Terry Corsianos

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action, which arose from a long-standing neighbour dispute involving allegations of assault, battery, defamation, and nuisance.

The defendants argued the claims lacked merit, noting that related criminal charges had been withdrawn, and that some claims were statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the withdrawal of criminal charges did not invalidate the civil claims, and that issues regarding the quantum of damages and limitation periods for continuing torts required a trial.

The appellant developer appealed two summary judgments ordering the return of deposits paid for commercial and residential condominium units in a development.

The respondents had sought to rescind the purchase agreements based on material changes to the development disclosed in revised disclosure statements.

After the developer's financial difficulties led to receivership, the receiver conveyed the units to a third party, making performance impossible.

The motion judge found the agreements were terminated through no fault of the purchasers and ordered return of deposits with interest.

The appellate court upheld both judgments, finding the purchasers had not breached the agreements and were entitled to relief under the contractual termination provisions.

This case involved three concurrent motions: Aviva Canada Inc. sought to strike portions of the defendants' statements of defence and counterclaims, while the defendants (1843538 Ontario Inc., Fady Rony Warda, Rony Amanuel Warda, and Michael Wetzel) sought to dismiss Aviva's claim under Rule 21 and Michael Wetzel also sought summary judgment under Rule 20.

The defendants argued that Aviva's claim should be precluded by the doctrine of ex turpi causa and/or as an abuse of process, including a civil equivalent of entrapment, stemming from Aviva's 'sting' operation involving intentionally damaged vehicles and fictitious insurance claims.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions to strike/dismiss Aviva's claim, finding it was not 'plain and obvious' that ex turpi causa or abuse of process applied to prevent Aviva's action for compensatory damages.

Wetzel's motion for summary judgment was also dismissed due to genuine issues for trial regarding liability and damages.

Aviva's motion to strike was granted in part, specifically striking an itemized list of repairs as evidence from Wetzel's pleading and striking allegations of civil entrapment from the Warda defendants' pleading, but otherwise dismissed.

This decision provides supplementary reasons for costs following a motion brought by the Pappas Defendants for costs of a discontinued action.

The Master had previously awarded the Pappas Defendants $22,800.00 in costs for the discontinued action.

In this supplementary decision, the Master considered the costs of the motion itself.

The Pappas Defendants sought $10,000.00 for the motion costs, while the plaintiff argued for no costs.

The Master found the Pappas Defendants to be the successful party on the motion, but noted that the costs awarded for the action were only about one-third of what was sought, and that the plaintiff had some justification for commencing the action, and the Pappas Defendants failed to make a reasonable offer to settle.

Consequently, the Master ordered the plaintiff to pay one-third of the Pappas Defendants' partial indemnity costs for the motion, fixed at $4,300.00.

Following the plaintiff's discontinuance of a fraud action, the defendants brought a motion for full indemnity costs of approximately $65,000 under Rule 23.05.

The court held that the 2009 amendment to Rule 23.05 removed the presumptive entitlement to costs, requiring the court to exercise its general discretion.

Finding that the plaintiff had some justification for commencing the action but ultimately discontinued it for economic reasons, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs.

However, because the defendants unreasonably rejected a without-costs dismissal offer and countered with an inflated costs demand, the court limited their costs recovery to those incurred prior to the plaintiff's offer, fixing the award at $22,800.

The appellants agreed to purchase the respondents' property but failed to complete the purchase after the market declined and they were unable to sell their own home.

The respondents sued for damages and were awarded summary judgment for $135,841.24 and $8,000 in costs.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: denial of procedural fairness, misinterpretation of the purchase agreement, and improper mitigation of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three arguments and upheld the lower court judgment, fixing costs at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellants sought to review an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The original action arose from a purchase of equipment in November 2007, with default judgment obtained in March 2011.

The appellants delayed over three years before bringing a motion to set aside the default judgment, which was dismissed by the motion judge.

The appellants then appealed but failed to perfect their appeal, resulting in dismissal for delay in April 2015.

After over three years of inaction, they brought a motion to review the dismissal order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the delay extraordinary and the equities of the situation favored dismissal despite the appellants' arguable defences on the merits.

The applicant sought an order setting aside a decision by Doherty J.A. dismissing his motion for leave to intervene as an added party in an appeal.

The applicant claimed to be the effective alter ego of the appellants and sought to adduce evidence he characterized as important and not previously presented.

The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold criteria under Rule 13.03(1) for intervention as an added party, noting that the arguments he sought to make were more properly made by the appellants through their counsel.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, Henry Jung and Long Ocean Holding Ltd., brought two motions for summary judgment seeking the return of deposits plus interest for commercial and residential units in the former Trump Tower.

The defendant, Talon International Inc., counterclaimed for forfeiture of the deposits, alleging breach of contract.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the agreements of purchase and sale were terminated through no fault of the purchasers due to Talon's receivership and subsequent sale of the units to a third party.

The court also found Talon's statements of adjustments to be aggressive and overreaching, and that the plaintiffs' actions for specific performance were not a breach of contract.

The Receiver sought a declaration that a claimant did not hold an equitable mortgage against a property and had no claim against two related companies.

The claimant asserted an equitable mortgage, arguing his investment was intended for a pooled mortgage on the property.

The court found no objective evidence of a common intention between the claimant and the company's president to secure the investment with a mortgage on the property.

The claimant's request for an equitable mortgage or an equitable lien was denied, as there was no evidence that the funds reached the property-owning company.

The Receiver's motion was granted.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to properly assess the merits of the 'wrong defendant' defence, the potential counterclaim for rent and breach of trademark, and the prejudice arising from the seizure of the trademark.

The default judgment and noting of default were set aside on conditions, including the payment of costs and the return of the trademark.

The appellants appealed a Master's order requiring them to pay $49,767.47 into court as security for costs pursuant to Rule 56.01(1)(c).

The appellants argued the Master erred by effectively rescinding an agreement to pay the outstanding costs upon the closing of a real estate transaction and by failing to recognize that a $300,000 deposit held by the respondent was sufficient security.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the Master's exercise of discretion to order security for costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $200,000 for breach of a factoring agreement that was not pleaded.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that it was liable for intentional interference with economic relations and the award of $175,000 in damages at large to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the $200,000 judgment because the claim was not pleaded and would have been statute-barred.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding of intentional interference with economic relations and the damages at large award, and refused to allow the respondent to raise equitable set-off for the first time on appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for further document production, including an independent search of a defendant's emails, and costs thrown away due to a trial adjournment.

The defendants brought motions for leave to amend a statement of defence and for production of settlement agreements between the plaintiffs and other defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' discovery motion, finding they had declared readiness for trial despite knowing of the alleged document deficiencies.

The defendants' motion for production of settlement agreements was granted in part, with individual settlement amounts ordered redacted.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed from a judgment made at an undefended trial, arguing they were not properly served with notice of two preceding orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to move to set aside the underlying orders.

The court noted that an order made without notice is not a nullity but remains an order of the court until set aside.

The moving parties sought a review of a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in rejecting hearsay evidence from the moving parties' solicitor regarding their intention to appeal.

Given the short delay, the lack of prejudice to the respondent, and the arguable merit of the proposed appeal, the Court set aside the motion judge's order and granted the extension of time.

The appellants moved to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing their appeal for delay.

The panel admitted fresh evidence showing that the delay was due to the inadvertence of former counsel, who failed to provide the full explanation for the delay or evidence of the appellants' intention to pursue the appeal.

Finding that the appeal raised serious issues regarding the scope of a receiver's authority, the court set aside the dismissal orders, extended the time to perfect the appeal, and awarded costs to the appellants.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting the developer's application for declarations that the appellants were bound by agreements of purchase and sale for two hotel investment condominium units, and dismissing the appellants' application for a refund of deposits.

The appellants argued that changes to the building, including a reduction from 70 to 60 stories and changes to PATH access, constituted material changes under the Condominium Act, entitling them to rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the May 2012 disclosure statement was a revised statement under s. 74(3) of the Act and that the changes were not material changes under the objective standard in s. 74(2), as they did not reasonably affect the value of the units for investment purposes.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts arising from criminal charges related to a 1992 arson.

The court found the 63-page statement of claim to be prolix, repetitive, argumentative, and replete with evidence, violating the rules of pleading.

The court struck the entire statement of claim but granted the plaintiffs 60 days leave to amend, providing detailed guidance on how to properly plead the causes of action.

The court declined to strike the negligent investigation claims without leave to amend, noting the law in this area is unsettled.