Alexander Reuben Bogach

In a certified class action regarding the employment classification of Uber drivers and delivery persons, both parties brought motions to compel answers to questions refused during examinations for discovery.

Uber also brought a motion under s. 15(2) of the Class Proceedings Act for leave to examine ten additional class members.

The court dismissed both refusals motions, finding the refused questions were irrelevant to the common issues, overbroad, or lacked foundation.

The court granted Uber's motion to examine the additional class members, finding their evidence regarding individual choices and interactions with the Uber app was highly relevant to the common issues, necessary, and would not cause undue burden.

The examinations were limited to a half day per class member.

The appellant challenged a bankruptcy order and a related post-judgment Mareva order granted at the request of a court-appointed monitor holding a substantial judgment debt.

The court held the bankruptcy order was appealable as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and treated the Mareva order as a final order appealable under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act in the circumstances.

On the merits, the court found no reversible legal or discretionary error in rejecting objections to the monitor’s authority, rejecting allegations of collateral purpose, and refusing dismissal or adjournment under ss. 43(7) and 43(10) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court also upheld continuation of the Mareva relief as complementary to bankruptcy administration and dismissed the appeal with agreed costs.

The court granted the Monitor's application to assign John Aquino into bankruptcy and continued the Mareva order against him.

The decision addresses the requirements for a bankruptcy order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the discretion to dismiss or stay such an application, and the standards for continuing a Mareva injunction post-judgment.

The court found that John Aquino had committed an act of bankruptcy, was unable to pay his debts, and that there was no bona fide dispute with the Monitor.

The court also rejected arguments that the application was brought for a collateral purpose and found the continuation of the Mareva order appropriate.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions for intervention by various public interest groups and a motion by the plaintiff for exemption from mandatory mediation and a blanket order regarding disclosure.

The court granted intervention status as "friends of the court" to the CCPI Coalition, Amnesty International, ESCR-Net, Colour of Poverty Coalition, and Migrant Worker Coalition, with varying rights including access to productions and attendance at discovery for some.

The court also granted the plaintiff's request to exempt the matter from mandatory mediation, citing the public interest nature and previous attempts at resolution.

The plaintiff's request for a blanket disclosure order to third parties was adjourned.

All intervenors were relieved from liability for costs.

The appellants, including the directing mind of two family-owned construction companies, participated in a false invoicing scheme that drained tens of millions of dollars from the debtor companies prior to insolvency.

The trustee in bankruptcy and monitor applied under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover the false invoice payments as transfers at undervalue on the basis that the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors.

The Supreme Court held that insolvency is not a prerequisite to establishing fraudulent intent under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B), and that the directing mind's fraudulent intent was properly attributed to the debtor corporations.

The Court confirmed that the corporate attribution doctrine must be applied purposively, contextually, and pragmatically, and that the fraud and no benefit exceptions to corporate attribution do not apply in the context of s. 96 of the BIA because applying them would undermine the creditor protection purpose of that provision.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed an amendment to a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm, which imposed stricter noise limits on a specific turbine.

The Director and the approval holder brought motions to dismiss the appeal without a hearing.

The Tribunal granted the motions, finding that the appellant's grounds and requested relief focused on the original approval and general compliance issues rather than the amendment itself.

As the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the specific decision under appeal, the appeal related to matters outside its authority and had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal held a Case Management Conference (CMC) regarding an appeal of an amendment to a Renewable Energy Approval for the Niagara Region Wind Farm.

The Approval Holder failed to serve the Notice of CMC to all assessed property owners within 550 metres of the project location by the required methods at least 15 days prior to the CMC.

Consequently, the Tribunal adjourned the CMC and directed the Approval Holder to properly serve the notice.

Motions to dismiss filed by the Approval Holder and the Director will be heard at the rescheduled CMC.

At a case management conference in a certified class proceeding against Uber, the court considered whether to schedule the plaintiffs' proposed motions to amend their statement of claim and certify an additional common issue regarding an arbitration and class action waiver clause.

The defendants had already brought a motion to amend the class action notices.

Pursuant to section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to allow the plaintiffs' motions to be scheduled and heard together with the defendants' motion, and set a timetable for the delivery of materials and the hearing.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The parties disputed the wording of a Certification Order in a class action regarding whether Uber drivers are employees.

The defendants requested the addition of the phrase 'to be calculated and assessed on an individual basis' to the paragraph describing the relief sought.

The court granted the request, finding that the phrase provided true and helpful information to the putative class members regarding the potential need for individual issues trials.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice addressed disputes regarding the Notice of Certification and Notice Plan in a certified class proceeding against Uber.

The plaintiffs, representing drivers and delivery people seeking employee classification, proposed a notice plan.

Uber responded with alterations, including broader newspaper publication and inclusion of its defence commentary.

The court largely sided with Uber, approving a more robust, province-wide notice plan sensitive to language and diversity, and requiring the inclusion of Uber's legal position in the notices.

The court also apportioned the costs of newspaper notices 33% to the Plaintiffs and 67% to Uber.

This decision addresses an omnibus motion and cross-motion within a certified class proceeding concerning the employment status of Uber drivers and delivery people.

The court granted Uber's request to certify an additional common issue, which clarifies the possible classifications of the relationship between Uber and class members (customer, independent contractor, or employee).

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request to certify a common issue regarding the validity of the Class Action Waiver, finding that no cause of action had been pleaded to support such a claim.

The enforceability of the Class Action Waiver will not be determined at the common issues trial but may be addressed at individual issues trials.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against Uber on behalf of drivers and delivery people, alleging they are employees misclassified as independent contractors and are entitled to benefits under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

Uber opposed certification, arguing the relationship is idiosyncratic and relying on a new Arbitration and Class Action Waiver Clause.

The court certified the action for breach of contract and ESA claims, finding some basis in fact for common issues regarding employment status based on the standard form contracts and app functionality.

The court declined to strike down the arbitration clause at this stage, ordering that class members be given notice of its potential legal significance.