding the pricing. He had a number of explanations as to how this happened. First, he said he paid less attention because of the small scale of the job; he was involved in another much more significant building project at the time. Second, he said he trusted Susan Henry who had recommended John LeBlancq and did not think the project needed to be watched. Third, he was of the view that John LeBlancq had asserted himself into the plaintiff’s life with all the banter, exaggerations and lies about his skills, and the social contact, thereby getting him to in essence let his guard down. He called this an intentional “con.” He said that Mr. LeBlancq was a “very engaging character”.
[14] On that latter point, the plaintiff went so far in argument to assert that John LeBlancq “induced him” into the contract based on many false allegations regarding his capabilities and experience. However, this was inconsistent with his admission that he had relied on the advice of his friend Ms. Henry. He further suggested that John LeBlancq was in a fiduciary relationship with him, and had asserted himself into the plaintiff’s life to gain his trust. Again, this is stretching the evidence; it is inconsistent with Ms. Henry’s introduction and her own observation that afterwards it appeared to her that the two of them had become friends. I touch on the allegation of an alleged fiduciary relationship further below.
[15] At some point in mid-August 2011, the plaintiff had another contractor who was involved on his larger project into the cottage to review the work. He came to the view that he was being “fleeced” by the defendants regarding the price of the work, and that the renovations beyond the initial floor contract were not being done right and required a building permit. Specifically, both a post holding up a roof rafter and a load bearing wall had been removed. Regarding the former, the “L” brackets that were installed by the defendants to compensate for the load appeared to be unsafe. On August 25, 2011, the plaintiff sent an email to John LeBlancq challenging him on these two points. Mr. LeBlancq responded immediately explaining that the cottage project had evolved, and as they were still in the exploratory stage of exposing the structure it was too early to get a building permit as that required an actual building plan. He also suggested that his securing the rafters with the metal brackets was only a temporary measure. However, the evidence on this point was that John LeBlancq had told the plaintiff that that the brackets were intended to be permanent. That of course was unchallenged in this trial and indeed confirmed by the brother Michael LeBlancq.
[16] As the plaintiff explained, at this point his deeply ingrained due diligence kicked back in and, referring to himself, “the hunted became the hunter.” He scheduled a meeting with John and Michael LeBlancq at the site for August 29, 2011, and arranged for a retired engineer and the building inspector to be there. He said he was convinced that the other contractor he had consulted was correct, and that the defendants either did not know what they were doing or that they were fleecing him. The plaintiff said he set up the meeting “to flush him [John LeBlancq] out.”
[17] The meeting occurred as planned and became very heated. The main issue appeared to be the support beam, and John LeBlancq maintained that the brackets were only intended to be a temporary measure and that the plaintiff was lying when he said he was told it was to be permanent. The plaintiff said that in the course of the confrontation John LeBlancq physically threatened him and threatened to burn the cottage down and to burn the pine wood for the floor, which was still in his shop. The plaintiff ordered John LeBlancq off his property and a Stop Work Order was issued by the building inspector. That was the last direct contact between the plaintiff and John LeBlancq.
[18] The original Statement of Claim was dated April 16, 2012. A Defence and Counterclaim was filed. The Statement of Claim was amended on July 31, 2012. The Defence and Counterclaim was then struck by court order on October 8, 2013. Afterwards the defendant Michael LeBlancq brought a motion to set aside that order, and was cross-examined under oath on his supporting affidavit. While he subsequently withdrew his motion, the transcript of the cross-examination was filed as part of this trial pursuant to a previous court order. Michael LeBlancq agreed with many aspects of the plaintiff’s claim. He refuted John LeBlancq’s accounts to the plaintiff of his previous work and experience.
[19] The plaintiff subsequently obtained a report from an engineer confirming that neither using “L” brackets to secure the rafters after the removal of the support beam, nor the removal of the load bearing wall, complied with the Ontario building code.
Position of the Plaintiff on Damages
[20] The plaintiff sued for (1) “$100,000 for negligence, breach of contract, and negligent and/or fraudulent misrepresentation”, (2) damages for assault of $25,000, and (3) $50,000 for punitive and exemplary damages, all with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
[21] The plaintiff indicated that the cottage project has been on hold ever since the August 29, 2011 incident, and as such he did not have estimates or evidence about the costs of remediation to repair the negligent work of the defendants. He therefore sought $58,000 being a return of all the money paid, namely $21,000 on the floor contract and $37,000 for the ‘time and material’ invoices.
[22] The plaintiff’s other contractor, Hank Doornekamp, submitted an assessment of the value of the work performed by the defendants on the cottage to date, which was essentially the gutting until “LeBlancq was terminated”. The amount was $13,358.53 including H.S.T. This assessment was admitted into evidence per a previous court order. The plaintiff’s position was that ‘set-off’ is an equitable remedy, and therefore there could be no set-off of this amount as the defendants had committed fraud.
[23] The plaintiff was therefore seeking a total of $133,000 plus interest comprised of all monies paid and the full assault and punitive damages claimed.
Law
[24] As noted Defence and Counterclaim were struck by court order, and the defendants are therefore in default. As such, they are deemed to admit the truth of all allegations of fact made in the Amended Statement of Claim: Rule 19.02(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended (“Rules”). However, those facts, and the additional evidence at trial, must still entitle the plaintiff to judgment: see Rule 19.06 and Nikore v. Jarmain Investment Management Inc. (2009), 2009 46655 (ON SC), 97 O.R. (3d) 132 (S.C.J.).
Analysis
Flooring
[25] For the floor, the plaintiff entered into a contract, and paid $21,000 on it. The contract was terminated because of concerns raised about the other renovations, and the plaintiff’s suspicions, subsequently confirmed, that the wood purchased was not what he agreed to. As John LeBlancq said he was going to destroy the wood, where it was from or what work might have been done to prepare it remains unknown. I am left with uncontested evidence of a fundamental breach of the contract, with zero consideration flowing to the plaintiff. In my view, on this evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to a return of the full $21,000 that he paid for the wood floor.
Renovations
[26] While John LeBlancq appears to have exaggerated his experience and even lied about it on the evidence before me, there was no evidence about deficiencies in his work other than the removal of the support beam and the load bearing wall. While those are very serious, and indeed dangerous, there was no evidence of the damages that they may have caused or of the costs of any remediation. Further, it is unknown whether their removal still remains part of the plaintiff’s overall renovation plans. While the plaintiff is quite angry in that he has subsequently learned that John LeBlancq greatly exaggerated his skills and experience as a craftsman, there was no evidence that John LeBlancq or his company ever got to the stage where any skilled work was actually done at the cottage. All that happened was that it was gutted in consultation with the plaintiff, and the defendants were paid $37,000. Hank Doornekamp’s evidence was that his company would have charged $13,358.53 for that work.
[27] When the plaintiff, in consultation with Mr. Doornekamp, came to the view that he was paying way too much for the defendants’ services and that the defendants likely did not have the expertise to do the engineering and structural design portions of the job, he immediately terminated the ‘time and materials’ agreement.
[28] Sometimes becoming too friendly with your contractor can be a recipe for disaster. The plaintiff here went blindly yet willingly into this arrangement. While the evidence establishes that the plaintiff was paying labour rates that he accurately describes with hindsight as “grotesque” and “obscene”, there was no dispute that he agreed to those rates. In my view he cannot, upon subsequently learning that what he willingly agreed to pay was too high, automatically get all his money back.
[29] The fast and loose nature of these arrangements needs to be noted. The contract from the floor was entered into on June 27, 2011. Already by July 22, 2011 discussions about further renovations had taken place and a deposit related to those was given. Planned renovations were determined by discussions on site and in emails that eventually also involved Ms. Henry. About two or three weeks later the plaintiff became suspicious that he was being fleeced. Emails were exchanged on August 25, 2011, and the last meeting on site happened on August 29, 2011.
[30] The plaintiff clearly agreed to the defendants’ rates, and he terminated further work immediately when he learned he was paying too much. Had he done his homework beforehand, he might have proceeded differently. I fail to see how he can rewrite the agreement after the fact. While the failure on the structural end is very serious, I am unable to provide any relief related to it without a repair or damages estimate.
Damages for Assault
[31] The plaintiff has not provided me with any case law relating to the assault claim. I am aware of the following. Assault is the intentional creation of the apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact, as distinguished from battery which is the intentionally caused harmful or offensive contact: Shaw v. Shaw, 2012 ONSC 590, 9 R.F.L. (7th) 359, (Sup. Ct.). In most cases both the assault and battery are committed in rapid succession, and if the battery occurs the assault tends to be ignored since the quantum of damages will be relatively small. This case is quite unusual in that the claim is only for assault and not battery.
[32] The plaintiff arranged the August 29, 2011 meeting seeking a confrontation. He indicated that he thought John LeBlancq was going to hit him. It was not clear from the evidence how this affected him. Indeed, while Ms. Henry in her affidavit said that she feared for the plaintiff’s safety, he himself seemed rather fearless. He went so far as encouraging John LeBlancq to hit him – “take your best shot” he said - although no punches ever materialized.
[33] As set out in Shaw v. Shaw and Graham v. Graham, [1999] O.J. No. 1984 (Sup. Ct.) the compensatory damages for assault can comprise both economic and non-economic loss. There was no evidence led by the plaintiff regarding economic loss, commonly referred to as ‘special damages’. Non-economic loss addresses the loss of the amenities of life, physical and non-physical, arising from discomfort and stress occasioned by the tortious conduct. This loss is compensation for pain and suffering, often referred to as ‘general damages’. The general damages awarded must be fair and reasonable as gauged by earlier judicial decisions. Again, no case law was submitted to me of what damages award would be suitable in this situation. The plaintiff himself did not provide any evidence of a residual or lasting fear of intimidation by John LeBlancq. No resulting discomfort or stress was noted.
[34] While there is evidence of an assault here in the technical sense, I am unable to find on the evidence and law before me any basis upon which to make a damages award.
Punitive Damages
[35] The plaintiff seeks punitive damages, essentially based on what he has alleged was the fraudulent conduct of the John LeBlancq. He has not provided me with caselaw on the test. I note the following statement of the law from Ferme Gérald Laplante & Fils Ltée v. Grenville Patron Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 61 O.R. (3d) 481, [2002] O.J. No. 3588, 2002 45070 (Ont. C.A.):
[65] The Supreme Court of Canada has provided an extensive review of the law of punitive damages in Whiten [Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257] and has provided guidance on its general application and, more particularly, on its application in a contract case. The Supreme Court has also reiterated the applicable standard of appellate review of such awards. I will simply reiterate those principles that apply to the facts of this case.
[66] The single most important feature of punitive damages that must be kept firmly in mind is that their purpose is not to compensate a plaintiff, but to punish a defendant for its misconduct, to deter the defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future, and to denounce the misconduct as meriting society's condemnation. As such, as stated in Whiten, "punitive damages straddle the frontier between civil law (compensation) and criminal law (punishment)" (para. 36). Since criminal law and quasi-criminal regulatory schemes are recognized as the primary vehicles for punishment, it is a fundamental principle of the law of punitive damages that the remedy be resorted to only in exceptional cases, and with restraint.
[67] The exceptional case is usually described as one where the defendant's misconduct was "malicious", "oppressive", "high-handed", "offensive to the court's sense of decency": see for example, Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 1995 59 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at para. 196, 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129. These incantations are well-known and they cannot be ignored. As stated in Whiten, they serve to limit "the award [of punitive damages] to misconduct that represents a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour" (para. 36).
[68] Restraint is then exercised by limiting the award to those cases of serious misconduct where punitive damages serve a rational purpose. As stated by Cory J. in Hill (at para. 197), the question is whether "the misconduct of the defendant [was] so outrageous that punitive damages were rationally required to act as deterrence?" This rationality test must be met both with respect to the question of entitlement to the award of punitive damages, and its quantum: see Whiten at para. 101.
[70] As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Whiten (see para. 67), it is in the nature of the remedy that punitive damages will largely be restricted to intentional torts or breaches of fiduciary duty, but they are nonetheless available in other civil cases where the circumstances warrant the addition of punishment to compensation.
[71] In a contract case, the plaintiff must show more than simply a breach of the defendant's obligations under the contract. Since the parties themselves define the scope of their relationship and the nature and extent of their respective obligations, the remedy for breach of contract lies in putting the plaintiff in the same position as he or she would have been if the contract had not been breached. This is the remedy to which the parties have contractually agreed and it will generally be viewed as sufficient to remedy the wrong, no matter how egregious. The Supreme Court in Whiten confirmed its decision in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 1989 93 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 193 and held that, in order to found a claim for punitive damages in a contract case, there must be an independent actionable wrong. The wrong in question may be a tort, but need not be. It is sufficient if it can form the basis of an independent cause of action at law.
[36] Fraud, other than fraudulent misrepresentation, was not pled, and while I find that the defendants were incompetent with the evolving renovations on the cottage project, and in particular in failing to address the building code requirements and the permit, in my view the facts here do not establish fraud. As touched on above and further below, I do not find a fiduciary duty here. Despite Michael Leblancq’s agreeing with the plaintiff afterwards that the price for the wood floor and the labour costs were obscene and that John Leblancq was a charlatan and dishonest, I do not find an independent cause of action at law on these facts, or an exceptional case of malicious and oppressive conduct by John LaBlancq that warrants punishment by way of punitive damages.
[Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-b-3/latest/rsc-1985-c-b-3.html) s. 178
[37] Following a previous cost award against John LeBlancq on a motion in these proceedings, the plaintiff’s counsel attempted to examine him in aide of execution of that debt. John LeBlancq was quite inappropriate with the plaintiff’s counsel. In the course of the exchanges he indicated, among other things, an intention to declare bankruptcy. The plaintiff was focused in this trial on establishing that the circumstances meet the requirements of two subsections of 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, (“BIA”), such that whatever award I make will not be released in a subsequent bankruptcy.
[38] As I indicated to the plaintiff’s counsel, I had some difficulty with this process. I appreciate that following a judgment and a subsequent bankruptcy creditors can obtain a declaration that the debt in question survives the bankruptcy relying on s. 178 of the BIA: for example see Dickerson v. 1610396 Ontario Inc., 2013 ONCA 653 at paragraphs 2 and 51. However, there is no evidence before me in this case that John LeBlancq has actually gone bankrupt. The plaintiff points to the following passage from Winfield v. Lomas, 2008 BCSC 1636 at paragraph 9 for the proposition that such a declaration can be made at trial in advance:
The question of whether a debt is released by operation of s. 178 of the BIA is not a question for the bankruptcy court. Rather, it is a question for the court with jurisdiction over the claim: Hughes. v. Graves (2001), 2001 NSSC 68, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 255.
However, I note that this paragraph continues as follows:
In Turner v. Midland Doherty Ltd. (1992), 1992 2304 (BC SC), 70 B.C.L.R. (2d) 268, for example, Hardinge J. dismissed the defendant's application for a declaration that a debt owed to the plaintiff pursuant to a judgment in the action had been extinguished. In so doing, he proceeded on the basis that the court had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, although the issue of jurisdiction was not directly addressed.
In my view Winfield establishes which court has the jurisdiction to make the s.178 declaration. It does not say, however, that this is a question for courts to routinely consider at the trial stage in anticipation of but before there is an actual bankruptcy. I am not convinced that the timing of this request is appropriate.
[39] Notwithstanding the above concern, I cannot see how the facts in this case meet either of the exceptions relied on by the plaintiff in any event. Section 178(1)(d) allows the debt to survive in the context of a misappropriation when there is a fiduciary duty between the parties. I do not see a fiduciary duty in this case. While the existence of a contract does not necessarily preclude the existence of fiduciary obligations, I fail to see how the contracts here gave broad discretionary power to John LeBlancq or how Mr. Sorenson can be characterized as a vulnerable plaintiff: see Hodgkinson v. Simms, 1994 70 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, per La Forest J. for the majority of the Court, at paragraphs 28 and 30. To the contrary, the plaintiff, as already noted, is a smart accomplished retired businessman who acknowledges making some poor initial contracting decisions, but caught them early on. He overpaid for certain work, but then confronted John LeBlancq and essentially fired him. The defendants’ invoices for the work done were being rendered and paid almost weekly, with close contact and communication about the work between the parties during what was a rather short business relationship. While the parties briefly became friends, I do not see any vulnerability here on the part of the plaintiff, and see no basis for characterizing this relationship as fiduciary.
[40] The plaintiff also sought to rely on BIA s.178(1)(e) which allows a debt or liability resulting from property or services obtained by false pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentation to survive a bankruptcy. John LeBlancq did not obtain property or services from the plaintiff. I have not made a finding of fraud.
[41] In the circumstances, I am not prepared to make the declaratory orders under the BIA that the plaintiff is seeking.
Decision
[42] The plaintiff is an altruist and a philanthropist. He is obviously a very smart and decent man. He voluntarily addressed in his evidence the obvious question as to why he would go to the lengths and expense that he has for this summary trial when, as he put it, he likely “won’t see a dime” from John LeBlancq. He explained that he felt that John LeBlancq was a bully and he was on a “crusade” to stop him, and had the means and the money to attempt to do so. As well-meaning as this may be, my decision has to be based on the law. This is essentially a contract case where the plaintiff made a poor bargain. In my view these facts do not establish fraud, which was the basis for many of the heads of the relief the plaintiff was seeking.
[43] I grant judgment to the plaintiff against the defendants except Michael LeBlancq for $21,000 for breach of contract. There shall be pre-judgment interest from April 16, 2012, the date of the original claim, and post-judgment interest at the prescribed rates.
[44] The plaintiff has already given me his costs submissions. He is seeking $49,444.85 on a full recovery basis, including H.S.T. and disbursements. Some adjustments to the Bill of Costs are necessary relating to the unsuccessful BIA requests, and in particular the exception sought based on intentionally inflicted bodily harm which the plaintiff withdrew during the hearing. Other than that, however, the accounts as submitted generally appear to be in order. In weighing costs, I am mindful of the principle of proportionality, the requirement that the costs order be fair to the parties and reasonable in the circumstances, and that the reasonable expectations of the losing litigant regarding costs be considered. I order that the plaintiff shall have his costs of the proceeding set at $32,000 inclusive of H.S.T. and disbursements.
Mr. Justice Timothy Minnema
Date: April 1, 2015
CITATION: Sorensen v. LeBlancq, 2015 ONSC 2118
COURT FILE NO.: 12-0406
DATE: 20150401
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Stephen Sorensen
Plaintiff
– and –
JOHN LEBLANCQ, MICHAEL LEBLANCQ, JOHN LEBLANCQ AND MICHAEL LEBLANCQ carrying on business as LEBLANCQ DESIGN GROUP, and NORMAND J. LEBLANCQ (2001) INC.
Defendants
BEFORE: Mr. Justice Timothy Minnema
COUNSEL: David M. Adams, for the Plaintiff
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr. Justice Timothy Minnema
Released: April 1, 2015