Susan Vella

The applicants sought a declaration that an option in a 1997 mining rights option agreement was void under the 21-year perpetuity period in s. 13(3) of the Perpetuities Act.

The court held, in a case of first impression, that the option concerned an incorporeal interest akin to a profit à prendre and therefore fell within s. 14, which provides a 40-year vesting period for easements, profits à prendre, and similar interests.

Applying a textual, contextual, purposive, and original-meaning interpretation, the court concluded that s. 13(3) addressed options relating to corporeal hereditaments, while s. 14 addressed incorporeal hereditament interests.

Because the option was created in 1997, it remained presumptively valid and the application was dismissed.

The franchisee applied to rescind a franchise agreement under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act, alleging material deficiencies in the franchisor's disclosure document.

The court found that the franchisor failed to disclose complete financial statements, the absence of a head lease, a negotiated agreement to lease, and the fact that the location was the franchise's first non-mall setting.

These omissions effectively deprived the franchisee of the opportunity to make an informed investment decision, amounting to a failure to provide a disclosure document.

The application was allowed, the rescission was declared valid, and the franchisor and its associate were ordered to pay $306,581 in statutory compensation, with the franchisee's loss of income claim referred to a master.

The defendant, Broccolini Construction (Toronto) Inc., brought a motion to strike various paragraphs of the Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim filed by Urban Mechanical Contracting Ltd. The motion was based on the argument that the impugned paragraphs constituted an abuse of process by attempting to relitigate issues previously determined by Sossin J. The court reviewed Sossin J.'s prior decision, which had limited Urban's claims to those within a specific "Delay Claim" carved out of a settlement agreement, excluding tort and unjust enrichment claims against Broccolini.

The motion to strike was partially granted, with specific references to negligence and unjust enrichment claims being struck without leave to amend, as they were found to be an abuse of process.

The defendants, Altus Group Limited and Jason White, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing the plaintiff, Melvyn D. Eisen (the Trustee), lacked standing to represent 13 investors in a syndicated mortgage transaction.

The Trustee brought a cross-motion seeking a declaration of standing or, alternatively, to add or substitute the Investor Beneficiaries as plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the defendants' summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the Trustee's standing and the timing of detrimental reliance.

The court also denied the Trustee leave to bring his cross-motion, concluding that adding or substituting parties at this late stage, after the action was set down for trial, was not warranted given the deliberate tactical choice made by the Trustee and the potential for further delays and prejudice to the defendants.

The respondent brought a motion seeking payment into court by the applicant for accrued and future interest under the Mortgages Act and for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d).

The applicant opposed, arguing the initial consent order for payment into court was sufficient and that security for costs was unwarranted.

The court found the applicant's financial disclosure insufficient to rebut the presumption for security for costs and ordered the applicant to pay an additional sum for interest shortfall and a sum for security for costs into court.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) which found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who did not appear for the virtual hearing, argued that the CCB failed to consider whether he could recognize the possibility of being affected by a mental condition and erred in its corroboration finding.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found that the CCB had sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment due to his illness, and that the corroborative evidence from his family was sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

This application concerned an "orphan lane" in Toronto, a private laneway whose original 19th-century owners were deceased and whose heirs could not be located despite diligent efforts.

The applicant, a corporation formed to acquire the lane and owning all adjacent properties, sought an order under Rule 14.05(3)(e) to vest title of the lane in its name and extinguish any claims from the original owners or their successors.

The City of Toronto was served and did not oppose the application, confirming the lane was private.

The court granted the order, finding that the applicant was the only party with a well-founded claim and that vesting title in the applicant would ensure the lane's maintenance as part of the redevelopment of surrounding properties.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it for failure to provide notice within 10 days of the injury, as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2015 but did not notify the municipality until 2018, after retaining an expert who suggested a potential intersection design defect.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 42(8), as he had sufficient facts to investigate a potential claim against the municipality much earlier.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The moving party insurer brought a motion under section 128(5) of the Insurance Act for the appointment of an umpire after the parties' appraisers failed to agree on a candidate to value a water loss claim.

The court reviewed the candidates proposed by both the insurer and the insureds, considering their experience in valuation, impartiality, and prior experience as an umpire.

The court appointed George R. Milnes, finding his 30-year career representing both insurers and insureds demonstrated the necessary expertise and impartiality.

The client appealed an Assessment Certificate and a Costs of Assessment Certificate issued by an Assessment Officer regarding unpaid legal fees.

The solicitor brought a motion to quash the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing the client failed to seek leave to appeal costs and failed to file objections.

The court granted the client an extension of time to appeal the Assessment Certificate and dispensed with the objection requirement.

On the merits, the court found the Assessment Officer did not err in concluding the solicitor's requisition for assessment under s. 3(c) of the Solicitors Act was not time-barred, as the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act applied.

The court also upheld the Assessment Officer's award of $39,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis to the self-represented solicitor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a Master's Order that granted leave for the plaintiff corporation's president, a non-lawyer, to represent it in the action.

The court found it had jurisdiction to set aside the order because one defendant received inadequate notice of the original motion and new facts had arisen.

Applying the test for non-lawyer representation of a corporation, the court concluded the non-lawyer was not reasonably capable of comprehending the complex legal issues involved in the litigation, which included copyright, trademark, and defamation claims.

The court revoked the leave and ordered the plaintiff to appoint a lawyer.

Following the dismissal of an appeal as an abuse of process, the Crown sought costs.

The appellant, a declared vexatious litigant, had used an alias to subvert a prior order and commence the appeal without leave.

The court found the appellant's conduct reprehensible and outrageous, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 payable to the Crown.

ICapital Financial Services Corp. brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the main action by Alireza Ghasempoor and judgment on its counterclaim against Ghasempoor and third-party claim against Atciti Corp. The court dismissed Ghasempoor's action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding his claims of damaged credit rating and unreasonable payment demand.

The court granted summary judgment to ICapital on its counterclaim and third-party claim, finding Atciti Corp. defaulted on a loan agreement, triggering Ghasempoor's personal guarantee.

Judgment was awarded for $82,250.00 plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs were fixed.

The applicant second mortgagee sought a determination of the legitimacy and priority of certain charges and an increased interest rate claimed by the respondent first mortgagee under a renewed first mortgage.

The court held that the disputed charges and the increased interest rate were enforceable and held priority over the second mortgage, as the second mortgagee was deemed to have notice of the standard charge terms permitting such increases.

However, the court adjourned the final allocation of funds to a trial of an issue to address the applicant's late allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff bank brought motions for an order amending the style of cause, summary judgment against one defendant, and default judgment against the other defendant.

The defendants had provided joint and several personal guarantees for corporate loans that went into default, leading to a receivership.

The court granted the amendment to the style of cause to include aliases.

The court granted summary judgment against the defending guarantor, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and granted default judgment against the noted-in-default guarantor based on deemed admissions and affidavit evidence.

Judgment was granted for over $3 million plus full indemnity costs.

The moving parties (the Crosslinx Defendants) sought an order under Rule 49.09 to enforce a settlement reached with the plaintiff.

The parties disagreed on the scope and form of the release to be signed by the plaintiff.

The court held that without prejudice communications were admissible to determine the scope of the settlement.

The court further held that the parties bargained for a standard general release, which implicitly includes claims over and contribution/indemnity clauses, and ordered the plaintiff to execute the release with those terms included, subject to minor clarifying revisions.

The Crown moved to dismiss an appeal brought by 'Maxine Adwella' against a decision of the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of abandoned pets.

The Crown argued that 'Maxine Adwella' was an alias for Althea Reyes, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was prohibited from commencing proceedings without leave.

The court found that the appellant was indeed Althea Reyes using an alias to circumvent the vexatious litigant order.

The appeal was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) and as an abuse of process.

The defendant brought a motion to stay or dismiss the action on the basis that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff, a UK national residing in Bahrain, had entered into an oral loan agreement with the defendant, who claimed to reside in Pakistan.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant was domiciled or resident in Ontario, or carried on business in Ontario.

The court found that while the defendant carried on business in Ontario, the presumption of jurisdiction was rebutted because there was no real and substantial connection between the loan agreement and the defendant's business activities in Ontario.

The action was stayed for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in a simplified procedure wrongful dismissal action arising from a without-cause termination after less than one year of service.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and determined the matter on the written record.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court found the plaintiff was not a senior manager or executive despite his title, but his age and the limited availability of comparable employment justified a reasonable notice period of two months.

After crediting the termination payments already made, the court awarded damages of $11,359.98 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.