P. Theodore Matlow

The applicant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation for mental and nervous shock following the death of his estranged wife.

The wife died after falling from a vehicle while attempting to sell illicit drugs.

The Board denied the applicant's claim based entirely on the wife's illegal conduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board unreasonably failed to distinguish between the applicant's conduct and the wife's conduct, as the applicant was claiming as an independent victim.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The appellant was successful on appeal and cross-appeal and sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $30,000.

The Divisional Court found the claimed hours and rates disproportionately high and fixed the costs of the appeal at $17,500 all inclusive.

The court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to award costs of the trial, leaving that determination to the trial judge or an assessment officer due to a prior reservation of jurisdiction and a dispute over an agreement between counsel.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the judge excluded opinion evidence from several of the appellant's treating professionals and medical assessors because they had not complied with the expert report requirements of Rule 53.03.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's rulings, confirming that the application of Rule 53.03 depends on the nature of the evidence (opinion vs. factual) rather than the role of the witness (treating professional vs. litigation expert).

The court held that any witness seeking to provide expert opinion evidence must comply with Rule 53.03.

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Brampton's decision to remove his name from a priority list for a taxi plate licence.

The City removed the applicant after he failed to provide reliable documentation proving he met the ongoing eligibility requirement of driving a taxicab in Brampton for at least 24 hours a week for 40 weeks of the year.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the City's decision was justified, the by-law was valid, and the by-law officer did not fetter his discretion.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision regarding the interpretation of a collective agreement governing shift assignments for transit operators.

The arbitrator had found that the employer's method of assigning work on the spare board violated the agreement, interpreting provisions related to vacant shifts and wind down operators.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application.

The court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement, including her reliance on past practice to resolve an ambiguity, to be defensible and reasonable.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions granting union certification in the construction industry.

The employer argued the Board erred by accepting a union membership card from an employee who worked on the application date but signed the card later that day after being laid off.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness.

The Court found the Board's long-standing practice of not parsing the date of application into units of time of less than a day was consistent with the Labour Relations Act and its purposes.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an order compelling the Chief Building Official to issue a building permit for a residential dwelling.

The lot in question was created through a scheme involving the registration of sham deeds designed to evade the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the scheme was a fraud upon the Planning Act, meaning the deeds did not convey valid title.

As the appellant was not the lawful owner of the land, she was not eligible to apply for a building permit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a consent order implementing the recommendations of a jointly retained assessor for parallel parenting.

She argued the judge failed to consider the children's best interests and that the assessor's investigation was flawed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judge made no error in giving effect to the parties' agreement to be bound by the assessor's recommendations, and the appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error in the assessor's factual findings.

The appellants appealed a judgment awarding compensation of $228,261.41 to the respondent Estate Trustees on a contested passing of accounts.

The appellants argued the application judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and awarded a grossly excessive amount.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding errors, noting the application judge correctly applied the five factors for determining compensation and reasonably concluded the Estate Trustees' demand for releases was justified given ongoing matrimonial litigation.

The respondents cross-appealed the costs award, arguing they were denied natural justice by not being allowed to make submissions on offers to settle.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that while an opportunity should have been given, the offers would not have affected the substantial indemnity costs awarded out of the estate.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the Ontario Securities Commission sought costs.

The Divisional Court awarded the Commission costs of the appeal fixed at $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis, finding no issue of broad public interest or misconduct by staff during settlement negotiations that would warrant denying costs.

The appellant builder appealed a trial judgment ordering the return of the respondents' deposit and upgrade payments for a new home.

The trial judge found that the appellant's letter extending the closing date amounted to an anticipatory breach of the agreement of purchase and sale, which the respondents accepted, terminating the agreement.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by deciding the case on the unpleaded issue of anticipatory breach.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding of repudiation was a natural consequence of interpreting the documentary evidence and the appellant suffered no unfairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award to the third-party lawyer.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing its application to terminate a tenancy for its own use under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Board had ruled that a large corporation could not claim 'own use' of a rental unit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a corporation can occupy a rental unit through its employees or agents, such as a live-in superintendent, to fulfill its statutory duties.

The Court set aside the Board's orders and granted vacant possession to the appellant.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against their residential property.

The respondents had obtained the certificate in the context of an oppression remedy claim involving a corporate dispute.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and discharged the certificate, finding that the motions judge erred in law by applying a broad equitable discretion instead of determining whether there was a reasonable claim to an interest in land.

The court concluded that the pleadings did not demonstrate a reasonable claim to an interest in the land, as the claims were for damages and corporate remedies, not for an interest in the property itself.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission dismissing his application under s. 144 of the Securities Act to set aside a settlement agreement.

The appellant argued the agreement should be set aside due to non-disclosure by Commission staff regarding an investigation into a key witness for breaching a cease trade order.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Commission's decision not to revoke the settlement was reasonable, as the undisclosed information would not likely have affected the outcome of the administrative proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant contractor appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim for unpaid renovation fees and the respondents' counterclaim for defective work, while ordering the appellant to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by implying a contractual term requiring the appellant to provide warranties, which contradicted the express written terms of the contract.

The court set aside the trial judgment, dismissed the counterclaim, and awarded the appellant his unpaid invoices totaling $22,727.54.

The appellant subcontractor registered a construction lien after not being paid.

The respondent mortgagee posted security to vacate the liens.

The property was sold, but proceeds were insufficient to pay the mortgages.

The appellant argued the posted security should cover the full amount owed by the owner to the general contractor, while the respondent argued it was limited to the 10 percent statutory holdback.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 78(2) of the Construction Lien Act, the mortgagee has priority over all but the basic holdback, and section 44(6) prevents the notice holdback from extending to the posted security.

The moving party appealed a joint custody order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 110, finding little apparent merit to the appeal based on the deferential standard of review for custody orders.

Furthermore, the court noted that both parties sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding post-trial events, making a variation application based on a material change in circumstances a more appropriate remedy than an appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director.

The Director had screened out a complaint regarding seized funds and confirmed a decision by the Hamilton Police Service not to proceed to a disciplinary hearing regarding allegations of excessive force.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside a criminal conviction or order the return of funds on judicial review, and that the Director's decisions were reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that dismissed his application to review an order to pay outstanding wages under the Employment Standards Act.

The Board had treated his application as abandoned after he failed to attend the hearing or request an adjournment.

The Divisional Court held that the Board reasonably proceeded in his absence pursuant to its rules and found no denial of procedural fairness.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt and requiring him to reinstate a life insurance policy and designate his wife as beneficiary.

The Divisional Court found that while the motion judge did not err in making an order despite there being no current support obligation, she did err in law by ordering the appellant to reinstate a life insurance policy, as s. 34(1) of the Family Law Act only provides jurisdiction to require a spouse who already has a policy to designate a beneficiary.

The appeal was allowed in part, the penalty for contempt was varied to compel the appellant's participation in the proceedings, and a procedural timetable was ordered.